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ABSTRACT
Over forty years since the Korean War, Americans 
continue to face limited war as a fundamental challenge to 
their security. In order to help the public to deal more 
effectively with the problem, this study seeks a pragmatic 
understanding of limited war (i.e., one in which it is 
possible to judge in retrospect the cumulative practical 
results of previous limited wars). In achieving that goal, 
two other objectives are sought: first, to model and
critically evaluate two types of knowledge used by 
policymakers to wage limited wars; and, second, to detail 
the development of such knowledge from its historical 
origins in the Korean War.
The first model of knowledge dealt with is the 
deductive theory of limited war. In order to assess the 
policymaking impact of the theory, the study addresses the 
following questions. What framework does the theory 
provide for limited war strategy? What variables are 
identified by the theory to which policymakers must give 
specific strategic content? What logic does the theory 
associate with the successful employment of limited war
vi
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strategy? What strategic use did policymakers make of the 
theory?
The second model of knowledge dealt with is derived 
from Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's 1984 
speech to the National Press Club. Reformulated to allow 
for a comparison of five limited-war case studies, the 
Weinberger criteria provide five open-ended questions.
What interests were used to justify the commitment of 
troops to combat? What were the political and military 
objectives to be accomplished? What were the main 
decisions regarding and consequences of mobilization? What 
were the levels and timing of public support relative to 
combat? What combination of military and nonmilitary means 
were used to achieve political objectives?
vii
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Since the Korean War, few ongoing national security 
problems have proven more difficult to understand for 
participants at all levels of the U.S. political system 
than the problem of limited war. In dealing with this 
problem, this study has two concurrent goals: (1) to model
and critically evaluate two models of knowledge (as defined 
below) used by policymakers to wage limited wars, and (2) 
to trace the development of such knowledge from its 
historical origins in the Korean War. Restating these 
goals in the form of a research question: To what extent
have past limited war efforts by the United States affected 
its involvement in and conduct of subsequent limited 
wars?1
^his study is subject to three caveats. First, 
the lessons of history are generally ambiguous and open to competing interpretations. Second, even in the presence of broad agreement on appropriate lessons to be drawn from particular historical cases, such lessons are open to misapplication to contemporary cases. Third, in order to increase objectivity and consistency in the treatment of available cases, the results of this study are left open to 
reassessment in view of alternative explanations and additional information. These caveats reflect the work of 
Alexander George, “Case Studies and Theory Development," in Diplomacy. ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press,1979), 43, 58.
1
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The primary difficulty in addressing this question is 
the general lack of recent literature providing an aid in 
judging limited war policies in contrast with the 
phenomenon's continued development as a U.S. security 
problem.2 Even allowing for recent experience in the 
Persian Gulf War, it is debatable whether the United States 
retains either the military capabilities to respond 
effectively to threats or the political consensus needed to 
persevere in war efforts. The technologies, training, 
types and uses of intelligence, and methods of operation 
developed in the past for contingencies involving Soviet 
and Warsaw Pact aggression have undergone trials by combat 
against lesser adversaries. However, such combat cannot 
fully demonstrate the ability to control the use of armed 
force. There remains the constant problem that 
disproportionate or indiscriminate force might be applied 
merely to avoid the prolongation of conflicts threatening 
domestic consensus. There is also the more subtle problem 
of being drawn gradually into costly, prolonged conflicts. 
In either case, knowledge is effectively lacking.
2An important exception in this regard is Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force (New York:Columbia University Press, 1994). Placing limited war theory in historical context, he provides strong empirical evidence of a "complex learning process" (294) whereby "the 
decisive use of force has become today's 'common wisdom'" (311) in American foreign policy. This study complements 
Gacek's work by directing more explicit attention to the democratic processes needed for the accumulation and 
articulation of empirical evidence in such learning.
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The task set for this study is to suggest and 
establish the plausibility of the view that the development 
of security policy regarding the controlled use of military 
force can best be explained inductively, by the 
accumulation of knowledge, through historical experience. 
Assuming that theoretical knowledge can best be judged 
after achieving some level of practical success, it appears 
justified to proceed with an inductive demonstration of 
such accumulation in limited war.
Two Models of Knowledge
The foregoing remarks are meant only to caution 
against the limits of knowledge in relation to 
policymaking. As a matter of course, such caution is 
appropriate in dealing with the period of limited war 
theorization and debate that extended roughly from the end 
of the Korean War through the early years of U.S. 
involvement in the Vietnam War. While the former war 
provided an impetus for theoretical work during the period, 
that work was deductive and proceeded primarily through 
logical argumentation rather than empirical evidence.3 
The resulting deductive model of limited war was not 
subject to further development after the Vietnam War but
Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).
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did give rise to a host of derivative concepts (i.e., 
deterrence, signaling/bargaining, coercive diplomacy) which 
have since undergone empirical examination by scholars.4
The deductive model of limited war corresponds to one 
type of knowledge relevant to policymakers' selection and 
implementation of strategies against adversaries, what 
George characterizes as ’’abstract conceptual models of 
strategies."5 Utilizing the characteristics attributed by 
George to such models, this study poses the following 
questions, in order to assess the policymaking impact of 
the deductive theory of limited war:
1. What "basic framework for understanding the 
nature and general requirements for designing an 
effective" limited war strategy was provided by 
the theory?
2. What were the "critical variable-components" 
identified by the theory to which policymakers 
had to give specific strategic content?
3. What "general logic" did the theory associate 
with the successful employment of limited war 
strategy?
4Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1974).
Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 137.
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4. What strategic use did policymakers make of the 
theory?
(The answers to these questions provide the substantive 
content of chapter 2).
Another type of policy-relevant knowledge referred to 
by George is "generic knowledge" of those conditions 
favoring successful strategic outcomes. Such knowledge is 
based on the "study of past experience that identifies the 
uses and limitations" of strategies "and the conditions on 
which" their "effective employment depends." Moreover, 
"generic knowledge is more useful" to policymakers "when it 
takes the form of conditional generalizations" (i.e., 
generalizations that apply under specific conditions).6
Taking these two points into consideration, along 
with the lack of recent scholarly attention to limited war, 
this study relies primarily on an existing expression of 
such knowledge in a speech by Secretary of Defense Caspar 
W. Weinberger to the National Press Club on November 28, 
1984. The speech drew on previous U.S. war experiences 
(particularly in Vietnam) to provide six criteria to guide 
decisions regarding the use of military force. Weinberger 
held that policymakers should commit forces to combat only 
after determining that: (1) vital interests are at stake,
(2) sufficient forces are sent to achieve their objectives,
(3) political and military objectives are clearly defined,
6Ibid., xvii, 138.
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(4) objectives and means are subject to constant 
reassessment, (5) prior congressional and popular support 
are reasonably assured, and (6) combat forces are used as a 
last resort.7 (The full text of the speech is given in 
appendix 1).8
In order for this study to use the five criteria as 
the basis for systematic comparisons yielding generic 
knowledge about limited war, it is necessary to keep 
certain admonitions in mind. First, the criteria represent 
prescriptive standards and must be converted into questions 
capable of yielding verifiable answers (discussed more 
fully below). Second, the criteria potentially attribute 
"a greater degree of prescience and rationality" to 
policymakers than can be justified, allowing of course for 
the role of judgment in decisions.9 Third, the criteria
7Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 433-45.
“Using the Weinberger criteria as standards of comparison offers the chance to access their historical and theoretical antecedents as well as to check the possible 
effects of the criteria on subsequent U.S. limited war 
involvements and conduct. More importantly, the criteria focus attention on the issue of informing public consensus 
through the translation of national interests into objectives and means. The idea of utilizing the criteria 
as comparative standards is based on Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Policy-Makers and Critics. 2d ed. (New York: Praeger,
1986), 265-71. The ideas expressed by Weinberger have influenced decision makers in subsequent presidential administrations, recently being reiterated under the Clinton administration by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, The Bottom-Up Review: Forces of a New Era (Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Defense, 1993).
9Crabb, Policy-Makers. 271.
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allow for reassessment of military efforts, given changing 
circumstances, but stress the need for security objectives 
to be pursued virtually irrespective of military costs.
Reformulated to allow for open-ended responses, the 
criteria provide the following questions:
1. What were the interests used to justify the 
commitment of troops to combat?
2. What were the political and military objectives 
to be accomplished?
3. What were the main decisions regarding and 
consequences of mobilization for combat?
4. What were the levels and timing of public support 
relative to combat?
5. What combination of military and nonmilitary 
means were used to achieve political objectives?
Employing these questions as comparative standards 
provides a chance to assess the degree to which the 
Weinberger criteria identify "variables and conditions that 
account for or explain the variance in the outcomes" of 
past limited wars.10 More broadly, the questions should 
contribute to a greater understanding of limited war as a 
subject of expert inquiry affected by domestic politics.
In this light, the utility of deductive, conceptual models 
becomes a matter of translating their insights into generic 
knowledge through the mediums of communication and
10George, Bridging the Gap. 120.
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participation. Developing the point more fully below, this 
study seeks a pragmatic understanding of limited war. In 
this understanding, specific limited war situations become 
subjects of reiteration in an ongoing public policy 
inquiry. Democratic political processes strengthen this 
inquiry, providing a means of arriving at consensually 
validated standards of military achievement and reassessing 
standards in view of accumulating evidence.
Defining Limited War
Before it can begin to move towards an understanding
of limited war as a subject of ongoing inquiry, this study
must first answer a question. What is limited war? A key
problem in answering this question is that cases of such
war are highly context dependent. An adequate definition
must permit comparisons without ignoring the variety of
factors that combine to produce individual limited war
outcomes. Moreover,
definitions of a complex phenomenon, . . .  are often of 
limited value; they should not be allowed to constrain 
open-ended empirical analysis of the phenomenon but should be used flexibly as starting points to facilitate such analysis.11
“Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 8.
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As a formal matter, maintaining a definitional balance 
between generality and specificity is necessary to the 
induction of military experiences.
A useful starting point is provided by the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who define limited war as ’’armed 
conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, 
involving the overt engagement of the military forces of 
two or more nations."12 General war is "armed conflict 
between major powers in which the total resources of the 
belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a 
major belligerent is in jeopardy."13 Incidents are "brief 
clashes or other military disturbances generally of a 
transitory nature and not involving protracted 
hostilities. ”14
The JCS definitions contain three major variables. 
These include the objectives (political and military), 
means (types and amounts of resources mobilized), and scope 
(location and duration of conflict as well as identities of 
belligerents) of war. Incorporating the three variables, 
the following definition is offered of limited war from the 
U.S. perspective: The overt engagement of conventional
U.S. military forces in armed conflict against other
12U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington,DC: GPO, 1989), 209.
13Ibid., 156-57.
“Ibid., 176.
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national military forces in which America's security 
objectives are not linked to threats immediately involving 
the physical survival of the nation, resources undergo less 
than total mobilization, and troops are physically present 
over some period of time.is
Certain operational features of U.S. defense policy 
can be linked to this definition; however, they are not 
applicable only to limited wars. Military operations 
generally include the following: political control over
military forces; proportional objectives and means; self- 
imposed rules of engagement; and flexible responses based 
on diverse means and a will to avoid the expansion of 
war.16
lsThe terms of this definition reflect the range of violence that occurs in limited wars. The definition permits consideration of military activities that occur in other forms of war (i.e., unconventional, nuclear) as they 
affect limited war contexts. The meanings of the main variables, as well as their relations to each other, remain contextual. In other words, the variables reflect "relationships that can be altered by deliberate acts of 
policy." Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991): 212.
Generalizations, particularly of objectives, occur at 
multiple levels of analysis and require explicit attention to the identities and environments of actors. The research goal is not only to establish coherent links between military actions and their consequences but also to distinguish which individuals and aggregations thereof 
attempt to control these consequences.
“William V. O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and 
Limited War (New York: Praeger, 1981), 222-23.
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Limited War Dynamics
1 1
Although by definition it focuses on limited wars 
fought by conventional U.S. forces, this study recognizes 
that such wars exist in conjunction with other forms of war 
(as discussed below). In other words, conventional forces 
can be used in all forms of war. Conceptual distinctions 
must permit overlaps among the forms based on that 
potential.
One form is unconventional war, also referred to as
low intensity conflict.17 Low intensity conflict is
political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing 
principles and ideologies . . . .  It is waged by a 
combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity 
conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third 
World, but contain regional and global security implications .18
Even applying the term unconventional, a partial list of
the conflict activities making up this form of war range in
violence from political and economic sanctions, through
17Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluh, Low Intensity Warfare (New York: Pantheon, 1988); Sam C. Sarkesian, The
New Battlefield (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1986); D.Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1988).
18JCS, Department of Defense Dictionary. 212.
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peacekeeping, to support of or opposition to subversion, 
sabotage, terrorism, coups, and insurgency.19
The other form is general war. In both forms, the 
potential use of nuclear weapons to supplement conventional 
forces has provided an important motive for efforts to 
limit wars.20 There is much support for the assumption, 
the one shared by this study, that the use of nuclear 
weapons other than in a deterrent capacity constitutes an 
act of general war.21
The theoretical and contextual complications 
introduced by nuclear weapons can be summarized around two 
general issues. First, when (if ever) should the United 
States begin using nuclear weapons in actual combat?
19Richard H. Schultz, Jr., "Low-Intensity Conflict and U.S. Policy, in Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern 
Technology. ea. David J. Dean (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1986), 77. Specific types of 
unconventional war activities are dealt with individually as they affect limited war. Attention is paid to the timing and significance of the activities relative to conventional conflict.
2°Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New 
York: Harper & Bros, 1961), 75-94.
21Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled? Adelphi Paper, no. 169 (London: IISS, 1981); Desmond Balland Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Aaron L.
Friedberg, "A History of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'— 1945 to 1980," Journal of Strategic Studies 3 (1980): 37-71; Scott 
D. Sagan, Moving Targets (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1989); Warner R. Schilling, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s," International Security 6 (1981): 49-79.
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Second, what means ought the United States keep in 
readiness for all forms of war?22
This latter issue is of major significance to an 
understanding of limited war and concerns military planning 
as a relatively long-term process and a process subject to 
the exigencies of any form of ongoing war. Both long-term 
and immediate plans involve efforts to anticipate 
contingencies, with mobilization occurring at various 
levels and stages in advance of and during wars. The 
purpose of mobilization is to assure the physical 
availability of types and amounts of resources sufficient 
to achieve objectives against the limiting factors (e.g., 
time, space, geography, and logistics) present in one or 
more operational environments. Admittedly, to the degree 
that these factors "are calculable with some precision, the 
military planning process, as it relates to the ponderables 
of real or hypothetical situations, may result in carefully 
prescribed and viable results."23
The conditionality of this statement is necessitated 
by the dynamic nature of war.24 The relationships between
22Richard Smoke, War; Controlling Escalation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 11-12.
23Elmer Plischke, Foreign Relations. Contributions 
in Political Science, ed. Bernard K. Johnpoll, no. 213 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 216.
2“Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," International Security 17 
(1992-93). The author explains war as a nonlinear system, 
the dynamics of which yield outputs disproportionate to
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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objectives, means, and scope produce operational limits 
relative to ongoing events. It is possible to fight wars 
of comparatively unlimited means and scope for limited 
objectives, or vice versa.25 It becomes empirically 
untenable to assume a “simple one-to-one correspondence 
between extent of purpose and extent of method" in war.26
Unable to assume such correspondence between 
objectives and means, the question of the means that should 
be mobilized before and during any form of war is 
complicated and ambiguous. Military plans are made with 
incomplete foreknowledge of the initial forms of war in 
which U.S. forces will engage and the possibilities for 
expanded engagement (i.e., in more than one war or form of 
war at a time). In order to cope with these uncertainties, 
U.S. plans and actions tend to stress the flexibility of 
conventional forces.
An indication of this stress is provided by the 
mobilization of conventional forces for combat in 
unconventional, limited, and general war. Such
inputs and irreducible interactions among variables.
“According to Smoke, War. 14, U.S. forces fought "comparatively unlimited wars" for what ended up being 
limited objectives in Korea and Vietnam. Even though this position can be contested in view of the broad objective of containing Communist expansion, the examples suggest useful counterpoints to U.S. operations in Grenada and Panama. It 
can be argued that U.S. forces fought comparatively limited wars for unlimited objectives (i.e., overthrowing hostile governments) in the last two cases.
“Ibid.
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mobilization provides for operational continuity among all 
three forms of war, enabling them to be arrayed along a 
spectrum of conflict. Rather than being an arbitrary 
matter, correspondence between the forms of war and the 
scale of conventional mobilization depends on the 
willingness and ability to deliberately control the use of 
force. Given the relative uncertainties behind military 
planning, the spectrum necessarily permits areas of overlap 
between the forms. In any particular context, these areas 
are contingent on two factors: first, the primary form(s)
of war for which conventional forces are mobilized and, 
second, the degree to which that mobilization detracts from 
the ability to support objectives in other environments.27 
These factors can combine at some point to lead to the 
supplementation of standing conventional forces with those 
that are reconstituted or newly created,28 as shown in 
figure 1.
27Relatively small conventional forces may be required for limited war (i.e., Grenada and Panama), while 
large forces may be required for unconventional war 
activities during limited war (i.e., Vietnam). Moreover, a variety of scenarios suggest possibilities for the onset of nuclear warfare to reduce chances to carry out conventional mobilization. Harvard Nuclear Study Group, "The Shattered Crystal Ball: How Might a Nuclear War Begin?" inInternational War, 2d ed., ed. Melvin Small and J. David Singer (Chicago: Dorsey, 1989), 355-68.
28U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Miliary Net Assessment (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense,Office of the Secretary, 1992), 3-1 - 3-2.
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' Reconstituted 










S General WarUnconventional War ' Limited War
Spectrum of Conflict
Fig. 1. The spectrum of conflict and mobilization of U.S. conventional forces for combat.
Source: Adapted from JCS.29
Note: The source defines the spectrum according to thegeographic scope of war. U.S. based forces include reserve components. No distinction is made between operational deployments and the onset of combat.
29Ibid. , 3-1.
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At issue above is timing, which can be defined as the 
initial engagement in a particular form of war and 
subsequent opportunities to mobilize conventional forces in 
order to preclude or carry out expanded engagement.
Subject to the timing of war, it is conceivable for plans 
and preparations to offset constraints on available combat 
resources, particularly when mobilization includes 
reconstitution efforts. In this sense, mobilization at all 
levels can be graduated into stages reflecting the temporal 
proximity of general war. At a stage furthest from the 
onset of general war, plans are general, and preparations 
involve efforts to maintain programs for resource 
allocation as well as methods to prepare and test 
resources. Examples of activities during this stage 
include the following: assuring that standby authorities,
legislation, and the Selective Service System are in place, 
maintaining a pool of trained personnel, stocking certain 
components, and continuing research and development. At a 
stage proximate to general wars, plans and preparations are 
geared to manage more specific crises. Actions can be 
taken which were prevented earlier due to resource 
constraints and the lack of more specific objectives. 
Examples of activities during this stage include surging 
production of certain weapons as well as purchasing 
hardware requiring long production periods in anticipation 
of further production increases. During a national
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emergency or war, industrial and personnel mobilizations 
are made in anticipation of further mobilization 
approaching totality,30 as shown in figure 2.
Allowing for both physical and political constraints, 
the availability of combat resources only partially 
explains the varying limits of U.S. war efforts up to total 
mobilization. There might be situations in which U.S. 
technical and numerical superiority over opponents makes 
for apparently predictable military outcomes such that 
initial mobilizations effectively preclude the need for 
expanded war efforts to achieve objectives (e.g., Grenada). 
Even in such situations, however, outcomes depend on the 
tactical and strategic uses made of available resources.31
Whatever theoretical and practical significance is 
attached to the superiority of U.S. resources as a 
determinant of U.S. military success, resources attain 
importance in general according to their effective use in
3°Ibid., 10-5.
31Tactics are the planning and execution of 
individual engagements during a war. Strategy is the coordination of engagements with one another in order to achieve the objectives of a war. Strategy determines the times when, locations where, and forces with which 
engagements are fought, providing for tactical resources and relying on tactical results. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 128, 196.
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Fig. 2. The stages of mobilization. 
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combat.33 Resources are necessary, but they are not 
always sufficient to assure successful military outcomes.
This is not to argue that operational decisions 
affecting the use of resources are more important to 
military outcomes than resources themselves. Such an 
argument oversimplifies an issue requiring more rigorous 
treatment, the variation of limits due to the interaction 
of objectives and means. Political conditions establish 
initial relationships between objectives and means. 
Political decisions influence military command and are 
influenced in turn by the political consequences of 
military decisions. Generalizing operations to include the 
highest levels of authority, the coincidence of political 
and military objectives common to total mobilization is 
also possible at various lower limits due to the ultimate 
locus of strategic responsibility in government. However 
much of political discourse is accomplished through 
military means, whatever modifications are exerted on
33Ibid., 95-97. Clausewitz (204-13) defines effectiveness according to four issues: concentrating
forces in space, holding forces in reserve to achieve successive results, using reserves for strategically decisive operations, and maximizing combat-related action (204-13). He holds that there are usually a variety of ways by which a weaker power can try to offset the conventional advantages of a stronger power. This is in keeping with his overall stress on the utter importance to 
military outcomes of moral factors, factors that "cannot be 
classified or counted" (184). He allows that the readily quantifiable physical factor of numerical superiority can be decisive in those outcomes relative to all other factors affecting them (194-97).
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policy by military decisions, the precise mix and measure 
of resources devoted to war remains subject to the 
strengths and weaknesses of political decisions.34 As has 
more recently been observed, "gross military capabilities 
provide only the ingredients from which planners must 
develop usable options," options that political leaders can 
and will use along with nonmilitary resources to achieve 
limited objectives.35
The significant question above is the degree to which 
knowledge of specific operational contexts helps actors in 
the U.S. political system to achieve their objectives 
through combat mobilizations, especially in contexts where 
war efforts undergo expansion.36 The term for the dynamic
34Ibid., 81-89, 605-08.
3SGeorge, Avoiding War. 16. The differences 
between "gross capabilities" and "usable options" are elaborated in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), ch. 1.
360f the relationship between objectives and means, Clausewitz, On War. 585-86, says that
To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized 
for war, we must first examine our own political aim and that of the enemy. We must gauge the strength and situation of the opposing state. We must gauge the character and abilities of its government and people 
and do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other states and 
the effect the war may have on them.
It is obvious that, however partial and transitory, knowledge in war must include reference to the enemy. 
Objectives and means relate to each other mainly through their interaction with opposing counterparts.
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of war expansion is escalation. Escalation is any action 
that exceeds the current limits of a war as defined by its 
more or less salient contextual features (i.e., objectives, 
means, and scope). Limits vary within and between wars 
relative to the knowledge that actors have of the 
consequences of their actions. Actors have more or less 
accurate knowledge that particular actions and opponents' 
potential reactions will interact to produce contexts 
promoting new actions that will exceed still other salient 
limits.37
Locating the dynamics of war in political knowledge 
has several implications, not the least of which is to 
reinforce the need to recognize the mutual effects of 
objectives and means. Primacy accorded to objectives as 
extensions of such knowledge is qualified by their 
adaptation to means selected over the course of a war.
Given that wars at all levels of mobilization are political 
acts, policymakers must initially determine the type of war 
in which they are engaging, judging as well as possible at 
the outset what means are needed to achieve their
:7Smoke, War. 34-35. Smoke (29) is concerned only with those cases of escalation that demonstrate a 
"potentially open-ended cyclical sequence" of events driven by less accurate knowledge of consequences. This study 
shares Smoke's concern but draws on cases of close-ended escalation to explore the interactions of several 
variables: the superiority of resources and knowledgerequirements, the salience of time constraints and the significance of immediate consequences, and the 
decisiveness of military outcomes and the quality of public 
inputs into political decisions.
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objectives.33 This holds to whatever extent that observed 
limits involve mobilization that protracts or ends combat.
Defining Pragmatism
Pragmatism is a methodology that seeks the meanings 
of concepts in their consequences for human experiences and 
actions and that provides consensual bases for truth(s) in 
the agreed opinions of those participating in ongoing 
inquiries.39 Various tenets are associated with this 
definition. These include the following: adherence to
syncretism, skepticism of a priori belief systems, belief 
in continuous interaction between the mental and physical 
efforts of humans on one hand and problems presented by 
environmental changes on the other, stress on the 
importance of contextual understanding in problem solving, 
stress on the need to constantly evaluate the relations 
between ends and means, treatment of science as a 
community-based endeavor between expert inquirers and 
others in society, acceptance of the fallibility of 
knowledge, belief in the possibility of human progress in 
terms of improving scientific methods and applying them to 
increasingly complex social problems, preference for
33Clausewitz, On War. 87-89.
39A.R. Lacey, A Dictionary of Philosophy (Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 168.
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evolutionary changes in human affairs, and adherence to 
democratic forms of association as the most conducive of 
progress.40
The above definition and list of tenets differ in 
important respects from other uses of the concept of 
pragmatism in studies of foreign policy and international 
relations. Perhaps most basically, there is a tendency for 
the label "pragmatic" to be associated with students or 
practitioners of realism.41 That label is apt in some 
regards, but is does not account for pragmatism7s regard 
for the concept of power as a means of achieving other ends 
related to human welfare.42 In a related vein, there has 
been a tendency for some scholars, working at the level of 
individual decision makers, to disassociate pragmatic 
behavior from its welfare orientation and to associate such 
behavior with a lack of principles.43
4°Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The American Approach to Foreign Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective. The Credibility
of Institutions, Policies and Leadership, ed. Kenneth W. 
Thompson, vol. 2 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,1985), 9-11; Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Diplomacy and 
the Pragmatic Tradition. Political Traditions in Foreign Policy Series, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 83-86, 125-127.
41Greg Russell, Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics 
of American Statecraft (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana StateUniversity Press, 1990).
42Crabb, American Diplomacy. 112, 227-28.
43Inis L. Claude, Jr., “The Tension Between Principle and Pragmatism in International Relations," Review of International Studies 19 (1993): 215-26; John G. Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists. 2d ed. (New York:
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In an approach to the study of collective learning in 
government, Ernst Haas uses the label "pragmatic" to 
connote a particular decision-making style among others 
combining the goals of politicians with the scientific 
knowledge used by experts in attaining those goals. The 
"pragmatic" style involves pursuit of a specific or 
singular policy outcome over a long period of time with the 
use of expert knowledge that is moving towards greater 
consensus.44 Such knowledge is systematic in the sense 
that it results in increasingly complex sets of public 
policy problems that draw on past accumulations of 
knowledge and begin to moderate competition among political 
interests. Still, politicians make selective use of such 
knowledge based on ideological preconceptions.45
This study employs pragmatism in a way that differs 
from those above in its treatment of interest-based 
politics. Power is not considered an end in itself. This
W.W. Norton, 1985).
44Ernst B. Haas, "Collective Learning," in Learning 
in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy, eds. George W. Breslauer 
and Philip E. Tetlock (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991),68-69. Haas (65) defines consensual knowledge as "generally accepted understandings about cause-and-effect linkages about any set of phenomena considered important by society, provided only that the finality of the accepted chain of causation is subject to continuous testing and examination through adversary procedures." A fuller 
elaboration of Haas' ideas on the relation of expert 
knowledge and political decisions, particularly those involving the development of international organizations, is not attempted here.
45Ibid., 88-89.
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calls into question any assumption of an objective national 
interest capable of guiding security policies apart from 
the values expressed through domestic political activities. 
Competition among interests is treated as a process 
necessary to provide information of common social concerns 
to scientific inquirers and politicians who make use of 
their knowledge. Although competition insures neither 
responsiveness to social concerns nor policies informed by 
cumulative knowledge, constant dissent and consent in 
accordance with democratic ideals are required if policy­
relevant knowledge is to accumulate from iterative 
solutions to public problems.46
Limited War and Pragmatism
The relevance of pragmatism to the study of limited 
war derives from several propositions. First, the 
phenomenon of limited war remains a central concern of U.S. 
security policy but has not been developed by scholars as 
have other concepts in the literature of security studies. 
Second, in order to understand limited war, it is necessary
46John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt, 1927), ch. 6. Democracy is defined here
as an ideal whose realization depends on social inquiry in which "the persons for whom something is a problem must themselves partake in the inquiry, must come to agreement on goals and means, and must themselves test the proposed 
solution in terms of its effects on their lives." Charles Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New 
York: George Braziller, 1970), 161-62.
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to view the phenomenon and its associated literature in 
historical context. Third, in this context, limited war 
exists as a subject of expert inquiry with consequences 
accessible to members of U.S. society through democratic 
political processes.
The pragmatic thrust of these three propositions is 
in support of public opinion as an arbiter of decisions to 
use limited military force. Short of general war, what 
constitutes an interest vital enough to prompt U.S. 
military action usually “emerges only from an authentically 
democratic aggregation of domestic preferences."47
This position ameliorates the conception of an 
objective national interest accessible only to certain 
experts or political leaders as well as the view of the 
public as capable of judging only the ideological contents 
of security policies. The improved versions of these 
policies offer empirical standards of success open to all 
members of society. These standards are attained when 
abstract, nonoperational goals are translated into 
specific, operational objectives and communicated to the 
public along with means needed to achieve them. Short of 
unambiguous threats to national security, the main
47Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 168. Notableefforts to relate security policy and democracy include Robert Dahl, Controlling Nuclear weapons (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1985) and Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1990).
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standards for judging the success of policy actions are 
those inherent in the rules governing democratic discourse 
and participation.48 Do the limits observed in wars arise 
from the efforts of political leaders to form and maintain 
consensus around objectives and means?
Apart from normative grounds for doing so, there are 
growing evidentiary grounds to suggest an affirmative 
answer. The public is generally moderate in its foreign 
policy leanings as seen in its expressions of support for 
U.S. presidents moderating their own actions towards the 
Soviet Union.49 This is supported by Shapiro and Page, 
who demonstrate that U.S. public opinion is highly stable 
and rationally responds to both domestic and international 
events.50 Moreover, public opinion is divisible into four 
stable dimensions reflecting varying degrees of willingness 
to utilize force (e.g., use force, cooperate rather than 
use force, use force only in cooperation with other
48Nincic, Democracy. 166-67.
49Miroslav Nincic, "The United States, the Soviet 
Union and the Politics of Opposites," World Politics 40 (1988): 452-75.
“Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 32 (1988): 211-47. This provides substantial 
confirmation of earlier works which "established, for the United States and several European countries, that 
sustained change in basic attitudes resulted only from repeated, dramatic events." Russett, Controlling the Sword. 93.
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nations, avoid cooperation and force).51 A key finding is 
that "a new 'post post-Vietnam' pattern has emerged in 
which public support" for the limited use of force "varies 
according to" its "principal policy objective."
Accordingly, the public can distinguish between the 
objective of restraining aggressors (e.g., Saddam Hussein) 
and of carrying on interference in other nations' political 
systems (e.g., Panama), generally supporting the former 
objective.52
The suggestion offered on the basis of the above 
evidence is that the limits in war emerge largely from a 
consensuaily arrived at balance of objectives and means 
within a domestic context. This is only to point out that 
the domestic political context of limited war is at least 
as important as its foreign context. Allowing for the 
knowledge that military leaders have of their opponents' 
intentions, communication of objectives and means is placed 
at a premium. Including the public among those involved,
5101e Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Domestic and Foreign Policy Belief Systems Among American Leaders," Journal of Conflict Resolution 32 (1988): 248-94; Eugene R. 
Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism (Durham, NC: DukeUniversity Press, 1990).
52Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force," International Studies Quarterly 36 (1992): 49-50. Jentleson's work is highly suggestive, offering insights into the potential links between changes in the U.S. conduct of war and public opinion.
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the knowledge needed to wage limited war emerges from 
specific contexts rather than abstract speculation.
The goal of this study can be restated by way of a 
caveat. Domestic consensus and pragmatism can never 
accumulate absolutely certain knowledge in judging policy 
objectives, not that such an attempt is a viable option. 
Objectivity is retrospective, "the judgment that after 
enough success and consistency in practice and prediction 
[of policy outcomes], a theoretical application works as it 
does because it gets things right."S3 Although this study 
deals directly with the question of relating past U.S. 
limited wars to subsequent involvements and modifications 
of conduct, it does not seek to validate the prescriptive 
standards established by the Weinberger criteria for 
military actions. The primary goal is to explore limited 
war as a product of expert inquiry shaped by democratic 
practice.
By way of a further caveat, democracy is not a 
panacea for an effective understanding of problems like 
limited war. Particularly in relation to this problem, 
consensus can be manipulated by political leaders (e.g., 
urges to rally around the flag). Although this problem 
inhibits informed consensus, its effects are temporary and
S3C. G. Prado, The Limits of Pragmatism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1987), 159.Pragmatism has to offer some method of ascertaining progress.
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potentially a source of negative public support relative to 
the duration of war.5*
Research Method
In order to explore the topic of limited war as a 
subject of inquiry with consequences affecting the U.S. 
public, this study employs what George characterizes as a 
"systematic progression of . . . controlled comparisons," 
the method of structured-focused comparison.55 Based on 
the definition of limited war offered earlier, five cases 
(e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian 
Gulf) are available for comparison.
Each case is asked the same set of questions, in 
order that limited war theory can be linked inductively to 
its strategic applications. These questions are a means of 
making "contingent empirical generalizations— contingent 
because they apply only under certain (specified) 
conditions, and empirical because they are derived from 
analyses of multiple historical cases." Generalizations 
are possible because the five cases are evaluated using the 
same operational concepts. The diverse contexts of the 
cases are given a common, theoretical viewpoint enabling 
accumulated findings to be applied towards subsequent
5*Russett, Controlling the Sword. 151. 
ssGeorge, "Case Studies," 59.
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limited war problems and theorization. Essentially, the 
motive for adopting the method of structured-focused 
comparison is to arrive at an understanding of limited war 
that is "neither purely descriptive nor derived from more 
general propositions about human" actions.56
Unlike early refinements of this inductive method57 
and more recent applications,58 this study derives its 
operational questions from a statement of policy rather 
than previous scholarly research.59 This statement is, as
“Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational 
Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 61 (1989): 147. According to Achen and Snidal, 
the focused comparative method is poorly equipped to 
produce systematic theoretical accumulations or to test hypotheses given its modest requirements in selecting data. 
Nevertheless, such requirements are complementary of formal, deductive theory because they generate variables, 
provide contingencies explainable by theory, and generate 
antecedent knowledge for statistics.
57George "Case Studies"; George and Smoke,Deterrence: Smoke, War.
“Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.— Soviet Security Cooperation 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Paul K. Huth,
Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni,Israel and Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1988).
59Those employing the method of structured-focused comparison seek to provide theory that is policy relevant 
and offers operational knowledge of potential use to decision makers, Smoke, War. 305-315. The use of focused 
comparison by this study reverses such an emphasis under the assumption that operational standards already in use by decision makers represent accumulated knowledge of potential use to scholars. In either direction of influence, knowledge should be regarded as impartial and improvable rather than as doctrine.
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will be recalled, the Weinberger speech. This choice 
offers a good opportunity not only to relate the theory of 
limited war to its practice but also to explore more 
broadly the relation between scientific inquiry and public 
opinion.
In answering these questions, this study makes use of 
both primary and secondary resources. Primary 
documentation consists of a range of sources. Official 
statements of policy are found in numerous speech texts and 
public papers. The operational aspects of those statements 
are laid out in various'directives, enactments, and 
regulations. The texts of agreements, mutual declarations, 
resolutions, treaties, and other negotiations supplement 
the treatment of policy objectives.
Public support is to be primarily documented from 
Congressional voting records and public opinion polls. The 
main sources for this study's polling data, when not 
available from secondary sources, are the Roper 
Organization,60 with the addition of various other news 
polls.
It bears note that this study is not intended as 
primary historical research. When needed, secondary 
materials should aid the incorporation of competing 
explanations into the body of the study. Allowing for
60Public Opinion Online, Available: Lexis/Nexis,
Library: Market, File: RPOLL.
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successful challenges from later scholars or additional 
cases, the responses provided to the questions above are 
provisional.
Plan of the Study
In chapter 2, deductive limited war theory is 
analyzed in historical context. The stress is on the 
policymaking influence of the theory. Chapter 3 deals with 
the Korean War. Primary attention is paid to the relevance 
of the war to the subsequent development of theory.
Chapter 4 deals with the Vietnam War. Attention is 
directed towards the application of limited war theory and 
its effects on strategy as an instrument of negotiation. 
Chapters 5 and 6 deal, respectively, with U.S. 
interventions in Grenada and Panama. These two chapters 
offer important insights into limited warfare. Attention 
is drawn to the relation between decisive military action 
and possibilities for informed public debate as well as to 
the examples set by those two wars for the use of decisive 
force. Chapter 7 deals with the Persian Gulf War.
Emphasis is on the danger of drawing "too many" lessons 
from a clear political and military success. Chapter 8 
draws out the theoretical implications of the case studies.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DEDUCTIVE THEORY OF LIMITED WAR
The deductive theory of limited war has not undergone 
a great degree of development since the Vietnam War.
Viewed in its historical context, however, the theory 
becomes part of a wide public policy debate. Even though 
marked by a general lack of recent scholarly attention, the 
phenomenon with which the theory deals remains a vital 
concern of U.S. security.1
At the beginning of an important early essay tracing 
the theory's development, it is stated that the "need for a 
capability and doctrine for fighting limited local wars was
1In a field of such policy relevance as security studies, there are several reasons why limited war qua limited war is not a source of scholarly debate. Walt, 
Renaissance. 217-18, would remark that limited war theory was part of the "golden age" in the field of security studies but did not survive the Vietnam War to be part of a 
later “renaissance," among whose "most important developments . . . was greater reliance on history." Given its logical development from the single case of the Korean War and subsequent strategic application in Vietnam, one might argue that the theory fell into disrepute among 
scholars seeking a public forum for their research. More likely is the position that the theory, although developing as far as it could solely based on general principles, at least survives in terms of its strategic applications, Osgood, Limited War Revisited.
35
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accepted slowly and reluctantly by Americans.”2 Following 
the application of such capabilities and doctrines in the 
Vietnam War, another treatment holds that limited war 
strategy "not only survived" that war "but continued to 
expand in application and acceptance."3
The central theme in these observations is that of 
policy-relevant theory and its subsequent application and 
modification under conditions of public scrutiny. This 
chapter should contribute to an increased understanding of 
security policy as an inquiry process involving the 
democratic selection and evaluation of knowledge by 
detailing the following: (1) the historical background of
the deductive theory of limited war, (2) the basic 
framework provided by the theory for "effective" strategy, 
(3) the critical variables identified by the theory for 
strategy, (4) the general logic identified by the theory 
for strategy, (5) the strategic uses made by policymakers 
of the theory, and (6) the exposure of the theory to 
political consequences.
Norton H. Halperin, Limited War. Occasional Papers 
in International Affairs, no. 3 (Cambridge, MA: Center forInternational Affairs, Harvard University, 1962; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1973), 1.
30sgood, Limited War Revisited. 10. For a more detailed treatment of limited war theory and its literature, see Gacek, The Logic of Force.
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The deductive theory of limited war developed 
primarily in response to two historical events; first, the 
deliberate political restraint of military efforts during 
the Korean War? and second, the subsequent enunciation of 
the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation.4 The 
significance of the first event lies in the proximity of 
World War II, with its outcome of total victory, to the 
Korean War as well as in President Truman's removal of 
Douglas MacArthur from command in the latter war.s The 
significance of the second event lies in the fears 
generated by the stark terms with which John Foster Dulles 
originally put forth the doctrine of massive retaliation.6
It is an understatement to point out that these two 
events affected the tone and content of public debate over 
limited war. In particular, this debate can be discerned
4The literature on limited war actually predates the Korean War, extending back to the efforts of the 
Clausewitzian student Basil H. Liddell Hart, "War Limited," Harper's Magazine. March 1946, 193-203; and Basil H.Liddell Hart, Revolution in Warfare (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1947).
A national security report made to President Truman before the Korean War, NSC-68, anticipated the nuclear and conventional force needs for responding to general and 
limited wars. Paul H. Nitze, "Limited War or Massive Retaliation?" The Reporter. 5 September 1957, 40-42.
George and Smoke, Deterrence. 23-27.
‘Xouis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York; Harper & Row, 1967), 276-82.
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in the relationship between the theory and its strategic 
applications.
Basic Framework
The primary impetus for theorization concerning 
limited war was the prospect of confronting localized 
Communist aggression with massive nuclear retaliation.7 
Not only were the deterrent effects of such retaliation 
called into serious question,® but it was also argued that 
the very existence of nuclear capabilities made it vital to 
develop alternatives that could be more easily controlled 
in actual use.9
7Halperin, Limited War. 2-3. The Truman administration sought to reduce military expenditures in 
order to provide more money for European recovery under the Marshall Plan. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, however, the administration stressed the buildup of conventional forces to defend Europe. Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1980), 163-73. The Eisenhower 
administration stressed nuclear capabilities both to reduce the burden of defense spending on a prosperous U.S. 
economy, Ronald Ritchie, NATO (Toronto, ON: Ryerson Press,1956), 14, and to deter overt Communist aggression, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1982), 121-22.
“William W. Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence," in Military Policy and National Security, ed. 
William W. Kaufmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1956), 12-38.
9Bernard Brodie, "Unlimited Weapons and Limited War," The Reporter (18 November 1954): 16-21; Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1959).
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Could nuclear weapons form part of U.S. limited war 
capabilities?10 One position on this issue was that 
nuclear weapons should form part only of U.S. general war 
capabilities, being restricted even then to strikes against 
military targets.11 Moreover, the potential productivity 
of the U.S. economy was seen as grounds for pursuing wars 
of conventional attrition, allowing for the possibility of 
using tactical nuclear weapons.12 With stress laid on the 
distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, 
it was argued not only that the former weapons could be 
used in limited warfare but also that such use was the only 
alternative to general war.13 A more nuanced approach 
stressed the need to develop conventional armaments without 
foregoing the use of tactical nuclear weapons as well as to
10Halperin, Limited War (4) indicates that this question was affected by the increasing U.S. stockpile of material from which to produce tactical nuclear weapons. Coupled with the French defeat in Indochina, the 
possibility of larger numbers of tactical nuclear weapons led to a large public debate over their use.
“Paul H. Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy," Foreign Affairs 34 (January 1956): 188-98.
12Henry A. Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the 'Grey Areas,/H Foreign Affairs 33 (April 1955): 416- 28.
“Anthony Buzzard, "Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence,” World Politics 8 (January 1956): 
228-37; Denis Healey, "Tactical Nuclear Defense," New Republic. 9 January 1956, 8-9.
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develop limitations through a differentiated view of 
warfare at all levels.1*
Critical Variables
A key issue in the development of limitations was the 
relationship between objectives and means. An important 
step in arousing theoretical debate over this issue was 
taken by Osgood. He argued that Americans, unlike the 
Soviets, did not understand the political nature of warfare 
as an instrument of diplomacy, an instrument to be combined 
with other instruments (i.e., economic) in the furtherance 
of U.S. interests. Developing the Clausewitzian notion of 
the primacy of politics, Osgood argued that war was only an 
expression of political conflict at a higher level. Given 
the limitation of war by policy makers, military forces 
were to be treated only as a means of negotiating with 
enemies. In order for the United States to possess a 
successful limited war strategy, the author stressed the 
need to reorient American attitudes from their traditional 
adherence to complete military victory and military 
autonomy from political influence towards greater
“Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955); Raymond Aron, "Can War in the Atomic Age Be Limited? Confluence 5 (July 1956): 99-114; Raymond Aron, On War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959).
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acceptance of limited military objectives decided on by 
political leaders.15
Kissinger shared the above concern with establishing 
the primacy of politics, but he also offered positive 
suggestions for formulating a U.S. limited war strategy.
The strategy suggested was continued reliance on nuclear 
weapons in limited war. He linked the prospects for 
adhering to limits upon the use of these weapons to the 
maintenance of limited political objectives.15
Challenges emerged to the notion that limited 
political objectives could prove themselves sufficient to 
limit military efforts. Rather than limited political 
objectives, the destructive potential of nuclear weapons 
and the corresponding desires among combatants to avoid 
their use were identified as critical variables in limiting 
wars.17 Relaxing the stress on the connection between 
political objectives and chances for limiting the use of 
nuclear weapons produced arguments to build up conventional 
forces.18
15Robert E. Osgood, Limited War (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1957).
“Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons.
“Bernard Brodie, "More About Limited War," World Politics 10 (October 1957): 112-122; William W. Kaufmann,
"The Crisis in Military Affairs," World Politics 10 (July 1958): 579-603.
“Kissinger, Necessity for Choice. Both Osgood and Kissinger were apprehensive of the U.S. public's ability to accept and understand limited war efforts. This view
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Early theory had recognized such tangible factors as 
geography and weapons as the most crucial sources of limits 
in war.19 Taking up the question of such physical 
variables, Schelling used them in his development of a 
theory of bargaining between competing nations. Limits 
were seen as the mutually recognized product of combatants' 
actions. Apart from actions directly intended to achieve 
objectives, military activities could also be conducted as 
a process of bargaining. Carried out as a part of 
bargaining, military activities were linked by Schelling to 
salient contextual factors (i.e., weaponry, geography) 
recognized by all combatants. Limits were seen to expand 
relative to the strength of communicated intentions between 
interacting opponents. The threat of escalation to total 
war became part of a bargaining strategy that could either 
reduce or increase the level of conflict.20
typifies what Nincic, Democracy (ch. 1) calls the realist thesis of "disruption from below" in relation to popular 
pressures on foreign policy.
19William W. Kaufmann, "Limited Warfare," in Military Policy and National Security, ed. William W. 
Kaufmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1956), 102-36.
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Thomas C.Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press, 1966).
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4 3
By the early 1960s, a general consensus had emerged 
among theorists, political leaders, and military 
strategists on the need for a doctrine and capabilities to 
confront enemies short of recourse to total war. Based on 
logic and speculation, the consensus involved the “proper" 
application of military force in actual contingencies 
ranging from the least to most intense. Accordingly, the 
proper way to conduct war was seen as involving a 
bargaining process through which opponents would apply 
force incrementally to achieve negotiated settlements.21
Strategic Use22
As early as 1957, the Eisenhower administration had 
come to state the utility of tactical nuclear weapons to 
offset reliance on strategic weapons. By 1960, the 
administration was publicly acknowledging a need for 
capabilities of responding to threats down to the lowest
210sgood, Limited War. 9-11.
22This study's treatment of public policy making as 
an inquiry process would be strengthened if room existed to explicitly detail all the areas of cross-fertilization between the theory and practice of limited war (i.e., think 
tanks, academics recruited into government). As it stands, reliance is on the political, military, and technological manifestations of theory.
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levels of intensity.23 Still, these pronouncements must 
be viewed against Soviet advances affecting delivery of 
strategic weapons (e.g., Sputnik and intercontinental 
ballistic missiles).24 In line with these advances and 
budget constraints, the administration cut spending on 
conventional and tactical nuclear forces "in order to take 
some halting steps towards protecting its strategic 
forces.I,2S
The Kennedy administration inherited a strategic 
situation in which prospects for limited war were largely 
confined to declaratory emphasis. The new administration 
responded with the doctrine of flexible, controlled 
response. Rather than relying on threats of nuclear 
retaliation, the new doctrine sought to enhance deterrence 
and diplomatic bargaining power by providing civilian 
leadership with a wide range of controllable military 
options at all levels of conflict.26 Aside from the 
administration's efforts to build up conventional forces in 
Europe, the doctrine found its first application in the 
need for strategies and capabilities to wage unconventional
23Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 142-59).
“Robert M. Slusser, "The Berlin Crises of 1958-59 and 1961," in Force Without War, ed. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1978), 392.
2SHalperin, Limited War. 8.
26George, Hall and Simons, Coercive Diplomacy, ch.
1.
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war in Southeast Asia. Just at the time when the limited 
war debate had begun to focus upon certain issues (i.e., 
the relation between political objectives and military 
means, the importance of winning or not winning), these 
issues were submerged in the larger problem of dealing with 
communist aggression in Vietnam.27
Political Consequences
The Vietnam War can be seen as a test of limited war 
theory, in the restricted sense that the war called into 
question the grounds for previous consensus.28 The 
situation is evident in the variety of lessons derived by 
scholars from the war. Among the ’’political" lessons 
associated with Vietnam, perhaps the most general is the 
need to pay constant attention to the relationship between 
political objectives and the means needed to achieve them. 
Domestic expressions of interests should be considered as a
27Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 7-8, 149-50, 413-39.
"Formally speaking, the inductive method would not qualify as a method if it were viewed as "a way of producing one specific result on one specific occasion" rather than "a generic device capable of repetitive application." Nicholas Rescher, Methodological Pragmatism 
(New York: New York University Press, 1977), 5. It wouldbe a mistake to regard limited war theory as conclusively invalidated by a single historical case. Similarly, it 
would be wrcng to judge the soundness of a decision to go to war merely on the basis of its success. John E. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York: Basic Books,1989), 229.
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primary source of objectives rather than merely a 
constraint on military actions as derived from some 
appraisal of external interests.29
Related to these political lessons, certain military 
lessons can be derived from the Vietnam War. Granting the 
importance of domestic opinion as a source of political 
objectives, there is the problem of maintaining public 
support over the period of time needed to achieve 
objectives. If time becomes the most crucial concern, 
there is an argument to be made for avoiding politically 
imposed restrictions on military efforts (including 
particularly gradual escalation).30
A more subtle understanding of the contexts within 
which limited wars occur suggests other possible military 
lessons. In order to avoid overgeneralizing those lessons, 
each case of limited war needs to be assessed according to 
its own peculiarities. This assessment should include not
"Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington, Ernest R. May, Richard N. Neustadt and Thomas C. Schelling, ”Vietnam Reappraised," International Security 6 (1981): 3-26.
Lessons cited here attain varying levels of consensus among the authors.
3°Samuel P. Huntington, American Military Strategy. Policy Papers in International Affairs (Berkeley: ITS,1986). The author maintains such an argument, stressing the need to rely on numerical and technological superiority 
to overcome the inability of U.S. public opinion to sustain 
war efforts. Commentary by Paul Seabury in the same volume amends this argument to include the need to change American attitudes. Both positions view democratically articulated interests as a hinderance to the pursuit of security policy.
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only the articulation of objectives but also the judgment 
of the means to be used within particular contexts. The 
forces and technologies needed in particular situations may 
or may not be generally adaptable to others.31 Perhaps 
the most important lesson derived from contextual 
understanding is, as Clausewitz understood, that political 
objectives should constitute limits within which military 
decisions are subject to execution. Clear communication of 
objectives by political leaders should facilitate 
operational assessments necessary for execution and, more 
significantly contribute to the moral bases of both 
civilian and military decisions.32
31Hoffmann, "Vietnam Reappraised," 7-12.
32Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," International Security 7 (1982): 
83-113. The term moral is here taken in the sense common to Clausewitz, On War, and William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in International War. 2d ed., ed.
Melvin Small and J. David Singer (Chicago: Dorsey Press,1989, 328-36. Both use the term moral in connection with a host of psychological characteristics (e.g., skill, experience, courage) necessary for the organized pursuit of 
objectives.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER 3
THE KOREAN WAR
The Korean War began on June 25, 1950 when North 
Korean forces invaded South Korea. With the experience of 
World War II just five years behind them, few among the 
U.S. public would have predicted that their political and 
military leaders' response to the invasion would eventuate 
in an ambiguous Mlimited" war. Even fewer would have 
predicted that an era had begun in which Korean-type 
limited wars would be a norm of U.S. security policy rather 
than total wars.
Several issues carried over from the Korean War into 
the era of limited war. The Korean War set the containment 
policy (Truman Doctrine) on a global footing and 
established the willingness of U.S. policy makers to 
enforce the policy through direct military means. With the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, such enforcement has 
involved integrating the goals of achieving military 
success and avoiding escalation to the point of regional or 
global conflagration.1
1Current U.S. security policy focuses primarily on the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons among regional actors. The assumption of strategic nuclear
48
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Public understanding and support of limited wars has 
been a key issue in integrating these goals. The question 
has remained to what extent the U.S. public can 
differentiate and express conditions favorable to U.S. 
security beyond the simplified alternatives of "'victory' 
and ' stalemate. ’1,2 Complicating this question has been 
the fact that U.S. involvement in Korea and subsequent 
limited wars has been undertaken without formal 
declarations of war by Congress. Instead, authority to 
wage limited war has generally been sought under provisions 
of the Constitution dealing with presidential powers and of 
international agreements (e.g., the United Nations 
Charter).3
Historical Background
The Korean War was an outgrowth of strategic problems 
dating from the end of World War II. Among these, none 
were more difficult than the development of contingencies
war as the main threat to American security has been 
relaxed, making decisive conventional force a more viable option in confronting aggressors. Aspin, The Bottom-Up Review. 5-8; Gerald M. Steinberg, "Non-proliferation: Timefor Regional Approaches?" Orbis 38 (Summer 1994).
Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1967), 144.
3Donald M. Snow and Dennis M. Drew, From Lexington to Desert Storm (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 180.
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for the Allied defeat of Japan and disposition of Japanese 
colonial holdings such as Korea.
The Korean contingency was worked out by a rapid 
series of events in August 1945. The United States bombed 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 8, and Japan surrendered 
on August 14.* A hasty agreement divided the Korean 
peninsula into separate U.S. and Soviet occupation zones 
along the 38th Parallel. As Commander of U.S. Army Forces, 
Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur selected forces under 
General John Hodge for the U.S. zone on the basis of their 
availability. The advance elements of Hodge's command 
arrived in southern Korea on September 8, 1945, weeks 
behind Soviet forces in the north.s
Administrative choices made under the U.S. occupation 
to channel Korean nationalism promoted the continued 
division of the peninsula. General Hodge's immediate 
decision to retain Japanese officials provoked such popular 
opposition that President Truman issued an order leading to 
increased administrative placement of Koreans in the 
southern military government6 These placements were
‘George Vernadsky, A History of Russia. 6th rev. 
ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, YalePaperbound, 1969), 452.
Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, ed. 
Walter G. Hermes (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 3, 7.
6Lee Suk Bok, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987),
7-10.
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accompanied by occupation moves to introduce electoral 
politics in the south. By October 1946, elections were 
held for an interim legislature in which half the members 
were elected and half appointed by General Hodge. All 
elected seats went to right-wing nationalist candidates who 
opposed the occupation, and General Hodge appointed more 
liberal members to balance the election results.7 By May 
1947, Korean administrators in the military government were 
formed as the South Korean Interim Government (SKIG). 
Against a dominant nationalist coalition led by Syngman 
Rhee in the SKIG, the U.S. occupation maintained both an 
advisory role in and financial control over 
administration.8
Administrative decisions by Soviet forces also 
interacted with Korean nationalism, promoting the emergence 
of a separate northern government. Rather than relying on 
military government per se, the Soviets retained a system 
of people's committees which had been organized by Koreans 
in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender but were 
suppressed in the U.S. zone. In early 1946, a national 
Provisional People's Committee under the chairmanship of 
the nationalist Kim II Sung came to power in the north.
7Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol.
I, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes. 1945- 
1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981-90),
260-62.
“David Rees, Korea (New York: St. Martin's, 1964),II.
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All political participation was channeled through the 
communist National Democratic Front. Polling under this 
single party led to the formation of a Korean People's 
Assembly in February 1947 with control centralized under 
Kim as chairman of a new national People's Committee.9
The emergence of separate governments coincided with 
two failed attempts by U.S. and Soviet officials to agree 
on plans to reunify and prepare Korea for independence 
through a trusteeship. By the end of 1945 and through the 
spring of 1946, southern nationalists had become 
sufficiently organized and vocal in their demands for rapid 
independence to affect U.S. and Soviet discussions at a 
Joint Commission. When the commission convened on March 
20, 1946, the Soviet delegation announced its desire to 
exclude all political groups that opposed trusteeship from 
consultation in an interim Korean government. The 
commission became blocked when U.S. delegates insisted that 
all groups should be allowed to participate and exercise 
freedom of speech. By May 6, 1946, the Joint Commission 
adjourned sine die, having failed to arrive at standards of 
popular participation acceptable to both U.S. and Soviet
9Ibid., 11-12.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 3
interests.10 A second Joint Commission was convened in 
1947 but dissolved over the same free speech issue.11
Once the second commission failed, the Truman 
administration had a difficult choice. With the 
formulation of containment in March 1947, withdrawal from 
the Korean peninsula seemed desirable to free up personnel 
and resources for locations more clearly vital to U.S. 
interests. At the same time, premature withdrawal seemed 
likely to send a political signal to the Soviets of a lack 
of commitment or ability to protect those very interests.
A compromise was reached by the Truman administration when 
in November 1947 the U.N. General Assembly passed a U.S. 
resolution calling for Korea-wide elections to be held by 
the end of March 1948. Under U.N. observation, Koreans 
were to elect a national assembly which would draw up a 
constitution and set up an interim government. Once that 
government had come into existence, U.S. and Soviet
10Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1945. vol. 6, The British Commonwealth, the Far East (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), 1152-54; Departmentof State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946. 
vol. 8, The Far East (Washington, DC: GPO, 1971), 615-16,
652-54, 665-67.
“Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract. 1947-1950 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981-90), 68-69.
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occupation forces were to be withdrawn from the 
peninsula.12
Because the Soviets refused to cooperate in the 
reunification of Korea, separate governments came to power 
on the peninsula. In the south, elections were held under 
U.S. observation, and Syngman Rhee later became president 
of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948. Kim II Sung 
became premier of the northern Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea on September 10, 1948. On December 12, 1948, the 
U.N. General Assembly recognized Rhee's government as the 
only "freely" elected one; U.N. membership for either 
republic was prevented by the respective opposition of U.S. 
and Soviet blocks. By the close of 1948, a pair of hostile 
Korean governments "founded on opposed ideologies and 
interests, and each claiming jurisdiction over the whole of 
Korea, faced each other over the 38th Parallel."13
The hostility exhibited between north and south had 
affected U.S. provisions for the south's security even 
before the foundation of separate governments. Given the 
need to limit such hostility during the U.S. withdrawal, 
the Truman administration decided to form an indigenous 
southern constabulary force capable of maintaining internal
12Ibid., 65-67; Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1947. vol. 6, The Far East 
and Australasia (Washington, DC; GPO, 1974), 832-35, 849, 
857-59.
13Rees, Korea. 13.
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security while only gradually assuming the burden of 
external defense. With the final withdrawal of U.S. forces 
in June 1949, an embryonic South Korean army was left under 
the training of U.S. military advisors whose mission was to 
prepare defenses. By June 1950, the South Korean army 
numbered 95,000. U.S. military assistance had limited the 
arm's offensive capabilities by providing only light 
artillery and armored cars.14
In the north, the Soviets had set up an army and a 
constabulary, training and equipping both for combat roles. 
In December 1948, the Soviets withdrew the last of their 
forces except for an abundance of advisors. Under these 
advisors, North Korean forces were built up with 
conscripts, veterans formerly attached to Chinese communist 
forces, and personnel trained in the Soviet Union to 
operate and maintain both combat aircraft and tanks. With 
military aid from the Soviet Union as well as through their 
own production, the North Koreans were able to sustain a 
period of border fighting and large-scale guerrilla 
operations against the south between the spring of 1949 and 
the winter of 1950. Nonetheless, the South Korean army was 
able to overcome these unconventional threats, leaving the 
north few means of unifying the peninsula other than full- 
scale invasion. By June 1950, the North Koreans had 
assembled 135,000 troops equipped with tanks, heavy
14Sawyer, Military Advisors. 12-45, 106.
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artillery, and combat aircraft for just such an invasion. 
Although U.S. aid prepared the South Korean army to cope 
with lower-level threats, that army had been equipped only 
sufficiently enough to resist a conventional assault for 
fifteen days.ls
When the North Koreans invaded the south on June 25, 
their primary goal was to reunify the peninsula in a fait 
accompli. This goal reflected a number of considerations. 
First, although the Soviets did not initiate the invasion, 
North Korean leader Kim II Sung's decision to escalate from 
unconventional operations to a massive conventional assault 
against the south could not have been made without prior 
Soviet military assistance.16 Second, the United States 
had limited military assistance to South Korea in part to 
prevent Syngman Rhee from having sufficient offensive 
capabilities to attempt the forceful reunification of Korea 
under his own regime.17 Third, "the border incidents in 
which both sides had been involved since the spring of 
1949, and Rhee's own martial pronouncements" provided Kim 
with evidence "of a long-term threat from South Korea,
15Ibid., 104-105; John Merrill, Korea (Newark, DE; University of Delaware Press, 1989), 130-167.
16James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, The Korean War (Washington, DC; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, 1978-79), 54-55; Sawyer, Military Advisors. 105.
17Ibid., 100-101.
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which would be eliminated only by a preemptive strike 
southward."18 Fourth, given U.S. efforts to disengage 
from Korea as well as an unclear commitment to the south 
(discussed more fully below), the North Koreans did not 
count on the swiftness of the American response to 
aggression.
U.S. Interests in Korea
As noted above, Korea's political and military 
significance to the United States emerged as a subsidiary 
consideration of ending the war against Japan. In this 
regard, U.S. interests in Korea were defined as part of 
broader interests in establishing political conditions to 
prevent another total war once Japan was defeated. That 
definition did not change with the advent of the Cold War 
and the subsequent outbreak of the Koran War.
In a joint statement released on December 1, 1943 
following their meeting at the Cairo Conference, President 
Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated their intentions 
towards Japanese holdings. Claiming no interest in 
territorial expansion, the statement expressed the
“Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 33. Rhee had ordered several incursions into the north with what military capabilities he had available.
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determination "that in due course Korea shall become free 
and independent."19
The timing of Korean freedom and independence proved 
to be subsidiary to the maintenance of Allied cooperation 
in defeating Japan. At the Yalta Conference, President 
Roosevelt sought options to avoid or minimize any U.S. 
casualties necessitated by an invasion of Japan's home 
islands and, subsequently, its holdings in Manchuria and 
Korea. Given these concerns, Roosevelt signed a top-secret 
agreement with Joseph Stalin whereby the Soviets would 
receive territorial concessions (e.g., Kurile Islands, 
access to a Manchurian port) in return for engaging the 
Japanese. Although Roosevelt and Stalin discussed a Korean 
trusteeship in private, the public protocol agreed to at 
Yalta put off discussions of specific trusteeships at the 
upcoming United Nations Conference. Left unresolved were 
the possible duration of a Korean trusteeship and the 
commitment of Allied occupation forces during that 
period.20
19Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran. 1943(Washington, DC: GPO, 1961), 449.
20Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta. 1945
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 766, 768-70; Edward R.Settinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949), 93-98; Department of State, ForeignRelations of the United States: The Conference at BerlinfThe Potsdam Conference1. 1945 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1960), 1568.
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President Roosevelt was unable to resolve these 
issues. Several weeks after Yalta, the Soviets actively 
began installing pro-Soviet governments in Eastern Europe. 
Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, before he could convince 
Stalin that Soviet interests would be strengthened rather 
than compromised by adherence to international agreements. 
The President had not realized his ideal of a U.N. 
organization capable of reconciling the interests of the 
major powers and, thereby, guiding colonial populations 
such as Korea's towards self-governance by means of a 
generalized system of trusteeships.21
Under President Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, 
the issue of Korean trusteeship would remain unresolved as 
the administration confronted the larger issue of Soviet 
expansion. At both the United Nations and Potsdam 
Conferences, the administration attempted to deal with the 
same twofold problem of defeating Japan and preventing the 
Soviets from moving into the Pacific as they had in Eastern 
Europe. On July 16, 1945, news of the first successful 
atomic bomb test presented administration officials at 
Potsdam with evidence that Soviet engagement of Japanese 
forces was less necessary than when the mob was a mere 
probability. That day, based on information of Soviet- 
trained Korean forces, Secretary of War Henry Stimson 
warned Truman that the Soviets might set up a puppet
21Settinius, Roosevelt. 93-94, ch. 16.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
6 0
government in Korea- The Secretary urged the President to 
press the issue of trusteeship with the Soviets and to 
station U.S. forces in Korea as part of a trusteeship.22
Secretary Stimson's advice presaged the 
administration's commitment of forces to Korea to prevent 
the Soviets from occupying the entire peninsula following 
the rapid collapse of Japanese resistance in August 
1945.23 With the president's enunciation of the Truman 
Doctrine in March 1947 (discussed more fully in chapter 7), 
that commitment would present an increasing dilemma for the 
administration as it attempted to free up the economic and 
military resources to contain the Soviets in other areas 
(i.e., Europe, the Middle East).
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson sought to 
extend the basic rationale of containment to Korea. On 
March 27, 1947, Acheson personally approved a report which 
argued that Korea would only be a military liability during 
a total war. Nevertheless, the loss of U.S. credibility 
resulting from a withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea could 
just as easily encourage Soviet aggression in areas more 
clearly vital to U.S. security (e.g., Europe). This issue
22Department of State, Foreign Relations: PotsdamConference. 631-34; Harry S- Truman, Memoirs. vol. 1, Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY; Doubleday, 1955-56), 264- 65, 273-75; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Duty in Peace and War (New York; Harper & Brothers, 1948), 599-602, 637.
23Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktona. North to the Yalu (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961), 2-3.
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would affect subsequent considerations of U.S. interests in 
Korea.24
A report to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC 
1769/1) on April 29, 1947 was much more stringent in its 
treatment of U.S. commitments and security assistance. The 
report pointed out how assistance could be 
counterproductive to U.S. security when given to 
governments which sought only to suppress democratic 
participation (such as Rhee's). Another basis given for 
determining security assistance was the establishment of 
the area of primary strategic importance to the United 
States. In the Pacific, the report set a boundary running 
from Alaska through the Philippines to Australia. Korea 
was acknowledged as an area in need of assistance due to 
the existing U.S. commitment. Nevertheless, the report 
argued that commitments to Korea could be discontinued 
without inviting Soviet aggression against more vital areas 
(i.e., Europe). Because Korea was deemed incapable of 
providing sufficient support to the United States in a 
total war, only aid left over from more vital countries was 
suggested for Korea by the report.25
By November 1947, George Kennan had come to 
acknowledge the difficulties of applying containment in
24Cumings, Korean War, vol. 2, 46-48.
2SThomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979),71-72, 77-78.
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Korea. In a planning paper drafted for Secretary of State 
George Marshall, Kennan noted that the potential for 
democratic government throughout Korea was non-existent. 
Furthermore, such conditions favored communist political 
success. Combined with Korea's lack of strategic 
significance in a total war, this factor left the United 
States few options other than to attempt withdrawal, while 
minimizing the loss of U.S. credibility.26
The decision to turn the political future of Korea 
over to the U.N. represented just such an option. As noted 
earlier in dealing with the historical context of attempts 
to reunify Korea, U.N. acceptance of U.S. proposals for 
free elections throughout the peninsula provided the Truman 
administration with a way to smoothly withdraw U.S. forces 
and a collective security mechanism to confront the 
Soviets.
Even though the U.S. position was bolstered by 
adherence to U.N. authority, withdrawal from Korea was 
still an issue requiring consideration of the costs to U.S. 
credibility. According to a National Security Council 
paper (NSC 8) put out in April 1948, U.S. forces would be 
withdrawn from the south by December 1948. Granting 
Korea's military drawbacks, NSC 8 stipulated that security 
assistance to the south would forestall communist 
dominance. Considering both internal and external threats,
26Ibid., 95-96.
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U.S. forces had not been withdrawn by December 12, 1948, 
when the U.N. General Assembly recognized South Korea's 
government as the only freely elected one on the 
peninsula.27
A revision of NSC 8, designated NSC 8/2, was put out 
in March 1949. NSC 8/2 provided for the final withdrawal 
of U.S. forces in June 1949. NSC 8/2 acknowledged that 
Korea would not be a primary theater of operations in a 
total war and provided for substantial security assistance 
to South Korea. NSC 8/2 went on to admit the possibility 
of overt communist aggression against the south but 
provided several reasons to expect that U.S. credibility 
would remain unaffected. South Korean constabulary forces 
could deal with threats themselves. U.S. troops would not 
be in any wartime situations risking defeat or surrender at 
the hands of numerically superior communist forces. Prior 
to the final withdrawal of U.S. forces, a public statement 
would be made to signal that the United States had not 
abandoned its commitment to South Korea.28
Between December 23 and 30, 1949, two National 
Security Council papers (NSC 48/1 and NSC 48/2) were issued
27Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 1948. vol. 6, The Far East and Australasia 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), 1163-69, 1321-27, 1336-37.
28Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. vol. 7, The Far East and Australasia. 
Part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), 969-78.
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regarding U.S. policy in Asia. Among its provisions, NSC
48/1 restated the main objective of NSC 8/2:
to strengthen that Government [South Korea] to the point where it can (1) successfully contain the threat of expanding Communist influence and control arising 
out of the existence in north Korea of an aggressive Soviet-dominated regime, and (2) serve as a nucleus for the eventual peaceful unification of the entire country 
on a democratic basis.29
Although not included in the revised NSC 48/2, the second
part of the above objective presaged U.S. efforts under
U.N. authority to unify Korea by force.
NSC 48/2 pledged continued material and political 
support to South Korea, providing for both unilateral and 
multilateral efforts. Among its general provisions for 
Asia, NSC 48/2 held that the United States was aware of 
Formosa's strategic significance but lacked the military 
means to prevent the Chinese Communists from taking the 
island from the Chinese Nationalists. In a related sense, 
NSC 48/2 stressed that U.S. security in Asia would be best 
served by ambivalence in treating with the Chinese 
Communists, avoiding moves that might prevent the 
exploitation of any Sino-Soviet rifts. With an ambiguous 
situation in China and Formosa, NSC 48/2 urged the 
improvement of the overall U.S. situation vis-a-vis Japan, 
the Ryukus, and the Philippines.30
29Etzold and Gaddis, Containment. 256.
3°Ibid., 272-75.
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These three groups of islands formed the bottom
portion of a U.S. defensive perimeter anchored in the north
Pacific by the Aleutian islands. The perimeter was first
announced by Secretary of State Acheson on January 12, 1950
in a speech to the National Press Club. Accordingly, the
perimeter represented the primary U.S. interests in the
Pacific, or at least the interests for which Acheson felt
the United States could bear the primary responsibility to
defend. Outside the area of primary interests were South
Korea and Formosa. Secretary Acheson stated that
So far as the military security of other areas in the 
Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack . . . Should such an attack occur— one hesitates to say where 
such an armed attack could come from— the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it 
and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so 
far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression (emphasis mine).31
This was an accurate statement of the subsequent military
responses following the North Korean invasion.
The invasion's implications extended beyond the 
Korean peninsula. According to John Foster Dulles, *'to sit 
by while Korea is overrun" would produce a "disastrous 
chain of events leading most probably to world war."32
31Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 357.
32Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs. 67.
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This though was elaborated by President Truman, who felt 
that
if the communists were permitted to force their way 
into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger communist 
neighbors.33
In this context, the president linked U.S. interests with 
the United Nations in opposing the invasion. Ultimately, 
it was the possibility of a world war that led the Truman 
and Eisenhower administrations to choose to limit the war 
to the peninsula and seek a negotiated settlement through 
the United Nations.
U.S. Objectives in Korea
In the immediate aftermath of the North Korean 
invasion, the Truman administration took steps to convene 
an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council. When 
the council met on June 25, 1950, it passed an American 
sponsored resolution calling for "the immediate cessation 
of hostilities." The resolution called for "the 
authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their 
armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel” and for all 
members "to render every assistance to the United nations
33Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955-56), 332-33.
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in tiie execution of" the resolution "and to refrain from 
giving assistance to the north Korean authorities-"34
Once the North Koreans failed to comply with that 
resolution, the Security Council passed another on June 27. 
The new resolution recommended that U.N. members "furnish 
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be 
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore 
international peace and security in the area."35
These resolutions reflected the Truman 
administrations' efforts to establish political and 
military objectives under crisis conditions. In a second 
meeting with his top diplomatic and military leaders on 
June 26, the president decided to use air and naval forces 
to attack North Korean forces below the 38th parallel.
This decision was extended to the use of ground troops on 
June 30 (both decisions are discussed more fully below). 
Between those dates, on June 27, the president made a 
national statement regarding objectives in Korea. In a 
speech dealing predominantly with the military quarantine 
of Formosa (Taiwan), he noted that "I have ordered United 
States air and sea forces to give the Korean government
34Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. vol. 7, Korea (Washington, DC: GPO,
1976), 712-13.
3SIbid., 713. The Soviets were boycotting the Security Council over its refusal to admit China as a 
member and were thus unable to veto the resolutions passed on June 25 and 27. Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs. 76.
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troops cover and support."36 For the time being, U.S. 
objectives remained primarily to restore the territorial 
and political sovereignty of South Korea.37
Between July and September 1950, the battle for South 
Korea varied between the North's farthest advance to the 
Pusan Perimeter and the destruction of northern forces as 
an effective fighting force. Utilizing air strikes, 
amphibious landings, naval blockades, and infantry 
assaults, U.N. and South Korean forces routed the North 
Korean army and had achieved the original U.N. and American 
objectives by September 1950.38
The route of the North Koreans beginning in mid- 
September reflected a significant expansion of objectives 
from the restoration of South Korea. According to a 
National Security Council report (NSC 81/1) signed by 
President Truman on September 11, "the political objective 
of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the 
complete independence and unity of Korea."39 NSC 81/1 
went on to qualify that objective with two other
36President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1965), Harry Truman, 1950, 492.
37Acheson, President at the Creation. 405.
38Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 10-17.
39Department of State, Foreign Relations. 1950: Korea. 713.
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objectives: avoiding general war with the Soviet Union and
China and building U.N. support for the imposition of a 
political settlement on North Korea.40
By September 26, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
drafted orders for U.N. Commander General Douglas
MacArthur. The orders stated that his military objective
is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces.
In attaining this objective you [MacArthur] are authorized to conduct military operations, . . . north of the 38th parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation [sic] there has been no entry 
into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat 
to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a 
matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet 
Union or in the area long the Manchurian border.41
In the event of Soviet intervention, MacArthur was ordered
to "assure the defense," take no action "to aggravate the
situation," and "report to Washington." Regarding Chinese
intervention, MacArthur was ordered to continue "action as
long as action by your forces offers a reasonable chance of
successful resistance."42 The issues would remain how far
to advance beyond the 38th parallel without crossing
specified boundaries and what forms or extent of action to
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On October 7, 1950, forces commanded by MacArthur 
crossed the 38th parallel, having been authorized by U.N. 
Resolution 376 to take "all appropriate steps . . .  to 
ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."43 By 
mid-October, with no apparent signs of Chinese 
intervention, MacArthur had violated his orders and sent 
non-Korean troops to within thirty-five miles of Manchuria. 
Without contradictory orders from Washington, he ordered 
his forces towards the Yalu River on October 24.44
As of late November 1950, it had become apparent that 
massive numbers of Chinese Communist "volunteers" had 
entered North Korea from Manchuria (approximately 210,000). 
U.N. forces were forced to retreat south, back across the 
38th parallel. In January 1951, U.N. forces were able to 
regroup, counterattack, and force the combined Chinese and 
North Korean armies back into North Korea. Rather than 
pursuing those armies, however, U.N. forces were required 
to remain south of the parallel. The war stalemated there 
for over the next two years.45
China's entry into the war presented the Truman 
administration with the problem of managing relations with 
U.N. allies as well as neutral members (e.g., India). In 
particular, the administration had to confront growing
43Ibid., 904.
44Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs. 274-76.
45Mossman, Ebb and Flow, ch. 3, ch. 26, ch. 27.
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demands for crease-fire arrangements while preventing
measures leading to a compromise which might encourage
further Chinese aggression. "Many in Washington were
afraid that a cease-fire . . . would give the Chinese time
to build up their forces for another thrust southward.1,46
Reflecting these concerns, the administration had
moved by March 20, 1951, to open cease-fire negotiations
with the Chinese. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed
General MacArthur "that, with [the] clearing of [the] bulk
of South Korea of aggressors, [the] United Nations [is] now
prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea."47
In response to this, MacArthur released a public statement
in which he noted that China
must now be painfully aware that a decision of the 
United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to 
contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to . . . [Chinese] coastal 
and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse . . . .48
Having previously been refused in his requests to carry out
such an expansion,49 MacArthur persisted in his
46Kaufman, Korean War, 115.
47Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs. 525.
48Truman, Memoirs. vol. 2, 440-41.
49On January 9, 1951, the Joint Chiefs informed MacArthur that he could not blockade China, carry out naval 
and air attacks against China, or obtain reinforcements from Taiwan. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1951. vol. 7, Korea (Washington, DC: GPO,1983), 41-42.
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contradiction of administration authority until relieved by 
Truman on April 11, 1951.50
Although not directly connected, MacArthur's relief 
coincided with a change in objectives from that of seeking 
a military solution in Korea to seeking a political one.
As the president told a national audience upon relieving 
the general, "in the simplest terms, what we are doing is 
. . . trying to prevent a third world war."51 This 
objective was reiterated in a national security report (NSC 
48/5) signed by Truman on May 17, 1951. NSC 48/5 held that 
the main U.S. objective had become "a political, not 
military, solution which would [eventually] provide for a 
united, independent, and democratic Korea.,,S2
NSC 48/5 provided for a substantially altered 
military mission, establishing greater political 
restrictions on the new U.N. Commander General Matthew 
Ridgway than had been set for MacArthur. Ridgway's orders 
were to
inflict the maximum personnel and materiel losses on the forces of North Korea and Communist China operating 
within the geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent . . .  in order to create conditions favorable
^or details on the decision to relieve MacArthur, see Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs, ch. 10.
slPresident, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1965), 
Harry Truman, 1951, 223.
S2James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1972), 393.
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to a settlement of the Korean conflict which would, as 
a minimum, a. Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; b. Establish the authority of 
- . . [the Republic of Korea] over all Korea south of a 
northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and [military] defense, and in no case south of the 38th parallel; c. Provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; d. Permit 
the building of sufficient . . . [Republic of Korea military] power to deter or repel a renewed North 
Korean aggression-53
Less than a year into the war, the conditions had 
been set for a subsequent two-year stalemate. To prevent a 
wider war, orders given to Ridgway would remain in force 
for subsequent commanders during that period. Washington's 
objectives had shifted from restoration of South Korea's 
independence by force, to the reunification of the Korean 
peninsula by force, and then to the maintenance of South 
Korean independence through negotiations backed by force. 
Strategically, mobilization of U.S. combat resources had 
become necessary to maintain a war of attrition.
U.S. Mobilization
The North Korean invasion of South Korea in late June 
1950 came at a time when the Truman administration was 
beginning to reassess its plans for fighting the Soviet 
Union. In light of the Soviet's development of nuclear 
capabilities nearly a year earlier, the administration had
“Department of State, Foreign Relations. 1951: 
Korea, 489-90.
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recently begun to question its own position that nuclear 
weapons were sufficient to compensate for the 
demobilization of conventional forces since World War 
II.54 In particular, President Truman was still 
considering a report (NSC 68) that "without superior 
aggregate [allied] military strength, in being and readily 
mobilizable, a policy of 'containment' . . .  is no more 
than a policy of bluff."55 Without both nuclear and 
conventional strength, NSC 68 argued that the United States 
would "be confronted more frequently with the dilemma of 
reacting totally to a limited [local] extension of Soviet 
control or of not reacting at all (except with ineffectual 
protests and half measures)."56
Reflecting the administration's nascent concern for 
Soviet nuclear capabilities, military planners had begun to 
assume a shorter warning period in which to mobilize for 
combat than they had assumed at the end of World War II. 
Still, at the time of the North Korean invasion, plans and 
preparations continued to focus on the primary contingency
5,*In order to curb inflation expected as a result of military spending, the administration had placed primary 
reliance on nuclear weapons as a more economical means of dealing with Soviet aggression than sustained conventional mobilization. Etzold and Gaddis, Containment. 383-84.
55Ibid., 402.
S6Ibid., 428.
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of another total war in which mobilization would be 
extended over at least two years.57
This focus would quickly call into question 
"preparedness for a larger, perhaps global struggle 
centered on Europe" once President Truman committed forces 
to defend South Korea.58 At that time, the United States 
had standing ground forces consisting primarily of 630,000 
army personnel, with 108,000 devoted to the continued 
occupation and defense of Japan under General MacArthur.59 
Having determined by June 30, 1950, that air and naval 
forces were inadequate to halt the North Korean offensive, 
the president authorized MacArthur to use what forces he 
needed to prevent the communists from overrunning the 
south.60
Before committing nearly a fourth of America's ground 
forces to Korea, Truman had received congressional 
authority to obtain draftees through selective service and 
to employ reserve forces (discussed more fully below).
57Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Armv Mobilization and 
Logistics in the Korean War (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987),
21-22.
58Ibid., 28.
MacArthur's forces were understrength and largely unprepared for combat. This problem was shared by active and reserve forces stationed in the United States, about960,000 strategic replacements to support worldwide 
commitments. Ibid., 25.
60Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs. 90, 118; Department of State, Foreign Relations. 1950: Korea. 178-183.
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Nonetheless, he expected that restoration of South Korean 
control up to the 38th parallel would not require prolonged 
combat.61 "Congressional authorization was necessary 
since the president had not declared a national 
emergency.1,62
On the basis of that authorization, the United States 
had deployed enough ground forces (about 155,000 army and 
marine personnel) by November 1950 to sustain the offensive 
along with South Korean forces (about 82,000) across the 
38th parallel. When the Chinese intervened with nearly
300,000 troops, the president declared a national 
emergency. As part of that emergency, the administration 
speeded up efforts to increase the nation's standing forces 
for use in other areas (i.e., Europe) while simultaneously 
beginning plans to redeploy from Korea. At the same time, 
the president did not move to totally mobilize the nation's 
industrial and manpower resources. He decided that 
mobilization would remain partial, with preparations being 
made for the possibility of a larger war against the 
Soviets and with only sufficient men and materiel being 
sent to Korea to contain the Chinese and North Koreans 
without triggering such a war.63
61Ibid., 248-53.
62Gough, Mobilization, 29.
63Bevin Alexander, Korea (New York: Hippocrene,1986), 310; Gough, Mobilization. 37, 45, 55-56.
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The problem of balancing the U.S. commitment to South 
Korea against other commitments (e.g., Europe, Japan) 
became less urgent with the effective reduction of Chinese 
offensive capabilities by June 1951.64 Yet, the problem 
became more difficult with the initiation of cease-fire 
negotiations the following month (discussed more fully 
below). Although U.S. forces would not be driven from 
Korea, their continuing presence was required so long as 
negotiations proceeded and South Korean forces remained 
unable to defend themselves.
It was not until two years later on July 27, 1953, 
that negotiations were brought to a conclusion under the 
Eisenhower administration. The United States had 139,272 
combat related casualties, including 24,965 killed in 
action and 12,939 missing and presumed dead. Of South 
Korea's 272,975 casualties, 46,812 were killed in action 
and 66,436 were missing and presumed dead. U.N. allies 
suffered 14,103 combat casualties, with 2,597 killed and 
1,925 missing or dead. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated 
that North Korea had 620,264 casualties, with 214,899 
killed in action and 101,680 missing or dead. China had an 
estimated 909,607 casualties, with 401,401 killed and 
21,211 missing.6S
64Clay Blair, The Forgotten War (New York: Times
Books, 1987), 897-902.
65Alexander, Korea. 483.
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On the same day that an armistice was signed in 
Korea, sixteen U.N. members signed a "Greater Sanctions 
Statement" indicating their support for South Korea in the 
event of renewed communist aggression. The members 
affirmed
in the interests of world peace, that if there is a 
renewal of the armed attack [on South Korea], 
challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be 
possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.66
By the time this statement was signed, the United 
States had built up its forces to include over 1,526,921 
active army personnel.67 Any doubt that those forces 
would not provide the greater part of the sanctions in the 
statement was removed by the Eisenhower administration. On 
December 26, 1954, the president announced that he would 
begin a gradual withdrawal of most of the 327,000 U.S. 
personnel remaining in South Korea (whose forces then 
numbered over 450,000). That announcement was followed 
three days later with one by Secretary of State Dulles 
that, as part of the administration's new strategy, renewed
“Department of State, American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents. 1950-55 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1957),2662.
67Gough, Mobilization, 17.
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communist aggression could result in the bombing of North 
Korea and China.68
U.S. Publi c Support
Initially very popular with Congress and the public, 
the Korean War became less so following Chinese 
intervention. Given rapidly shifting political and 
military objectives (as detailed above), congressional 
members and their constituents had little time to develop 
an understanding of the peace process initiated by the 
president. Led to expect victory prior to China's entry, 
the public expressed a growing, but not overwhelming, 
preference for decisive action to end the war. This was an 
indication that the public required greater knowledge of 
the war's changing political and military objectives.
On the day that President Truman announced the first 
air and naval actions against North Korean forces (June 27, 
1950), members of Congress discussed the U.S. intervention. 
Although the president had not yet committed ground forces, 
the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly (315-4) 
on a bill to extend the draft for a period of one year and 
to allow the president to begin reserve mobilization. The 
Senate unanimously approved the measure the next day.69
68Lee, U.S. Forces in Korea. 59.
69A1 exander, Korea, 42.
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After President Truman had implicit support for the 
use of ground forces, he did not ask Congress to declare a 
state of war, preferring to let the war be known as a 
police action. "Thus was born" a "presidential precedent 
to try to sanitize and minimize American military actions 
by avoiding formal congressional" authorization.70
It was not until the president relieved General 
MacArthur in the spring of 1951 that congressional members 
began to focus on the problem of limited war in Korea. 
Explaining that the primary aim of U.S. policy was to 
prevent another world war, the president told the nation 
that
events have made it evident that General MacArthur did 
not agree with that policy. I have therefore 
considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the 
real purpose and aim of our policy.71
In the highly politicized atmosphere surrounding his
relief, MacArthur7s response before a congressional
audience was that the goal of decisive victory in Korea had
been "fully shared by practically every military leader,
including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff."72
In Senate testimony beginning on May 3, 1951, 
MacArthur held that the policy of limited war removed the 
potential "of destroying the enemy's military power and
7°Ibid.
71President, Public Papers. 1951, 226.
72Kaufman, Korean War. 166.
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bringing the conflict to a decisive close in the minimum of
time and with a minimum loss of life.”73 In contrast with
this position, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Omar Bradley pointed out that
objectives in a war are not entirely military. In 
other words, the end results of war are a combination 
of military and political considerations, and you use the military to obtain your political objectives.74
Between the issues of prolonging hostilities and of
subordinating military objectives to political objectives
(i.e., avoiding a U.S.-Soviet strategic confrontation over
Korea), the terms of debate had been set for the American
political system regarding the limits to be observed in
war.
At the time of the Senate's hearings, the American 
public was not privileged to the testimony presented by 
witnesses. Nevertheless, there was a general awareness of 
the issues at stake in Korea. In particular, while public 
approval decreased over the course of the war, the public 
remained committed to American war efforts. The public's 
primary problem was understanding how the war could be 
terminated without escalating to a total war.
A Gallup poll conducted in August 1950 showed that 66 
percent of those polled approved of America's involvement 
in the war, with only 12 percent expressing a desire for
73Gacek, Logic of Force. 65.
74Ibid. , 69.
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withdrawal. Following Chinese intervention, that approval 
had fallen to only 39 percent when the poll was conducted 
in December 1950. Still only eleven percent favored 
withdrawal .7S
Consistent with the Gallup poll, a NORC poll 
conducted in June 1951 showed that only 37 percent approved 
of the initial decision to go to war in Korea; however, 76 
percent favored maintaining the U.S. commitment. When the 
war stalemated, public approval remained around 40 percent 
for the next 22 months. Various polls indicated between 12 
and 17 percent favoring withdrawal over the same period.76 
The constancy of approval during this period was in part 
attributable to the Chinese intervention, which had earlier 
removed the support of those unsure of unwilling to 
maintain a commitment in a prolonged war.77
While there was little variance in public support for 
the war following the Chinese intervention, the eventual 
stalemate caused the public to increasingly support 
escalation of the war against China- An April 1952 NORC 
poll showed 31 percent favoring to remain in Korea and 49 
percent favoring war with China. Through the course of the
7SBenjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties. Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention (Santa Monica, CA: Rand,
1994), 10.
76Ibid.
77John E. Mueller, War. Presidents, and Public 
Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 52.
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war, about 77 percent of respondents to a Roper poll 
favored retaining a U.S. presence in Korea. Respondents 
favoring escalation rose from 20 percent in June 1950 to 40 
percent around the period of Chinese intervention, 
remaining between 45 and 49 percent between June 1951 and 
the end of the war. Those favoring escalation outnumbered 
respondents favoring withdrawal by a margin of 2 to 1 in 
June 1950 and 5 to 1 from July 1951 onward.78
These opinions illustrated "the public's considerable 
frustration over what to do next in the war."79 While 
later observers and theorists would come to recognize that 
frustration as a considerable source of pressure to 
escalate limited wars like Korea, they would not provide a 
practical means of informing or channeling the public's 
desire for escalation.
Military and Nonmilitarv Means
A significant source of public frustration with the 
Korean War was the Truman administration's continued 
willingness to prolong combat while seeking a political 
solution to the war. The report (NSC 118/2) which 
formalized that policy noted that
78Schwarz, Public Opinion. 13.
79Mueller, War. 103.
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it must be expected that, in the event armistice 
negotiations fail, U.S. public opinion may demand the adoption of military measures adequate to achieve a political and military decision of the Korean 
struggle.80
NSC 118/2 was correct in its expectation that negotiations 
would become a primary source of pressure to escalate the 
war though it overstated the ultimate impact that public 
opinion had in exerting such pressure.81
In a review of NSC 118/2 (NSC 147) undertaken by the 
Eisenhower administration in April 1954, it was noted that 
American "sentiment for vigorous action to achieve a 
settlement [in Korea] is widespread, but there is no strong 
demand for any particular course of action."82 With 
armistice talks stalled on the issue of prisoner of war 
repatriation (the Chinese favoring forcible repatriation), 
the administration was considering actions ranging from a 
gradual redeployment from Korea to the forcible 
reunification of the peninsula. All options except the 
redeployment of forces left open the possible use of 
nuclear weapons.83
80Department of State, Foreign Relations. 1951: Korea. 1388.
81During the Eisenhower administration, the economic costs of prolonging the war played a substantial role in considerations to escalate the war. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952-1954, 
vol. 15, Korea, part l (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 847.
82Ibid., 847.
83Ibid. , 840, 845.
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In order to pressure the Chinese into concluding an 
armistice, President Eisenhower threatened to escalate the 
war to include the use of nuclear weapons against Chinese 
targets, thus risking a general war. While the actual 
impact of that threat on the Chinese remained open to 
question,84 Eisenhower's willingness to even make it 
pointed ”to the tremendous difficulties that inhere in 
using force nondecisively against an opponent possessing 
great resources and the will to fight.,,8S
Conclusion
The Korean War raised a number of issues which
carried over into and helped define an era of limited war.
The war established containment as a global policy enforced
by the threat or actual use of military force. The spread
of nuclear weapons complicated that issue, creating a
dilemma for Americans in which the need for military
success and the threat of nuclear escalation appeared as
equally valid concerns. As Matthew Ridgway notes
Korea taught us that all warfare from this time forth must be limited. It could no longer be a question of
84For more thorough discussion, see Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1985). Also by the same author, see A Substitute for Victory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
8SGacek, Logic of Force. 86-87.
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whether to fight a limited war, but of how to avoid fighting any other kind.86
The difficulty was in determining which groups learned this
particular lesson and how they interpreted it.
One group consisted of the theorists who drew on the
single case of Korea to develop a theory of limited war.
Notwithstanding considerable [public] dissatisfaction with the conduct and results of the Korean War, it was widely accepted [by theorists and civilian experts] as a preferable alternative to the contemporary 
alternatives of total war and acquiescence in aggression.87
Passed on to civilian experts who began to assume 
greater responsibilities for military strategy in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the theory of limited war gained 
prominence as a means of minimizing the risks of combat 
while achieving military success.88 The theory appeared 
to offer an acceptable strategic guide to President 
Johnson, who was concerned with maintaining U.S. 
commitments in Vietnam while attempting to avoid major 
combat. Given an overall lack of empirical content, the 
theory offered poor guidance.
With their primary focus on the prevention of total 
war, limited war theorists underestimated the need for 
public support in the evaluation of conditions favorable to 
U.S. security. This situation was made worse by the
86Ridgway, Korean War, vi.
870'Brien, Just and Limited Warr 257.
88Rosen, "Vietnam and Limited War Theory," 88.
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precedent set in Korea of bypassing congressional debate in 
committing forces to combat in limited wars. For President 
Johnson, expert consensus on the need for limited war in 
Vietnam would not prove to be an adequate substitute for 
popular consensus as to the meaning of such a war.
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CHAPTER 4
THE VIETNAM WAR
In a news conference on July 28, 1965, President 
Lyndon Johnson announced the deployment of additional 
combat forces to protect South Vietnam against an 
insurgency supplied and directed by the north. He argued 
that failure to oppose Asian communism would lead to 
further communist aggression, a situation in which no 
nation "could ever again have the same confidence in 
American promises, or in American protection."1 As part 
of his announcement on March 31, 1968, that he would not 
stand for reelection, Johnson stressed that the United 
States was still committed to South Vietnam but would begin 
a unilateral deescalation of its war efforts in order to 
achieve a negotiated end to the Vietnam War.2
T̂he Pentagon Papers f The Senator Gravel Edition, 
vol. 4 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-72), 632; hereaftercited as Gravel Edition.
President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1970), Lyndon Johnson, 1968-69, 469-76. Additional deployments 
announced in this speech were a "token" indication of the United States' continued commitment. Gravel Edition, vol. 4, 599.
88
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When President Richard Nixon came into office, he 
expanded on Johnson's efforts to negotiate an end to the 
war and to decrease American involvement. President Nixon 
implemented a plan meant to provide "a prospect of 
honorable disengagement that was not hostage to" communist 
"cooperation" and that would not lead to further 
aggression.3 By the end of 1973, about 250 U.S. personnel 
remained in South Vietnam, over 14,000 less than the number 
present before President Johnson assumed his office in late 
November 1963.4
Over two decades since the United States disengaged 
from the Vietnam War, that experience has continued to 
exercise profound influence on the nation's approach to the 
problem of limited war. A number of important and 
pertinent questions have remained over how the formation 
and implementation of U.S. policy towards Vietnam could 
have been so misdirected. In short, how did things go 
wrong?
American involvement in Vietnam did not come about 
due to a precise set of circumstances. Neither was the 
nation's conduct of the war based on a fully developed 
strategy addressing "the question of 'how' to use military
3Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1979), 306.
■•Department of the Army, Defense Information School, Vietnam. 10 Years Later (Washington, DC: GPO,
1984), 100, 105.
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means to achieve" its political objectives.5 American 
commitments and operations evolved over time, drawing 
strategic guidance from the abstract framework given by 
limited war theory for influencing opponents without waging 
a total war to defeat them (as detailed in chapter 2). 
Applied to the specific case of Vietnam, that framework 
contributed to a situation in which the costs of gradually 
expanded war efforts6 eventually weakened the popular 
support needed to sustain an effective negotiating stance 
with the North Vietnamese and a commitment to South 
Vietnam.
Historical Background7
The Vietnam War was largely a continuation of an 
earlier war (the first Indochina war) which began in 
December 1946 between communist Viet Ninth nationalists led 
by Ho Chi Minh and the French, who sought to reassert
^arry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy (Washington,DC: GPO, 1983), 3.
6Two early studies isolated casualty levels among American personnel as the primary variable, explaining increasing public aversion to the risks of prolonged conflict in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. See Mueller, War as well as Jeffrey S. Millstein, Dynamics of the Vietnam 
War (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1974).
7The proceeding discussion deals primarily with internal developments in Vietnam. American involvement in those developments is discussed more fully in subsequent sections of this chapter.
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colonial control over Indochina after World War II. That 
war ended in July 1954 with a negotiated settlement, the 
Geneva Accords, following the French defeat at Dienbienphu 
two months earlier. The accords provided for a division of 
Indochina at the 17th parallel until reunification 
elections could be held in 1956-*
Although a truce was achieved, it was one "that 
awaited a political settlement, which never happened."9 
Instead, one regime was set up in the north, and another 
set up in the south. The former, led by Ho Chi Minh, was 
dedicated to reunifying Vietnam under communist control.
The latter, led by Ngo Dinh Diem, sought to build a 
separate nation.
In the immediate aftermath of the Geneva Accords,
U.S. military and economic assistance enabled Diem to begin 
to consolidate his political position in South Vietnam 
after the French began to withdraw from South Vietnam in 
February 1955. In the spring of that year, he suppressed 
armed opposition by Buddhist sects. After proclaiming 
himself president of South Vietnam as a result of elections 
in October 1955, he refused to negotiate with the North 
Vietnamese. By July 1956, he had refused to hold 
reunification elections. (Neither the U.S. nor the South
'Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam (Washington, DC: Brooking, 1979), 36-61.
9Stanley Karnow, Vietnam (New York: Viking, 1983),199.
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Vietnamese representatives at Geneva had signed the 1954 
accords) .10
As part of his efforts to consolidate power, Diem had 
been waging a successful campaign against the 5,000 to 
10,000 Viet Minh who had remained in the south since 1954. 
Having been left with orders from the north to engage only 
in a political struggle against Diem's regime, the Viet 
Minh organized themselves as armed insurgents between 1956 
and 1957, after Diem had nearly succeeded in eliminating 
them as a revolutionary force. By the spring of 1959, the 
Viet Minh insurgents had become known as Vietcong, being 
supplied and directed by Ho's regime in Hanoi.11
Hanoi based its conduct of the war against South 
Vietnam on the same strategy of protracted war that had 
been used against the French, a strategy developed in turn 
from theories which Mao Tse Tung had applied in China. The 
strategy called for a gradual shift from guerrilla 
operations, which were defensive in nature, to an all-out 
offensive conducted by conventional forces. The strategic 
shift allowed for the continuation of unconventional 
operations while those forces were being assembled in the 
north. Unconventional operations were generally localized, 
intended to weaken popular support for the South Vietnamese
1QThe Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York 
Times (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 14-23; hereaftercited as Times Pentagon Papers.
“Ibid., 71-81.
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government and disperse its army's capabilities. Moreover, 
guerrilla forces served as a "source of manpower" for the 
development of regular forces in the south "whose scope of 
activities was more extensive and whose combat 
effectiveness and armament were better."12
By 1962, Hanoi had begun to infiltrate forces into 
the south to help organize the Vietcong and to replace 
their losses. As of 1964, large units of the regular North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) were being sent to the south, a trend 
that only increased with the introduction of American 
combat forces a year later. "The infiltration of NVA men 
and units, together with combat and logistic support assets 
continued unabated despite heavy" American bombardment.13
U.S. Interests in Vietnam
American interests in Vietnam date back to World War 
II. America found itself caught between two competing and 
problematic foreign policy objectives. On one hand, 
Franklin Roosevelt's administration was firmly committed to 
anticolonialism. In an internal memorandum, Roosevelt 
stated that: "France has had the country [Indochina]
thirty million inhabitants, for nearly one hundred years,
12Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 10.
13 Ibid.
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and the people are worse off than they were at the 
beginning. nx*
Roosevelt was unsuccessful in convincing the European 
allies to give their colonies independence. This led to a 
competing American foreign policy objective, the need to 
satisfy the allied desire to retain colonial holdings in 
order to keep the war effort against the Axis powers in 
place. With the death of Roosevelt, the dilemma over anti­
colonialism and the need to support the European allies was 
far from being resolved. The situation did not improve 
with the administration of President Harry Truman.1S
With the advent of the Cold War and the formulation 
and enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the defense of 
Europe was linked to collective security in Asia.
According to William Bundy, who became a senior policy 
maker in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, President 
Truman compromised on the issue of French colonialism in 
Indochina in order to improve chances for "the effective 
organization and rearming of" the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.16 By May 1950, the Truman administration
14Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War (New 
York: St. Martin's, 1981), 6.
lsIbid., 6-7.
16Ibia., 23.
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was providing $75 million in military assistance to support 
French efforts against the Viet Minh.17
The president's decision to help the French was
reinforced by subsequent events. In particular,
the outbreak of the Korean War, and the American decision to resist North Korean aggression, sharpened overnight [American] thoughts and actions with respect to Southeast Asia. The French struggle in Indochina came far more than before to be seen as an integral 
part of the containment of communism in that region of 
the world . . . .“
The Korean War would play a major role in the formulation
of American foreign policy toward Indochina for many years
to follow.
While that war was still being waged, events in 1953 
would further magnify Indochina's importance to the United 
States. Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president 
following a campaign in which Republicans accused the 
Truman administration of being responsible for the loss of 
China to communism. The possibility of an armistice in 
Korea only added to speculation that the Chinese would turn 
their attention to Indochina. During the campaign, John 
Foster Dulles traveled the United States arguing that 
Southeast Asia was a key region in the conflict with 
communist imperialism, and that it was important to draw
17Gravel Edition, vol. 1, 370. Indochina received nominal independence in February 1950, but the French remained responsible for internal and external security (41).
“Ibid., 83.
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the line of containment north of Indochina. This position 
was endorsed by Eisenhower in his first State of the Union 
Address, in which he linked communist aggression in Korea 
and Malaya with Indochina.19
On April 7, 1954, President Eisenhower held a news
conference in which he echoed this theme. During the
course of the conference, Eisenhower was asked whether he
would mind commenting on the strategic importance of
Indochina to the free world. In his response, he
elaborated on what he called the "falling domino"
principle. He stated that:
You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly . . . .  [W]hen we come to the possible sequence of events, the 
loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the 
[Malaysian] Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you 
begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through the loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people.20
As in Korea, failure to combat communist aggression in 
Indochina had come to be linked (correctly or not) with the 
prevention of future threats at a regional and global 
level. For President Eisenhower and those who would follow
19Ibid., 85.
2°President, Public Pacers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1960-61), 
Dwight Eisenhower, 1954, 383. The domino principle or 
theory had been formalized in NSC 64, a report signed by President Truman in February 1950. Gravel Edition, vol. 1, 83.
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him in office, the question would remain of the means 
needed to confront localized aggression on balance with 
larger threats.
By 1954, the Eisenhower administration faced the 
problem of more firmly establishing its commitment to 
Indochina, particularly in light of increasing French 
losses to the Chinese and Soviet supplied Viet Minh. Prior 
to the fall of Dienbienphu, the French requested American 
intervention. Apart from the prospects that such 
intervention would lead to Chinese intervention, there was 
also a considered risk that direct combat on the side of 
the French would detract from the ability to defend Europe. 
In either case, Eisenhower and his top political and 
military advisors did not want to repeat their experience 
with a protracted war of attrition as in Korea.21 Even 
after Dienbienphu fell, "the Soviet Union and China feared" 
the implicit threat represented by the administration's 
strategic emphasis on "massive retaliation" and forced the 
Viet Minh to accept a truce at Geneva which "was far 
better" for the United States "than the military situation" 
in Indochina "warranted."22
21Gacek, Logic of Force, ch. 4.
22Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon &Schuster, 1994), 634. It must be remembered that the Viet 
Minh victory at Dienbienphu has helped obscure "the extent 
to which the persistence of military stalemate in Indochina shaped the indecisive peace settlement at Geneva." George C. Herring, "The Legacy of the First Indochina War," in Second Indochina War Symposium, ed. John Schlight
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Whatever the role of massive retaliation in achieving
that truce, conditions remained open for a growing American
role in supporting the Diem regime in South Vietnam.
Paralleling that role was an increasing debate over the
adequacy of the Eisenhower administration's nuclear
strategy to deal with unconventional threats like the
Vietcong insurgency. The same year he retired as Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1959), General Maxwell Taylor
contributed to the debate, writing that
the strategic doctrine which I propose to replace Massive Retaliation is herein called the Strategy of Flexible Response. This name suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of 
possible challenge, for coping with anything from general atomic war to infiltrations and aggressions such as threaten Laos and Berlin in 1959 . . . . [T]he 
limited war which we cannot win quickly may result in our piecemeal attrition or involvement in expanding conflict which may grow into the general conflict we all want to avoid.23
President Eisenhower left office advising President-elect
John Kennedy to defend Laos against the North Vietnamese,
who were using the country to infiltrate South Vietnam.24
The strategic content of flexible response would be worked
out along with the development of capabilities to implement
it as a tool to protect American interests.
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), 10.
23Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 6-7.
24Kissinger, Diplomacy. 641.
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Even before he was elected president, then Senator
Kennedy had accepted both the need to develop flexible
means of protecting American interests and the domino
principle. Speaking in the Senate on February 29, 1960,
Kennedy stated that
events have demonstrated that our nuclear retaliatory power is not enough. It cannot deter Communist 
aggression which is too limited to justify atomic war. It cannot protect uncommitted nations against a 
Communist takeover using local or guerrilla forces. It cannot be used in so-called brush-fire peripheral wars. In short, it cannot prevent the Communists from gradually nibbling at the fringe of the free world's territory and strength, until our security has been steadily eroded in piecemeal fashion— each Red advance being too small to justify massive retaliation, with 
all its risks [of nuclear conflagration].25
By late November 1961, with the insurgency against the Diem
regime worsening, President Kennedy had approved the
commitment of military advisors to stabilize the situation
in South Vietnam.26
President Kennedy fixed on the concepts of 
counterinsurgency and nation-building to counter the North 
Vietnamese threat, an expression of so-called Wars of 
National Liberation or People's War. At the same time, 
developments in South Vietnam continued to worsen. By 
October 1963, Kennedy had sent about 15,000 advisors to 
South Vietnam, even as it remained unclear what actual 
effects his administration's strategic innovations were
2SGravel Edition, vol. 2, 798.
26Gelb and Betts, Irony of Vietnam. 77.
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having against the Vietcong. In particular/ it remained an
open question to what extent aid to the South Vietnamese
could enable them to defeat the Vietcong and North
Vietnamese infiltrators.27 On November 14, 1963,
President Kennedy had still not answered the question for
himself when he told reporters that his administration's
objective was "to bring Americans home" and "permit the
South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as a free and
independent country."2*
When President Johnson succeeded Kennedy, he pledged
himself to achieve the goals set by his predecessor. "That
meant seeing things through in Vietnam as well as coping
with the many other international and domestic problems he
had faced . . . .  Our policy would be 'steady on
course.'"29 The immediate problem that President Johnson
faced was the reliability of information pertaining to
Vietnam. He realized that intelligence information was
flawed and unreliable. He later stated his belief that
two things were wrong with the reporting in 1963: an
excess of wishful thinking on the part of some official observers and too much uncritical reliance on Vietnamese statistics and information. Many Vietnamese officials and officers in the field apparently reported
27Hilsman, To Move a nation. 419-46, 517-26.
2*President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1964),John Kennedy, 1963, 848.
29Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 41-42.
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as fact what they thought their own government wanted 
to hear. Some of our officials in turn accepted many of those reports at face value.30
Due to President Johnson's suspicions, he ordered 
Secretary of Defense McNamara to visit Saigon in early 
December 1963 to find out what was really the case in
Vietnam. McNamara returned to Washington and reported to
President Johnson that: "the situation is very disturbing
. . . . Current trends, unless reversed in the next two or 
three months, will lead to neutralization at best and more 
likely to a Communist-controlled state."31
In his search for options to maintain the American 
commitment to South Vietnam without taking on excessive 
combat responsibilities, Johnson settled on a strategy of 
graduated response offered by an assistant to Secretary 
McNamara. Although a debate had been going on since the 
Kennedy administration "over whether to bomb" North 
Vietnam, a fundamental issue had remained "how" to do so at
an acceptable cost. Informed by academic theories of
bargaining, "civilian planners wanted to start out softly 
and gradually increase the pressure by precise increments 
which could be unmistakenly recognized by Hanoi."32
President Johnson's decision to implement graduated 
response was a compromise to support American interests
3°Ibid., 63.
31Ibid.
32Summers, On Strategy. 72.
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given the same dilemma faced by his predecessors, how to 
halt the spread of communism in Southeast Asia while 
decreasing the risks of a total war against China and the 
Soviet Union over South Vietnam- He wanted to convey the 
message that
we [Americans] are there [in South Vietnam] because we are trying to make the Communists of North Vietnam stop shooting at their neighbors . . .  to demonstrate that 
guerrilla warfare, inspired by one nation against another nation, can never succeed . . . .  [and to make] the Communists in North Vietnam realize the price of 
aggression is too high— and either agree to a peaceful settlement or to stop their fighting . . . .33
Ultimately, Johnson wanted to demonstrate that American
interests were not in defeating the North Vietnamese but in
denying them victory in the south.34
Although strategically appealing, graduated response
had an opposite effect than the one desired on North
Vietnamese determination to continue their offense against
the south. As Henry Kissinger has recently noted,
theorists had originally conceived of graduated response
as a strategy in nuclear war— incrementally escalating and thereby avoiding a total holocaust. When applied 
to guerrilla warfare, however, it ran the risk of 
inviting open-ended escalation. Each limited commitment involved the danger of being interpreted as inhibition rather than resolve, thereby encouraging the
33President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the FederalRegister. National Archives and Records Service, 1967), 
Lyndon Johnson, 1966, 720.
34 Ibid.
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adversary to continue his climb along the ladder of 
escalation.35
If incremental bombing did not strengthen North Vietnamese 
determination, the strategy at least failed to convince 
them to cease their offense and to deny them the means to 
continue it.
A major consequence of this failure was an increasing
commitment of ground forces to South Vietnam, contributing
to a reappraisal of the best means to continue to protect
American interests in that nation. On September 29, 1967,
President Johnson was beginning to lean towards unilateral
concessions in order to achieve a negotiated peace with
Hanoi. In San Antonio, Texas, he delivered a speech in
which he said
the United States is willing to stop all aerial and 
naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam 
would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation.36
By the spring of 1968, the commitment of ground forces and 
the bombing of North Vietnam had helped to divide the 
American public and ruined Johnson's presidency, factors 
that Hanoi continued to exploit as part of its propaganda
3SKissinger, Diplomacy. 652.
36President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1968), Lyndon Johnson, 1967, 879.
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and strategy of "fighting and talking, talking and 
fighting."37
When President Nixon entered office in 1969, he
inherited the idea of "peace with honor." In his first
year as President, he formulated and enunciated a new
approach to American foreign policy, the Nixon Doctrine.
During informal remarks in Guam with newsmen, President
Nixon began to enunciate his approach in Asia and elsewhere
in the world, contrasting it with what he considered to be
the past mistakes of foreign policy:
What will be its [United States] role in Asia and the Pacific after the end of the war in Vietnam? . . .  I 
think that one of the weaknesses in American foreign policy is that too often we react rather precipitately to events as they occur. We fail to have the perspective and the long-range view which is essential for a policy that will be viable . . . .  I believe that the time has come when the United States, in our 
relations with all of our Asian friends, be quite emphatic on two points: One, that we will keep ourtreaty commitments, . . . but, two, that as far as the 
problems of internal security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled 
by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.38
37George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994), 176. This strategy was essentially a means of using negotiations to wear down American resolve during a prolonged war of attrition.
38President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1971), 
Richard Nixon, 1969, 545-59.
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Nixon argued that from that point onward, the United
States' role in Asia should be to "help them fight the war
but not to fight the war for them-"39
A few weeks later, the president reaffirmed his
doctrine more specifically.
— First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
— Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power 
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.— Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treatment commitments. 
But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the 
manpower for its defense.*0
In applying the standards of his doctrine to South
Vietnam, the president found it necessary to simultaneously
strengthen the South Vietnamese army, continue bombing
pressures to achieve a negotiated settlement, and assure
the commitment of enough force to attain an orderly
withdrawal. Ultimately, that withdrawal would be achieved;
however, strategic guidance derived from limited war theory
had helped to undercut the U.S. commitment to South
Vietnam. It would not be possible to legitimize a
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As indicated above, the United States faced a 
strategic dilemma in Vietnam, how to prevent the spread of 
communism throughout Southeast Asia without provoking a 
total war with the Soviet Union and China. In order to 
overcome the fundamental tension between these two goals, 
the Kennedy administration established the Military 
Assistance Command in South Vietnam. The command's basic 
objective was to assist that nation's government and armed 
forces "to defeat externally directed and supported 
communist subversion and aggression and attain an 
independent South Vietnam functioning in a secure 
environment.1,41
Following the assassinations of presidents Diem and 
Kennedy in November 1963, President Johnson signed National 
Security Action Memorandum 273 (NSAM 273). NSAM 273 
restated the basic goal of assisting "the people and 
Government" of South Vietnam "to win their contest against 
the externally directed and supported Communist 
conspiracy." Assuming that the South Vietnamese would be 
capable of winning "their contest" with current levels of 
military and economic assistance, the memorandum estimated 
that the withdrawal of advisory forces would begin by
41William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1976), 57.
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December 1963 and the Vietcong insurgency would be 
suppressed by December 1965.42
These latter estimates were modified during the 
spring of 1964 in light of South Vietnam's inability to 
suppress the Vietcong and the growing number of northern 
troops reinforcing them through Laos. As approved by 
President Johnson in March, a revised memorandum (NSAM 288) 
maintained the objective of assisting the South Vietnamese 
to defend themselves. In order to do so, NSAM 288 delayed 
the withdrawal of advisors and pointed out that the United 
States should "provide all the assistance and advice 
required to" defeat the Vietcong "regardless of how long it 
takes.1' In addition, the memorandum initiated advance 
plans and preparations for a graduated bombing campaign to 
pressure the north to discontinue its support of the 
insurgents.43
In approving NSAM 288, President Johnson judged that 
graduated response would minimize the need for ground 
forces to support the south as well as the risks of 
confrontation with the Chinese and Soviets.44 In part, 
the president based his judgment on the experience of
42Times Pentagon Papers. 238-39.
43Gravel Edition, vol. 3, 503.
44Johnson, Vantage Point. 119; Doris Kearns, Lvndon 
Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper & Row,
1976), 264.
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Chinese intervention during the Korean War.4S At the same
time, Johnson was relying largely on the advice of civilian
strategists in the Defense Department (e.g., Secretary
McNamara) whose views were shaped by limited war theory.
They assumed that in virtually all cases, ’’the United
States would be free to escalate or deescalate or make
whatever adjustments in policy that the President and his
advisors might think desirable."46
Neither experience nor expert advice could provide
unambiguous guidance in resolving the dilemma of how best
to stem communist aggression while preventing a major
confrontation over South Vietnam. As of June 22, 1964,
President Johnson could only tell reporters
It may be helpful to outline four basic themes that govern our policy in Southeast Asia. First, America 
keeps her word. Second, the issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole. Third, our purpose is peace. Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. On the point that America keeps her word, we are 
steadfast in a policy which has been followed for 10 
years in three administrations.47
Long-term credibility was at best only a broad standard for
assessing what was to be or was being accomplished in
45In February 1965, Johnson was advised by former President Eisenhower that the best deterrent to Chinese 
intervention was a secretly communicated threat of nuclear reprisal. Johnson, Vantage Point, 131.
46William Gerberding and Bernard Brodie, The Political Dimension in National Strategy (Los Angeles, CA: 
University of California, Security Studies Project, 1968), 30.
47Gravel Edition, vol. 3, 718.
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Vietnam, one obscuring the means needed to assist the South 
Vietnamese to defend themselves.
This left open the possibility of an expanding 
commitment lacking a viable strategy to coordinate national 
policy objectives and military actions. On April 7, 1965, 
the president did not substantially clarify the situation 
when he told a national audience
Our objective is the independence of South Viet- Nam and its freedom from attack. We want . . . only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide 
their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.48
By late April, the emerging strategy to achieve that
objective was "to break the will of" North Vietnam and the
Vietcong "by depriving them of victory," leading
"eventually to a political solution."49
The nation's policy and strategy had not undergone a 
significant test when the president announced the 
deployment of combat forces to South Vietnam on July 28, 
1965. He stated that "we [Americans] intend to convince 
the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms 
or by superior power." When asked if the deployment 
implied a change "in the existing policy" of "using 
American forces to guard installations and to act as 
emergency backup," he announced, "It does not imply any
48Ibid., 730.
49Ibid., 706.
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change in policy whatever.,,so What remained unclear to 
the president and all other participants in the political 
process was the amount of force that would eventually be 
exerted in the attempt both to convince the communists that 
they could not win and to secure South Vietnam.
One component of that force was the air campaign 
waged against North Vietnam. Designated Rolling Thunder, 
the campaign's primary operation underwent steady 
escalation (except for bombing pauses meant to promote 
negotiations) from its inception on March 2, 1965, until 
late 1967, when President Johnson began the process of 
deescalation. Rolling Thunder's strategic objective was to 
coerce Hanoi into abandoning the Vietcong. Tactically, the 
operation was intended to destroy the infrastructure (e.g., 
roads, bridges, industrial facilities) by which the north 
supported the insurgents.51
The other component of the force employed was the use 
of ground forces in South Vietnam. According to General 
William Westmoreland, head of the Military Assistance 
Command in the south, the ground war's strategic objective 
was pacification. Pacification meant the development of 
"an economically and politically viable society in which 
the [South Vietnamese] people could live without constant
“Ibid., 477.
slEarl H. Tilford, Jr., Setup (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), 105, 153.
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fear of death or other physical harm."52 Tactically, such 
development depended on a variety of social, economic, and 
military instruments, the latter form being the most direct 
way of establishing internal security.
From the beginning of major air and ground operations 
in Vietnam, President Johnson and his civilian advisors, 
particularly Secretary McNamara, attempted to maintain 
restrictions on the military's conduct in accord with the 
strategic objectives of the war.53 Nevertheless, it was 
not until late 1967 and early 1968 that the gradually 
expanding tactical requirements of denying a communist 
victory in the south prompted the president to more 
actively reevaluate and limit operations. Faced with an 
increasingly public dispute between McNamara and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff over the destruction of the north's 
military and industrial base in August 1967, the president 
allowed air operations to continue but began assuming a 
more conciliatory approach in seeking negotiations with 
Hanoi.54 Moreover, although the president had not
“Westmoreland, Soldier Reports. 68.
“Important examples of those restrictions included 
the number and variety of targets bombed in the north (e.g., bridges, oil storage facilities), geographic restrictions (e.g., the Chinese border), and the number of 
ground troops sent to South Vietnam.
54Tilford, Setup. 141-146; Gravel Edition, vol. 4, 138-144. The debate between McNamara and the Joint Chiefs occupied hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
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established a limit on the number of forces sent to Vietnam 
by late 1967, he had begun to redirect their tactical 
emphasis from attrition of the Vietcong towards the 
reestablishment of South Vietnam's control over 
pacification efforts.ss
By the time President Johnson left office, the
objective of disengaging from Vietnam had significantly
altered what was meant by denying a communist victory. In
particular, the withdrawal of American forces meant that
any possibility of a negotiated settlement would depend on
a combination of South Vietnamese ground strength
supplemented by the continued use of American airpower. As
President Nixon observed, if the North Vietnamese feel
that we are going to stay there long enough for the 
South Vietnamese to be strong enough to handle their own defense, then I think they have a real incentive to negotiate, because if they have to negotiate with a strong, vigorous South Vietnamese government, the deal they make with them isn't going to be as good as the deal they might make now.“
The best deal for the United States had become withdrawal
under the most favorable conditions achieved through
negotiations.
In order to achieve such conditions, the Nixon 
administration sought to simultaneously carry on a process
5SThomas W. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification 
Support (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), ch. 5.
“Richard M. Nixon, A New Road for America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1972), 681.
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of Vietnamization and of negotiation. The president later
wrote that the nation's policy goals
were to: Reverse the Americanization of the war . . .and concentrate instead on Vietnamization. Give more priority to pacification . . .  to extend their [South Vietnamese] control over the countryside. Reduce the invasion threat by destroying enemy sanctuaries and 
supply lines in Cambodia and Laos. Withdraw the half million American troops from Vietnam in a way that 
would not bring about a collapse in the south.Negotiate a cease fire and a peace treaty. Demonstrate 
our willingness and determination to stand by . . . [South Vietnam] if the peace treaty was violated by Hanoi, and assure South Vietnam that it would continue to receive our military aid as Hanoi did from its 
allies, the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent,China.57
Diplomatically, the administration recognized the 
possibility of escalating the air war against North Vietnam 
without risking Chinese intervention.58
It was in part due to that recognition that President 
Nixon escalated the bombing campaign against the north, 
reducing restrictions which had been imposed during the 
Johnson administration. (In particular, the president 
began by ordering the mining Haiphong harbor and expanded 
to targets throughout North Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia).S9 The bombing campaign (Linebacker) initiated 
by the president on May 9, 1972, had two objectives: 
first, to blockade North Vietnam from Soviet and Chinese
57Richard M. Nixon, The Real War (New York: 
Warner, 1980), 107.
58Kissinger, Diplomacy, 692.
S9Kissinger, White House Years. 1099-1100.
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supply sources; and, second, to destroy the north's 
industrial means of supporting its forces in the south. 
"Taken together," these objectives were meant to compel the 
north "to negotiate a peace plan acceptable to the United 
States."60
Gradual bombing had contributed to the buildup of 
U.S. ground forces to assist South Vietnam. Now sustained 
bombing was being used to allow for the withdrawal of those 
forces while assisting the south to defend itself.
U.S. Mobilization
The gradual deployment of American combat forces to 
Vietnam beginning in 1965 reflected the Johnson 
administration's inability to develop a coherent strategy 
"to help the South Vietnamese build up their forces so that 
they could win the war."61 When peace accords were signed 
in January 1973, the Nixon administration had managed to 
gradually withdraw combat forces while implementing the 
strategy of Vietnamization. The question remained open to 
what extent the South Vietnamese could defeat external 
aggression.
In answering this question, President Johnson faced 
an ambiguous situation. With the president's approval,
“Tilford, Setup. 234.
61Nixon, Real War. 106.
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U.S. Marines began deploying to South Vietnam in early 
March 1965 to protect air bases needed to sustain the 
bombing campaign against the north.62 After the North 
Vietnamese refused to negotiate following a six-day bombing 
pause he ordered on May 12, 1965,63 the president decided 
to proceed with the deployment of over 30,000 
reinforcements. Their primary purpose was "holding on and 
avoiding . . .  a spectacular defeat of" South Vietnamese 
and American forces already engaged against the 
Vietcong.6* By early July, the president had committed 
about 75,000 troops to limited offensive operations against 
the Vietcong. President Johnson had accepted a "consensus" 
among his advisors "that a settlement in Vietnam would come 
as much or more from Communist failure in the South as from 
'pain' [produced by bombing] in North Vietnam."65
This consensus was more difficult to maintain after 
June 13, 1965, when the American commander in South 
Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, requested about
175,000 combat troops to compensate for South Vietnamese
“Jack Shulimson and Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), ch. 1.
“Johnson, Vantage Point. 578.
6*Alexander S. Cochran, Jr. "Eight Decisions for War," in Second Indochina War Symposium, ed. John Schlight (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), 71.
“Johnson, Vantage Point. 141.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 1 6
losses since the previous month.66 In their endorsement 
of that request on July 2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued 
a broad recommendation to deploy "such additional forces at 
this time as are required to insure that the" Vietcong and 
North Vietnamese "cannot win in" South Vietnam "at their 
present level of commitment."67 With South Vietnamese 
losses as the clearest indicator of that commitment,
General Westmoreland could not assure anyone in the chain 
of command (from the president down) that the number of 
requested troops "would persuade the enemy to desist."68
After conferring with General Westmoreland in Saigon, 
Secretary McNamara met with the president and other 
advisors on July 21 to discuss Westmoreland's request. In 
that meeting, the secretary recommended that the 175,000 
troops be deployed and that the president seek 
authorization from Congress to call up an additional
235,000 reserves and to increase regular forces by 375,000. 
McNamara noted, "It should be recognized that even" if such 
mobilization allowed the United States to deny victory to 
the communists, "it is not obvious how we will be able to 
disengage our forces."69
66Karnow, Vietnam. 421-22; Gravel Edition, vol. 3,416.
67 Ibid.
68Westmore 1 and, Soldier Reports , 141.
69Gravel Edition, vol. 4, 621.
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By July 27, President Johnson had met with the 
National Security Council and congressional leaders. At 
both meetings, the president obtained a consensus that it 
was best not to mobilize reserves or to place the nation on 
a wartime footing. In a meeting held at General 
Westmoreland's request, Johnson decided that the use of 
existing forces and resources would avoid a hostile signal 
to the Soviet Union and China as well as a loss of money 
and popular support for his Great Society programs. 
Moreover, the president was by now convinced that ground 
forces would provide diplomatic leverage against the 
Vietcong and the north which had not yet been provided by 
bombing.70
Citing the lessons of history regarding past failures 
to resist aggression (e.g., Munich), the president 
announced on July 28 that he had ordered the immediate 
deployment of 50,000 troops to Vietnam with more to "be 
sent as requested."71 Placing primary reliance on the 
draft and recruitment to meet future needs, Johnson 
deferred the decision to mobilize reserves for later 
consideration. Whether or not the decision to make such an 
open-ended commitment was derived from the lessons of 
history, the president's decision to gradually commit
7°David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New 
York: Random House, 1972), 593-600; Johnson, VantagePoint. 148-151.
71Gravel Edition, vol. 3, 477.
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ground forces to combat at least reflected an 
underdeveloped strategy for fighting a limited war and a 
concomitant assumption of responsibility from the South 
Vietnamese. As he stated, "we intend to convince the 
Communists that we cannot be defeated."72
The indeterminate strategy for assisting the south 
manifested itself in the goals set by General Westmoreland 
after the decision was made to deploy combat forces. As an 
extension of the concept of graduated response only yet 
partially applied in the air campaign,73 the general 
divided operations into three phases. First, his goal was 
to "commit those . . . forces necessary to halt the [South 
Vietnamese] losing trend by the end of 1965." Second, by 
1966, the general called for the beginning of offensive 
operations "to destroy enemy forces and reinstitute 
pacification programs." Third, at some future date, the 
general envisioned that "if the enemy persisted, he might 
be defeated and his forces and base areas destroyed."74
The lack of more explicit strategic objectives 
combined with an open-ended commitment of forces to produce 
a war of attrition. By the time the number of forces 
deployed to South Vietnam had reached 385,000 at the end of
72Ibid.
73Summers, On Strategy r 73.
74Westmoreland, Soldier Reports. 142.
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1966,7S General Westmoreland had long since begun 
offensive operations to seek out and destroy communist 
forces in the south, operations requiring continuous 
reinforcements. The goals of pacification and negotiation, 
both intended to provide for a viable political order in 
the south, remained elusive as the war remained focused on 
the tactical requirements of maintaining enough U.S. troops 
"to destroy enemy forces at a rate higher than enemy 
input."76
This method of waging war was an adaptation of
limited war theory by the civilian strategists who had come
to dominate the Defense Department since the early 1960s
under McNamara. In particular, it was felt that
By using the numerical techniques of economics . . . rationality could be assumed . . . .  Therefore, when Hanoi appeared to be acting irrationally in not 
accepting American terms and yet did not appear to be near defeat, it could only be assumed that they were 
bluffing, and a little more pressure would force 
rationality upon them.77
In August 1967, that pressure included an announcement by
President Johnson that he had approved a U.S. troop level
in South Vietnam of 525,000, 200,000 less than that
requested by the military.78
7SDepartment of the Army, Vietnam. 101.
7<sCochran, "Eight Decisions," 77.
77Gregory Palmer, The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War (Westpoint, CT: Greenwood, 1978), 139-140.
78Department of the Army, Vietnam. 101.
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As of December 1968, there were over 485,000 U.S. 
combat forces in South Vietnam, a number which would prove 
necessary to help the South Vietnamese defeat communist 
forces during the month-long Tet offensive, which began on 
January 30, 1968.79 Tet helped to finally convince the 
Johnson administration "that as an interdiction measure 
against the infiltration of men and supplies" as well as a 
means of "breaking Hanoi's will," "the bombing [campaign] 
had been a near total failure."80 The Vietcong were 
destroyed as an effective fighting force, leaving a vacuum 
of political control in large areas of the south.81
In spite of this tactical success, the Johnson 
administration lacked time to fully implement plans to 
establish South Vietnamese control over those areas after 
President Johnson announced his decision not to seek 
reelection.82 In his announcement, he stressed that
The South Vietnamese know that further efforts are 
going to be required: to expand their own armedforces, to move back into the countryside as quickly as possible, to increase their taxes, to select the very best men that they have for civilian and military responsibility, to achieve a new unity within their 
constitutional government, and to include in the national effort all of those groups who wish to
79Ibid., 102.
8°Gravel Edition, vol. 4, 232.
81Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: ArborHouse, 1985), 105.
82Scoville, Pacification Support. 82-83.
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preserve South Vietnam's control over its own destiny.83
In the context of stabilizing the American troop commitment 
and deescalating the air war to promote negotiations with 
Hanoi, the president had come to a belated understanding of 
the limits of American military capabilities to protect 
other countries.84
The incoming Nixon administration inherited a troop 
commitment which had peaked at 543,400 by the spring of 
1969.8S Complicating the task of beginning the gradual 
withdrawal of those forces was the absence of clear 
strategic guidance for the military. By June 1969, the 
administration had provided the new commander in Vietnam, 
General Creighton Abrams, with the tasks of "providing 
'maximum assistance' to the South Vietnamese to strengthen 
their forces, supporting pacification efforts, and reducing 
the flow of supplies to the enemy."86 Since the Tet
83Gravel Edition, vol. 4, 598.
84Four weeks before his resignation was announced by 
President Johnson on November 29, 1967, Secretary McNamara gave the president a memorandum recommending a stabilization of troop levels and a bombing halt. Johnson, Vantage Point. 372-73.
8SDepartment of the Army, Vietnam. 103. That number included 11,000 of the 20,000 reservists which President Johnson had finally decided to activate after the Tet offensive. Westmoreland, Soldier Reports. 359.
86Kissinger, White House Years. 276.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
122
offensive, that enemy consisted primarily of regular North 
Vietnamese forces.87
As of December IS71, President Nixon had reduced U.S. 
troop levels to about 157,000, a figure which he announced 
would be brought to 69,000 by May 1972.88 In support of 
that withdrawal, the president had expanded the scope of 
air and ground operations to destroy North Vietnamese 
sanctuaries and infiltration routes in Cambodia and Laos 
beginning in March 1969.89 Although those targets were 
not destroyed, Nixon gained time to strengthen South 
Vietnamese forces.90
Ironically, it was the withdrawal of American forces 
and the defeat of South Vietnamese forces attempting to 
sever the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos91 which helped 
convince Hanoi to launch a large-scale offensive against
87Having ordered the offensive by the Vietcong, Hanoi held its regular forces in reserve "in order to exploit 
success." Westmoreland, Soldier Reports. 332.
“Department of the Army, Vietnam. 104.
“Actually begun in 1964, air operations in Laos were steadily intensified after October 1968 in order to aid the process of Vietnamization. By January 1973, U.S. forces had dropped "over 3 million tons of bombs on Laos, three 
times the tonnage directed at North Vietnam." Tilford, Setup f 173.
90Nixon, No More Vietnams. 109-138.
91The invasion of Laos occurred in the spring of 1971. 
American forces did not participate, having been prohibited by Congress from doing so in December 1970 following the joint invasion launched with South Vietnamese forces against Cambodia. Ibid.
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the south in the spring of 1972. In response to that 
invasion, President Nixon ordered the bombing of North 
Vietnam to "destroy [its] war-making capacity" beginning in 
May 1972.92 Halted in October to permit negotiations, the 
bombing was renewed on December 18, 1972, to force the 
North Vietnamese to quit stalling those negotiations.
Eleven days later, President Nixon ordered the bombing of 
the north to be halted again to permit the talks which 
would lead to the final withdrawal of American combat 
forces from South Vietnam.93
"The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace 
in Vietnam" was signed between the United States, North 
Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Vietcong on January 27, 
1973.94 Among its key provisions, the agreement provided 
for an in-place cease-fire, which left up to 160,000 North 
Vietnamese troops in control of southern territory seized 
since October 1972. In exchange for the release of 
American prisoners of war by Hanoi, the 24,200 American 
forces remaining in the south were to be withdrawn within 
sixty days. All four signatories were to refrain from 
violating Laotian and Cambodian territory. Elections were
92Kissinger, White House Years. 1199.
93Details on the events leading to these negotiations are in Kissinger, White House Years. 1458-59; and Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York:Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 741.
94Kissinger, White House Years. 1458-59.
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to be held in South Vietnam under an international 
commission's supervision, leading to a set of broader 
elections under an overall framework for Vietnamese 
reconciliation. Finally, the United States and North 
Vietnam were to be allowed to replace Vietcong and South 
Vietnamese equipment on a piece-by-piece basis, a provision 
not applying to Soviet and Chinese aid to the north's 
regular forces.95
When the terms of this cease-fire went into effect, 
U.S. forces had suffered a total of 58,022 deaths. Of 
these, 38,479 were killed in action, and 3,652 were listed 
as killed while missing or interned. By 1985, 745 
prisoners of war had been accounted for, with only one 
officially recognized as still living under enemy 
control.96
Total estimated deaths among the Vietnamese between 
1965 and the end of 1973 were 1,379,000. This figure 
included 430,000 civilian deaths in the south and 65,000 
killed in bombing campaigns against the north. About
224,000 South Vietnamese troops were killed, and about
95William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to 
Capitulation (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981), 2-3; Tilford,Setup. 249; Department of the Army, Vietnam, 104.
96Department of Defense, U.S. Casualties in Southeast 
Asia (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 1.
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660,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces died in 
combat.97
Casualties among the Vietnamese would rise even 
further as the north reorganized its forces and was 
resupplied by the Soviet Union and China after the cease­
fire. Renewed communist aggression would soon demonstrate 
that South Vietnam, ’’which had no strategy of its own when 
the Americans were in the country, also failed to develop a 
real strategy after they had left” the country.9® The 
Americans themselves had lacked a clear plan, gradually 
increasing their commitment in order to wage a limited war 
and, subsequently, expanding those limits to gradually 
withdraw from the south. When Saigon fell in 1975, the 
difficulty of developing a limited war strategy under 
prolonged combat conditions had long since diminished 
prospects for U.S. assistance.
U.S. Public Support
The dilemma facing the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations was how to maintain the support of Congress 
and the American public over the period of time needed to 
assure South Vietnam's continued existence. Under
97James S. Olson, ed., Dictionary of the Vietnam War (New York: Greenwood, 1988), 67.
9®Stephen T. Hosmer, et al. The Fall of South Vietnam (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1978), 46.
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President Johnson, constraints on the use of force in 
Vietnam were intended to avoid Soviet and Chinese 
intervention, a risk leading to his acceptance of a 
protracted war of attrition. That risk was reduced by the 
diplomacy of the Nixon administration, enabling President 
Nixon to pursue a more aggressive war against North 
Vietnam. Even so, Nixon's determination to follow through 
with Vietnamization led to a prolonged settlement just as 
damaging to support for the war."
Congressional support for President Johnson's actions 
in Vietnam was not originally expressed in connection with 
a war, but with a series of incidents between August 2 and 
5, 1964. In response to torpedo attacks against U.S. naval 
vessels patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin, the president 
ordered air strikes against naval and oil storage 
facilities in North Vietnam.100
Although the president consulted with the 
congressional leadership and announced his decision to the 
public prior to the air strikes, he used the incidents to 
achieve passage of legislation with much broader policy 
implications. Passing both houses with only two negative 
votes in the Senate, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution authorized
"Kissinger, Diplomacy. 692.
xooEdward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navv and the Vietnam Conflict, vol. 2, From Military Assistance to Combat (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986),
414-46.
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Johnson ’’to take all necessary measures to repel any armed 
attack against the forces of the United States and to 
prevent further aggression.” Moreover, he was authorized 
”to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed 
force, to assist any member or protocol state of the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.”101
President Johnson "hoped this strong congressional 
endorsement would help influence North Vietnam to refrain 
from accelerating aggression" (italics mine).102 A 
combination of a declaration of war and a bargaining 
instrument, the president took the resolution as a means of 
gradually entering the war in Vietnam. Because he had 
already decided by July 22, 1965, to deploy ground troops 
to South Vietnam,103 Johnson met with congressional 
leaders on July 27 primarily to establish a consensus that 
full national mobilization would create an unacceptable 
risk of Soviet and Chinese intervention.10*
101Congress, Congressional Recordr vol. 110, pt. 14.(4 August 1964 to 12 August 1964), 18441-555.
102Johnson, Vantage Point. 119.
103Melvin Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves (London: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 57-60.
104Gacek, Logic of Force. 210. Of course, the 
president also saw gradual mobilization as a means of 
avoiding a political contest endangering his domestic political agenda. Johnson, Vantage Point. 148-151. That 
consensus was established among the congressional leaders meeting with Johnson.
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In keeping with his desire to signal American resolve 
while avoiding total mobilization, the president chose on 
July 28 to announce only half of the 100,000 troops 
actually scheduled for deployment to South Vietnam as part 
of an open-ended commitment (see discussion above ).los 
Eventually, the war of attrition resulting from that choice 
undermined the consensus needed to exercise influence over 
the North Vietnamese.
After the Tet offensive, the ability to achieve 
negotiations appeared less likely when the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee opened hearings into the Tonkin Gulf 
incidents. Generally, the issue raised by the hearings was 
the need for more meaningful consultation between the 
president and Congress prior to the commitment of American 
combat forces.106
That issue came to President Nixon's attention early 
in his first term. According to Henry Kissinger, the 
president refused to accept advice that he should seek a 
congressional mandate for his conduct of the war. Nixon 
had two main reasons for refusing to go before Congress:
losGravel Edition, vol. Ill, 476-77. The president did not publicly announce his February 1965 decision to begin the bombing of North Vietnam. Small, Johnson. Nixon, and 
the Doves. 60.
10<sCongress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,The Gulf of Tonkin. The 1964 Incidents. 90th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 20 February 1968, passim. The specific issue was the adequacy of President Johnson's consultations after the fact of a broad Congressional authorization, itself granted 
after a single retaliatory action.
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First, he viewed it as an abdication of presidential 
responsibility. Second, having served for six years in the Congress, he was convinced . . .  that the Congress would evade making a clear-cut choice and give him— at best— some ambiguous endorsement hedged by so many conditions as to magnify the problem.107
This predisposition came ultimately to defeat the
president's efforts to follow through with the protection
of South Vietnam after four years spent in implementing
Vietnamization and forcing the North Vietnamese to
negotiate an end to the war.
By June 1973, Congress had cut funding for continuing
air operations against Khmer Rouge and North Vietnamese
forces in Cambodia. Seeking to further disengage from
Southeast Asia, Congress sent the War Powers Resolution to
President Nixon in October 1973.108 Among its key
elements, the resolution required the president
to make every effort to consult with the Congress in 
advance of any decision to introduce the armed forces 
of the United States into hostilities or into situations in which hostilities are imminent, unless there has been a declaration of war or specific authorization by Congress . . . .  to report to Congress within 48 hours of the time that U.S. armed forces 
became involved in combat or of the time that the President becomes aware that hostilities involving U.S. forces are imminent . . . .  [and] the Congress to authorize the deployment of U.S. armed forces within 
sixty days of the report's submission.100
107Kissinger, Diplomacy. 681.
108Nixon, No More Vietnams. 179-181.
1O0Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The War Powers Resolution. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., May 1994,IV.
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President Nixon vetoed the resolution on October 24, 
citing among his reasons that he believed it to be 
unconstitutional and a threat to the United States'1 ability 
to act decisively in response to international crises.110 
On November 7, both the House and Senate voted by two-third 
majorities to override the veto, "the objections of the 
President notwithstanding.1,111 The president held that 
Congress "had laid to rest any fears Hanoi might have had 
that another invasion of South Vietnam would provoke an 
American response. 1,112
Enactment of the War Powers Resolution over the 
president's veto was in part a reflection of the long-term 
decline in public approval for the war. In particular, the 
war's duration coupled with its lack of clear progress to 
convince an increasing number of people that continued 
involvement was a mistake.
This trend was evident in responses given to the 
Gallup organization's question, "In view of the 
developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do 
you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight 
in Vietnam?"113 In August 1965, 61 percent of respondents
11QNixon, No More Vietnams. 181.
^Congress, War Powers r V.
112Nixon, No More Vietnams. 181.
113Mark Lorell and Charles Kelley, Jr., Casualties. Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam 
War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1985), 17.
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to this question answered that they felt American 
involvement in Vietnam was not a mistake. President 
Johnson had managed to avoid a dramatic entry into the war. 
With nearly two-thirds of the country approving his policy, 
there was at least an indication that the president was 
"launching a war with strong popular backing."114
Nevertheless, by May 1966, it was becoming clear that 
the war was not going to be over very quickly. Those 
expressing support for the war had fallen to 49 percent. 
Moreover, those asked if they expected a long war increased 
from 54 to 72 percent between the end of 1965 and the 
middle of 1966.11S
Between September 1966 and December 1967, support for 
the war stabilized at just over 48 percent, never falling 
below the level of 44 percent in October 1967. These 
levels were hardly a mandate for the original decision to 
send troops to Vietnam, much less the steady increase which 
had reached nearly a half-million by December 1967.116
Following the Tet Offensive, those who felt that 
involvement in Vietnam was not a mistake fell below 50 
percent. "Thereafter, a steady decline set in at roughly a 
constant rate until support declined to an all-time low of 
28 percent in May 1971, at which time Gallup discontinued
114Ibid., 20.
llsMueller, War. 54, 56.
116Ibid., 54-55; Department of the Army, Vietnam. 102.
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the 'mistake7 question.”117 Without substantial popular 
support, the best President Nixon could do to achieve 
negotiations with the North Vietnamese was expand the war's 
scope in order to shorten its already considerable 
duration.
Military and Nonmilitarv Means
The Johnson and Nixon administrations both followed 
policies of gradualism in regard to Vietnam, the first 
resulting in unilateral concessions to initiate 
negotiations and the second in unilateral escalation to 
force those negotiations to a conclusion. Where the 
policies diverged in the maintenance of limits, they 
converged in the establishment of desired outcomes. The 
problem with both approaches to the limited war in Vietnam 
was the inability to maintain a clear understanding that 
the North Vietnamese were waging a total war.
Having participated in negotiations under Presidents 
Johnson and Nixon, Henry Kissinger noted that "Hanoi 
bargained only when it was under severe pressure . . . .  
precisely what most inflamed the critics at home."118 The 
disadvantages accrued by both administrations were part of 
a basic difficulty in waging limited wars under a
117Lorell and Kelley, Casualties. 20.
118Kissinger, Diplomacy. 684.
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democratic system of government. The ability to make 
military decisions restraining the use of force requires 
extra attention to popular support.
In addressing this need, neither president could
overcome another basic problem. The North Vietnamese, even
when compelled to negotiate, did not limit their conduct to
diplomatic moves- Hanoi did not define its war as
a bargaining process, one in which threats and 
proposals, counterproposals and counterthreats, offers 
and assurances, concessions and demonstrations, take the form of actions rather than words, or actions accompanied by words.119
While Washington sought a rational outcome, the North
Vietnamese were interested in negotiations only as a means
of delaying until they could conquer the south.
Conclusion
Over a period of eight years, U.S. policymakers 
attempted to work out a strategy for fighting a limited war 
in Vietnam. Particularly during the Johnson 
administration, the strategy of graduated response (derived 
from limited war theory) was subjected to a test under 
combat conditions. The problem in applying the strategy 
was the ease with which administration officials adopted it 
as a means of simultaneously countering aggression in
119Schelling, Arms and Influence. 142.
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Southeast Asia and avoiding war with the Soviet Union and 
China.
Improperly applied to the case of Vietnam, graduated 
response contributed to a growing commitment of ground 
forces lacking a fully coordinated purpose beyond the 
tactical goal of attrition. The lack of purpose had 
already weakened the domestic consensus needed to negotiate 
with the North Vietnamese when the Nixon administration 
took over the war's conduct. Although the new 
administration had a clearer strategic outlook in 
conducting the war, the expansion of limits needed to 
accomplish that strategy only further weakened remaining 
popular support for the South Vietnamese.
The war served to discredit limited war theory as a 
source of strategic guidance; nevertheless, the conditions 
in which the theory was meant to apply were not the same as 
those in which it was actually applied. As noted above, 
graduated response was a strategic concept developed in 
theory for nuclear warfare. Limited war theory retained 
relevance because it was not fully tested in Vietnam.
What was added to the concept of limited war after 
Vietnam was the political standard under the War Powers 
Resolution of maintaining consultations between the 
president and Congress over the use of combat forces. Like 
other standards, that one left room for selectivity in its 
application. Perhaps more significantly, the resolution
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provided a time frame within which to judge military 
decisions. In terms of the knowledge used by policymakers 
in waging limited wars, the time frame of the War Powers 
Resolution would soon become a major empirical standard of 
limiting wars even when not applied by the Congress.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER 5
U.S. INTERVENTION IN GRENADA
The U.S. intervention in Grenada on October 25, 1983 
was code-named Urgent Fury. It resulted in what one 
participant has described as Ma communist nutmeg" being 
"smashed by an enormous American sledgehammer."1 Indeed, 
Grenada is the only nation in which the United States has 
overthrown a communist government by direct military force. 
It is even more important from the perspective of this 
study that Urgent Fury set a precedent of using decisive 
military force to achieve victories in limited wars.
Historical Background
Urgent Fury was undertaken and later justified as a 
response to a crisis situation in Grenada. Events 
occurring there left only forty-eight hours in which to 
plan the intervention, according to President Ronald
Nutmeg provides a primary source of export income for Grenada. Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books 1989), xv.
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Reagan.2 In order to understand the crisis beyond the 
scope of immediate events, however, it is necessary to 
examine earlier developments in Grenada's history.
Among those developments was the formation of the 
People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Grenada 
following a coup against Prime Minister Eric Gairy in March 
1979. The coup's leaders, including Maurice Bishop, 
established themselves along the lines of a Leninist 
vanguard party. Reflecting principles inherent in such a 
structure, the PRG centralized power in its own hands (with 
both a Political Bureau and a Central Committee). The PRG 
came to rely on mass organizations and popular councils, 
neither of which had access to the secrets of included 
party members. Only PRG leaders were privy to the 
government's goals. Popular support came to depend 
increasingly on indoctrination, a situation in which 
Grenadians grew more and more disaffected with PRG 
sloganizing (e.g., against U.S. imperialism) as a 
substitute for tangible benefits. Above all, Grenadians 
remained unaware of growing factional problems within the 
PRG.3
President, "Remarks at the Reunion," Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents. (3 November 1983), vol. 19, no. 44, p. 1520.
^ony Thorndike, "People's Power in Theory and Practice" in A Revolution Aborted, ed. Jorge Heine 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 38-48.
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Bishop set aside the Grenadian constitution in favor 
of edicts issued as People's Laws. Admittedly, a 
commission was eventually appointed in 1982 to draft a 
"people's democracy constitution," but ongoing 
revolutionary processes forestalled its completion. The 
PRG seized control of all media, suppressing those mediums 
that it could not bring under its control. Arbitrary rule 
was further reinforced with aid from the People's 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (PRAF) and agents of the 
Ministry of the Interior. By early 1982, these agents were 
relaying on large-scale permanent detentions to deal with 
public dissatisfaction, dividing the island's population 
into groups that reflected the degree of threat they posed 
to the revolution.4
By mid-1983, Bishop and his associates came to be 
regarded as threats to the revolution because of personal 
and ideological differences with a more extreme faction in 
the PRG. Led by Bishop's deputy in the Political Bureau, 
Bernard Coard, this faction traced the PRG's increasingly 
precarious hold over state power to the party's failures to 
follow a stricter Leninist path.s
The remedy sought by committee members was joint 
leadership between Bishop and Coard. Bishop would remain
“Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in 
Grenada." Problems of Communism (July-August 1984): 507.
5Gordon K. Lewis, Grenada (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1987), 37-39, 45-46.
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the popular head of the Political Bureau but would give his 
chairmanship in the Central Committee to Coard, who was 
deemed more competent in matters of organization and 
ideology. Apparently, Bishop lacked the ideological 
vocabulary and zeal of his opponents. On September 25, 
Bishop pledged to the Central Committee that he would 
exercise greater self-criticism and attempt to overcome 
personal petit-bourgeois tendencies that had threatened the 
revolution. Faced with an overwhelming vote by committee 
members, Bishop further acceded to a position of joint 
leadership with Coard.6
Coard and his faction soon moved to make that 
position one of single leadership. Bishop had called for 
the issue of joint leadership to be reconsidered in a 
meeting of the Central Committee scheduled for the morning 
of October 12. Prior to the meeting, however, Coard and 
his followers made their move to seize total control of the 
PRG. Members of the PRA who were thought to be loyal to 
the Central Committee were assembled at 1:00 A.M. on the 
twelfth and instructed to accept no more orders from the 
disloyal Bishop. A later meeting at 7:00 A.M. among PRA 
members belonging to the party resulted in a call to expel 
all those who would not accept "joint leadership." Once 
the meeting had convened, a strong Bishop supporter named 
George Louison was removed from the party for telling
6Ibid.
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Grenadian students in Hungary that the issue of joint 
leadership remained unsettled. Another move against Bishop 
was the accusation that he, along with his security chief, 
had contrived a rumor of an assassination plot against 
himself by Coard. His security chief was arrested, and 
Bishop was forced to go on radio to try and quiet the 
rumor. The next day, October 13, Bishop was placed under 
house arrest.7
Following Bishop's arrest, his supporters organized a 
number of popular protests to stage his release and 
reinstatement in power. Those protests climaxed on October 
19 in the Grenadian capital, St. George's. Thousands of 
Grenadians, many from outside the city, freed Gairv and 
proceeded to occupy the fort overlooking St. George's, Fort 
Rupert. Armored cars and PRA troops arrived at the fort 
and began firing rocket grenades and machine guns at the 
fort and the crowd around it. From inside the fort, Bishop 
and several colleagues were forced to surrender. Soldiers 
lined them up and executed them.® That "Bloody Sunday" 
launched the brief military rule of the Revolutionary 
Military Council (RMC).
’Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Grenada (London: HamishHamilton, 1984), 122-126; Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike, Grenada (New York: St. Martin's, 1984),128-131.
‘Gregory Sandford and Richard Vigilante, Grenada (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1984), 163-165.
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Having accounted for successive phases of political 
turmoil in Grenada's history, it may be asked how that 
island nation came to occupy such a prominent position in 
U.S. national interests. Why would a large power like the 
United States intervene in an island nation 11 just 133 
square miles in size, with a mere 110,000 inhabitants, 
whose best-known export was nutmeg”?9
An important part of the answer to this question is 
Grenada's geopolitical situation as one of numerous small 
Caribbean nations emerging from the end of British 
colonialism. Grenada is the southernmost island in a chain 
extending 400 miles from just east of Puerto Rico to the 
north of Venezuela. Strategically, this chain controls 
passage between the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean 
Sea.10
It was not until the Carter and Reagan 
administrations, however, that Grenada figured prominently 
in considerations of U.S. interests in the Caribbean.
These administrations shared a number of broad goals for 
the region: discouraging the formation of governments with
links to the Soviet Union and its proxies; enhancing 
regional security arrangements and capabilities; promoting
9Payne, Sutton, and Thorndike, Grenada, 1.
10Adkin, Urgent Fury, 1.
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democracy and human rights; encouraging social reform; and 
promoting economic growth through both private and public 
sources -11
Initially, the PRG leadership did not seem to 
threaten U.S. goals in the Caribbean. Once in power,
Bishop and other PRG leaders decided to seek friendly 
relations with their foreign neighbors. Initially 
pessimistic about the consequences of Grenada's revolution, 
regional governments extended recognition to the PRG once 
they had received reassurances of early elections on the 
island. Accepting PRG promises to respect electoral 
processes and human rights, the Carter administration 
expressed its desire for continued friendly relations with 
Grenada.12
Those relations ran into immediate diplomatic 
difficulties with the PRG. Following a Cuban mission to 
Grenada on April 7, the U.S. ambassador to the east 
Caribbean, Frank Ortiz, met with Bishop and PRG cabinet 
members. Offering $5,000 in aid from his discretionary 
funds, Ortiz warned the PRG not to pursue stronger links to 
Cuba. By April 11, Cuba and Grenada decided to exchange
“One example of the Reagan administration's efforts to promote the last three goals was the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Robert Pastor, "U.S. Policy Toward the Caribbean" in American Intervention in Grenada. ed. Peter 
M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1985), 21.
12Sandford and Vigilante, Grenada. 49-51.
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ambassadors with each other. By April 13, Bishop announced 
on radio that no power would dictate Grenada's foreign 
policy, as if the island were in its "backyard.” On April 
14, arms and cement arrived in Grenada following a week- 
long journey by ship from Cuba.13
In light of these developments, mid-level State 
Department officials expressed doubts that U.S. development 
aid by itself was sufficient to curb emerging security 
threats in Grenada. Consideration was given to increased 
military training, arms sales, and other measures to 
protect Caribbean allies. These considerations reflected a 
growing concern for the spread of revolution in the region; 
however, the administration never came to regard the PRG as 
a major threat. Continuing concern over the lack of 
elections under the PRG, as well as human rights 
violations, remained confined to the State Department.14
The Reagan administration was to raise developments 
on the island to the status of a major security threat. 
Among the major concerns for administration officials was 
the construction of a 10,000-foot runway at Point Salines, 
Grenada. Ostensibly built for the tourist trade, the PRG 
construction project received funding from a range of
13Kai P. Schoenhals and Richard A. Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1985), 36-37.
14Ibid., 113-116.
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sources (i.e., Cuba, East Germany, the European Economic 
Community) in spite of U.S. efforts to block funds.
In two speeches in March 1983, President Reagan 
pointed out the geopolitical significance of Grenada. It 
was deemed a vital point along the southern underbelly of 
the United States, an area the Soviets would not hesitate 
to try to control in order to limit U.S. responses in other 
regions of the world. Moreover, connected in a triangle 
with Cuba and Nicaragua, Grenada was seen to threaten U.S. 
access to the Caribbean. Its airport could be used by both 
the Soviet Union and Cuba. According to Reagan, Grenada 
was becoming a base for both military and ideological 
aggression.15
Besides the Point Salines airport, there was other 
evidence to support the President's concern over Grenada as 
a possible base of communist aggression. From documents 
seized following the U.S. intervention, it became known 
that Cuba and the Soviet Union had entered into secret arms 
agreements with the PRG. Between October 1980 and July 
1982, agreements were signed that would have armed the PRG 
in increased increments. Under an agreement to cover the 
period between 1982 and 1985, Grenada was to receive a 
large shipment consisting of 50 armed personnel carriers,
ispresident, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1984), 
Ronald Reagan, 1983, 373, 440.
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60 mortars, 60 heavy guns, 50 portable rocket launches, and 
50 light antitank grenade launches- Not only did Grenadian 
military personnel receive Soviet training, but interparty 
agreements also provided for Grenadian civilians to be 
trained in espionage.16
If the Reagan administration's concerns over 
Grenada's military buildup were strong during the period of 
PRG rule, they became even more so during the rapid series 
of events following the Revolutionary Military Council's 
(RMC) takeover on October 19, 1983. RMC leaders 
established an immediate twenty-four hour curfew, giving 
orders to shoot violators on sight. Combined with the 
closure of Grenada's airports, an immediate problem for 
administration officials was the seizure of American 
hostages, as had happened in Iran.17
On October 20, U.S. Marines bound for Lebanon were 
ordered to the Caribbean by President Reagan. On October 
22, an urgent request was made by members of the 
Organization of East Caribbean States for U.S. assistance 
in restoring "order and democracy" in Grenada. Forty-eight 
hours later, President Reagan ordered Urgent Fury to 
commence.18
16Valenta and Valenta, Problems of Communism. 11-14.
17H.W. Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada,"Political Science Quarterly 102 (Winter 1987/88): 607-24.
lsIbid.
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The day that Urgent Fury began on October 25,
President Reagan spoke to reporters. He stated three
objectives for the intervention:
First, and of overriding importance, to protect 
innocent lives, including up to a thousand Americans, whose personal safety is, of course, paramount concern. Second, to forestall further chaos. And third, to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and 
order and of governmental institutions to the island of 
Grenada.
Restating these objectives, Reagan asserted that Urgent 
Fury was intended "to protect our own citizens, to 
facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave, and 
to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in 
Grenada. "19
In order to accomplish these political objectives, 
U.S. forces were expected to surprise and overwhelm enemy 
forces, seizing control of critical junctures on the island 
and paralyzing the enemy's command structure. Related 
objectives included the rescue of U.S. and other foreign 
nations, neutralization of enemy troops, and stabilization 
of Grenada's internal situation.20
These strategic objectives provided for a number of 
related tactical goals. U.S. Marines were assigned to gain
1STJ.S. President, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters," Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents (25 October 1983), vol. 19, no. 43, p. 1487.
2°Adkin, Urgent Fury. 345.
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control of the northern portion of Grenada. U.S. army 
rangers were assigned with the southern portion of the 
island. Special forces and navy SEALs were assigned 
certain objectives in the capital, St. George's: 
protecting Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, capturing the 
government radio station, and freeing political prisoners 
from Richmond Hill Prison. In the final phase of Urgent 
Fury, army paratroopers were to relieve southern forces, 
carry out mopping-up operations, and provide a law and 
order role until Caribbean peacekeepers arrived on the 
island.21
U.S. Mobilization
In seeking to fulfill the objectives of Urgent Fury, 
military planners faced two primary obstacles: time and
information. As the president later admitted, the "Joint 
Chiefs worked around the clock to come up with a plan.
They had little intelligence information about conditions 
on the island."22
U.S. intelligence sources estimated that Grenadian 
forces consisted of 1,200-1,500 PRA members and 2,000-5,000
21Ibid., 141-143.
22U.S. President, "Letter to the Speaker of the House 
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (25 October 1983), 
vol. 19, no. 43, p. 1501.
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militia members. It was also estimated that there were 700 
Cuban personnel on the island.23 Besides personal arms, 
it was believed that Grenadians and Cubans had up to twelve 
armored personnel carriers and six antiaircraft guns.24
Not knowing what resistance to expect, U.S. forces 
faced a worst case scenario. The Pearls Airport and 
Grenville in the north of the island were assigned to a 
Marine Amphibious Unit of about 800 marines (battalion 
size). Point Salines and the medical school to its west 
were assigned to about 600 ranger paratroopers (two 
battalions, each at half strength). SEALs, special forces, 
and reinforcing army paratroopers (two brigades) brought 
the number of U.S. forces in Grenada to approximately 6,000 
by October 28, when Urgent Fury had ended. U.S. forces had 
been joined by about 300 troops and police from the five 
OECS nations as well as Jamaica and Barbados.25
With the end of Urgent Fury, it became possible to 
account for casualties. It was estimated that 67 
Grenadians were killed, at least 17 of which died from the 
bombing of a mental hospital and one of which was a boy 
killed by a U.S. soldier. About 350 Grenadians were
23Cuban personnel consisted of approximately 40 military advisors and over 650 construction workers with reserve training. Adkin, Urgent Fury. 159.
24Ibid., 344.
2SIbid., 143-144; Payne, Sutton, and Thorndike, Grenada, 159-160.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 4 9
wounded. Cuban casualties included 24 dead as well as 59 
wounded and 602 unwounded who were returned to Cuba. U.S. 
casualties included 19 killed.26
U.S. Public Support
Urgent Fury's beginnings were marked by a scarcity of 
public information, except that which was either approved 
or provided by the Reagan administration- Direct media 
coverage from Grenada was not officially permitted until 
October 27. Yet, by that date, President Reagan had 
addressed the nation, raising public support for Urgent 
Fury.27
On October 24, before the main forces of Urgent Fury 
began combat, President Reagan informed five congressional 
leaders about the imminence of hostilities, but he did not 
ask their opinions.28 The next morning, the president
2<sAdkin, Urgent Fury. 308-09.
27Marcia Block and Geoff Mungham, "The Military, the Media and the Invasion of Grenada,” Contemporary Crises 13 (1989): 91-127.
28The five included Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill (D-Mass.), House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D- 
Tex.), House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.), Senate Majority Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), and Senate Minority 
Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.). Michael Rubner, "The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada, Political Science Quarterly 100 
(Winter 1985-86): 630-31.
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spoke to the entire leadership of Congress, telling them 
about the earlier commencement of hostilities.29
On October 26, Representative Clement Zabiocki (D- 
Wis.) introduced H.J. Res. 402 in order to mandate that the 
sixty-day limit for troop involvement in Grenada had come 
in to effect the previous day under the War Powers 
Resolution. The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 33 
to 2 in favor of H.J. Res 402 on October 27. The measure 
was adopted by the whole House of Representatives on 
November 1, with 403 in favor of it (256 Democrats and 147
Republicans) and 23 against it.30
Utilizing language identical to H.J. Res. 402,
Senator Gary Hart (D-Col.) raised the sixty-day time limit 
before the Senate as an amendment to another bill. That 
bill, which increased the national debt limit, was approved 
on October 28 by a vote of 64 to 20. The amendment, 
however, was defeated and left out of the debt-limiting 
bill approved in conference on November 17. Because 
Congress adjourned the next day, no joint legislation was 
passed to limit the time for U.S. forces to remain in 
Grenada.31
It was perhaps fortunate for those in Congress who
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to do so before adjournment. From the outset of Urgent 
Fury, before any on site press coverage, the public 
expressed its approval of the intervention. An ABC- 
Wash incrton Post poll conducted on October 25 indicated the 
58 percent approved of the ninvasion," as against 32 
percent who disapproved of it. A Gallup-Newsweek survey 
between October 26 and 27 gave 53 percent approval, to 34 
percent disapproval, for U.S. military participation with 
Caribbean allies in the "invasion."32
On October 27, President Reagan addressed the nation 
regarding the deaths of over 200 marines in Lebanon from a 
bomb attack on October 23, as well as discussing overall 
events in Grenada. Following that speech, public approval 
for Urgent Fury was given a boost. A Garth Analysis survey 
of registered voters on October 29 showed that 65 percent 
favored U.S. intervention, while only 25 percent opposed 
it. A Harris Survey on October 28 found 68 percent who 
thought the president was right to invade and take over 
Grenada, as opposed to 26 percent who thought it was not a 
correct action.33
Following signs that Urgent Fury was a success, 
public approval again increased. On November 3, a third 
ABC-Washinaton Post poll showed 71 percent approval, to 22 
percent disapproval for Urgent Fury. A Roper survey in
32Public Opinion Online.
33Ibia.
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early December showed 60 percent strongly to moderately in 
favor of the action, while 26 percent were moderately to 
strongly opposed to it.34
Military and Nonmilitary Means
Given the rapid and decisive nature of Urgent Fury, 
the U.S. public had little time to express major 
disapproval of the intervention.35 Moreover, under the 
conditions that evolved between the time the RMC assumed 
power and the beginning of combat, the Reagan 
administration was either unwilling or unable to forestall 
military preparations in favor of nonmilitary efforts to 
achieve its objectives.
Before resorting to force, Reagan had used 
nonmilitary means (e.g., efforts to withhold international 
funds) in his efforts to isolate Grenada's leaders even 
before the RMC came to power. Given its emphasis on 
security related interests, it was unlikely that the
34 Ibid.
35Urgent Fury demonstrates the "halo effect1 of quick, 
successful operations very clearly. Public opinion under such circumstances must be regarded with caution. 
Jentleson, "Pretty-prudent Public."
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 5 3
administration would choose to negotiate with leaders 
demonstrably more violent than the preceding PRG.36
Conclusion
Probably the most important consequence of Urgent 
Fury was that it set a precedent for subsequent limited war 
efforts. That precedent was reflected in the behavior of 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Initially cautious 
about the actual intervention, especially following the 
deaths of 200 marines in Beirut, Weinberger lent Urgent 
Fury his support only after he had determined that force 
was being used as a last resort and that such force was 
going to be decisive.37
In order to understand the secretary's insistence on 
a decisive use of force, it must be recognized that he and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were hesitant to intervene in 
Grenada based on the experience of Vietnam.38 It was in 
order to prevent another such prolonged conflict, that
36It would be difficult to overstate administration concerns for a potential hostage situation in Grenada. Of course, some might argue that U.S. citizens were not really 
in danger and served primarily as an added justification to overthrow a communist government. Schoenhals and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada. 130-136.
37Rubner, "The Invasion of Grenada," 635; Brands, "Decisions on American Armed Intervention," 617-18.
38Gacek, Logic of Force. 260.
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Weinberger enunciated six criteria to guide subsequent 
military actions (as detailed in chapter 1 and appendix 1).
Over a year after presenting those criteria, the
secretary wrote
According to theories developed in the 1950s and early 
1960s, limited war was essentially a diplomatic instrument— a total for bargaining with the enemy . . . . The gradual application of American conventional power, combined with the threat of incremental increases in the application of that power would, 
according to the theorists, persuade America's opponents to accept a settlement while they avoided strategic defeat-39
In their assessment of the length of time needed to achieve
such settlements, the secretary argued that the theorists
neglected "the domestic political realities of American
democracy. "4°
The question remained after Grenada, how can public 
support be gained and maintained over the course of a 
limited war. It became vital for the U.S. public to know 
what the objectives were to which it lent support. Even 
though conditions in Grenada were not favorable to lengthy 
discussion, communicated objectives were a vital political 
resource. The problem for the public was an inadequate 
period in which to debate the relative risks associated 
with intervention in Grenada. That was not the problem six
39Caspar Weinberger, U.S. Defense Strategy," Foreign Affairs 64 (Spring 1986), 684.
4°Ibid., 684-85.
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Panama.
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CHAPTER 6 
U.S INTERVENTION IN PANAMA
'Very early on the morning of December 20, 1989, U.S. 
forces engaged the regular and irregular forces of Panama 
in Operation Just Cause. About six and one-half hours 
later, President George Bush publicly announced the 
intervention, his reasons for ordering it, and his 
intentions to withdraw U.S. forces from combat as soon as 
possible. President Bush went on to point out that "key 
military objectives" had already "been achieved" and that 
"most organized resistance" had already "been 
eliminated."1 With the surrender of Panama's President, 
General Manuel Noriega, on January 3, 1990, Bush announced 
the achievement of all U.S. objectives in Panama and the 
first withdrawal of combat forces from that nation.2
The relative speed with which what was called 
Operation "Just Cause" achieved its objectives in Panama
President, "Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (25 December 1989) vol. 25, no. 51, 
pp. 1974-75.
President, "Remarks Announcing the Surrender of General Manuel Noriega to United States Authorities in Panama," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (8 
January 1990) vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 8-9.
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demonstrates a number of important issues with respect to 
the evolution of knowledge used in waging limited wars. 
First, the concept of limited war in Just Cause was the 
same as that in Operation Urgent Fury (i.e., the use of 
rapid and overwhelming force in order to prevent a 
prolonged conflict). Second, Just Cause reflected an 
escalation from unconventional to limited war. In this 
regard, both the Reagan and Bush administrations had 
previously attempted to achieve U.S. objectives in Panama 
through nonmilitary means (e.g., economic sanctions).
Third, Just Cause demonstrated the familiarity of American 
decisionmakers with conditions favoring decisive military 
action (e.g., clear objectives, superior combat resources). 
Nevertheless, the intervention's outcome demonstrated the 
limitations of such knowledge.
Historical Background
Operation Just Cause had antecedents in earlier 
efforts to influence Panama's political development. Those 
efforts extended back to the late 1840s before Panama even 
existed as a nation (explained more fully below). Still, 
it was not until the late 1960s that the United States had 
to deal with a military government in Panama.
In 1968, the Panamanian national guard launched a 
1968 coup which removed the country's commercial elite from
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power and led to a regime controlled by General Omar 
Torrijos. Torrijos relied on his charisma and the delivery 
of economic benefits to maintain support.3 In this 
regard, his regime was vulnerable due to its dependence on 
revenues from services (e.g., shipping, banking, 
warehousing) whose production was mainly under foreign 
control (e.g., the Panama Canal).“
By the late 1970s, poor economic growth, along with 
rising foreign debt, threatened Torrijos7 power base and 
provided President Jimmy Carter with diplomatic leverage to 
resolve the longstanding issue of control over the Panama 
Canal (as discussed below). In 1977, Torrijos and Carter 
concluded treaties providing for the gradual transfer of 
the canal to Panamanian control.
Torrijos died in 1981, enabling General Manuel 
Noriega to become commander in chief by 1983. Noriega 
transformed the national guard into a much larger and 
better equipped military/police force, the Panama Defense 
Force (PDF). The PDF rapidly took control of Panama's 
transportation network, along with customs and immigration 
services. Although outwardly necessary for the defense and 
operation of the canal, these actions enabled the Noriega
3Steve C. Ropp, Panamanian Politics (New York:
Praeger, 1982), chaps. 2-5.
“Andrew Zimbalist and John Weeks, Panama at theCrossroads (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1991), 17-18.
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regime to extract increasing amounts of legal and illegal 
funds from the service economy to privately benefit regime 
members and insure regime survival.s
The PDF's expansion and economic hold were paralleled 
by Noriega's consolidation of political power. Following a 
1984 election rife with allegations of fraud by the 
opposition, the pro-PDF coalition candidate, Nicolas 
Barletta, became Panama's president.6 Unresponsive to 
civilian authority, Noriega removed Barletta from office 
nearly a year later.7
The Reagan administration had given official 
recognition to Barletta's regime despite alleged electoral 
fraud.8 After limited efforts to prevent his removal, 
administration officials continued working with his
^teve C. Ropp, "Explaining the Long-Term Maintenance of a Military Regime: Panama before the U.S. Invasion,”
World Politics 44 (January 1992): 225-27.
6Evidence of electoral fraud is given by Ricardo Arias 
Calderon, "Panama: Disaster or Democracy?," ForeignAffairs 62(Winter 1987/88), 328-47.
■’Noriega removed Barletta for several reasons:Barletta's advocacy of economic austerity measures and Noriega's need for an economic scapegoat, Barletta's lack of popular support and Noriega's need for a more easily controlled president, and Noriega's need to prevent public 
awareness of crises facing the PDF (i.e., its role in the brutal 1985 murder of prominent Noriega opponent Hugo 
Spadafora and fragmenting leadership). John Dinges, Our Man in Panama (New York: Random House, 1990), 215-28.
“President Reagan received president-elect Barletta in the Oval Office in July 1986, and Secretary of State 
Schultz attended Barletta's inauguration in October.
Ibid., 194-198.
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successor, Eric Delvalle. In its dealings with both 
presidents, the Reagan administration declared that stable 
democracy was the best means of securing long-term U.S. 
interests under the canal treaties and decided that 
Noriega's growing political influence would not prevent 
Panama from developing such democracy.9
A key reason why democratization was not actively 
pursued by the Reagan administration was that cooperation 
with Noriega and the PDF enabled American officials to 
combat communism in Central America through covert 
means.10 Officials in Washington compromised on 
democratization in order to avoid losing PDF security 
assistance and possibly creating new political instability 
that would disrupt implementation of the canal treaties.11
Events in 1986 called into question the grounds for 
cooperating with Noriega and led to a growing consensus for 
his removal. In the spring, Senator Jesse Helms (D.-N.C.) 
chaired hearings which sparked further congressional
’Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Human Rights and International 
Organizations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Human Rights and Political Developments in Panama. 99th Cong., 
2nd sess., 29 April and 23 July 1986, 4-5, 30, 76.
10Reagan officials sought to reverse the Sandinista hold on Nicaragua via the Contra insurgency and, thereby, to counter Nicaraguan support for Salvadoran insurgents. See Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1988); Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads (New York: Pantheon, 1989).
“Congress, Human Rights. 42-46.
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investigations of corruption and repression under 
Noriega.12 Subsequent press coverage publicized Noriega's 
doubledealings with U.S. security and drug enforcement 
officials on one hand, and communists, terrorists, and drug 
traffickers, on the other.13 The Iran-Contra scandal in 
November could only provide additional publicity to the 
administration's dealings with Noriega.14
Relations with Noriega were still favorable enough to 
allow President Reagan to certify on March 1, 1987, that 
Panama had "fully cooperated" with U.S. drug enforcement 
efforts over the past year. Yet, three events in Jurie 1987 
would prompt the Reagan administration to decide to remove 
Noriega from power. When Noriega forced his Chief of 
Staff, Colonel Roberto Diaz Harrera, to resign, Harrera 
publicly accused Noriega of involvement in assassinations, 
electoral frauds, and drug trafficking. These accusations 
served as a rallying point for the Panamanian National 
Civil Crusade, a broad coalition of civic, business, and
“Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Situation in Panama, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 March and 21 April 1986.
“Seymour Hersh, "Panamanian Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms, and Illicit Money," New York Times. 12 June 
1986, 1 and 6. This article was the first in an influential series by the author.
“Margaret E. Scranton, The Noriega Years (Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 105. The Iran-Contra scandalundercut covert support for the Contras as a viable policy, removed officials stressing the need to cooperate with Noriega, and placed a premium on the need to refurbish the Reagan administration's public image.
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religious groups, to launch major demonstrations calling 
for a return to democracy. In response to these 
development, the Senate passed S.Res. 239 by a margin of 
84-2. Expressing support for human rights and the 
evolution of democracy in Panama, the resolution called for 
Noriega to step down until charges against him were 
investigated.15
As will be discussed below, S.Res. 329 marked the 
beginning of a two-year crisis in which Noriega became an 
increasing threat to U.S. interests in Panama. Viewed as a 
period of escalating unconventional war, the crisis 
involved efforts by both the Reagan and Bush 
administrations to employ various means for removing 
Noriega from power and thereby promoting stability and 
democracy in Panama. It was hoped that the Panamanians 
themselves (both civilians and PDF members) would join in 
achieving the objective. This combination of means did 
isolate Noriega but, in so doing, further increased his 
reliance on force to stay in power; in turn, this created a 
volatile political situation. By late December 1989, 
President Bush had determined that conventional war against 
the PDF was necessary to effect political change in Panama.
15Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Restricting United States Assistance to Panama. 100th 
Cong., 1st sess., 15 December 1987, 2-3.
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U.S. Interests in Panama
American efforts to influence Panama's political 
development stemmed in large part from that nation's 
location. Panama occupies the narrowest portion of the 
isthmus connecting North and South America and separating 
the Caribbean Sea from the Pacific Ocean. Panama's 
location has made it a site of military and commercial 
transit where the United States has retained treaty 
interests since the late 1840s.16
Those interests were clearly demonstrated by 
President Theodore Roosevelt. In August 1903, Colombia 
refused to grant U.S. rights to construct a canal across 
the isthmus. Roosevelt provided U.S. naval forces to help 
Panama gain independence from Colombia in November 1903, 
leading to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty between the United 
States and a newly independent Republic of Panama. In 
return for $10 million outright, and a $250,000 annuity to 
begin in 1912, Panama granted the United States the use, 
occupation, and control in perpetuity of a zone ten miles 
wide through which to construct a canal. As the guarantor 
of Panama's independence, the United States gained the 
right to intervene anywhere in Panama to maintain political
1<sThe Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty, signed with Colombia, gave the United States rights to use military force to protect transit across the isthmus. David N. Farnsworth and James W. McKenney, U.S.-Panama Relations. 1903-1978 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 15.
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stability. Within a year of the beginning of canal 
construction, Roosevelt interpreted the Monroe Doctrine to 
provide a policing role for the United States among its 
southern neighbors. According to the Roosevelt Corollary, 
U.S. intervention was justified when the "chronic 
wrongdoing" or inefficiency of governments to the south 
threatened to provide a pretext for European 
intervention.17
The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty remained the primary 
statement of U.S. interests in Panama for nearly three- 
quarters of a century. In January 1964, Panamanian 
frustration with the treaty led to mob violence in which 
there was widespread property damage and casualties, 
including the loss of four U.S. soldiers. After his 
reelection later that year, President Lyndon Johnson called 
for new treaties to replace the 1903 treaty. Along with 
Panama's President Robles, Johnson announced in late 1965 
that new treaties would more firmly establish Panamanian 
sovereignty over the Canal Zone and fix the time period 
during which the United States would continue to defend and 
operate the canal. Treaty drafts produced with the 
Panamanians in June 1967 contained two main provisions for 
U.S. interests. First, American control of the canal would 
not be given up until 1999. Second, the United States
17Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 152-193.
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would retain military bases in Panama until 2004, beyond 
which date base leases were open to renewal.18
These provisions were rejected by the Torrijos regime 
in December 1970. When treaty negotiations resumed in June 
1971, the regime was still unable to exact concessions from 
the Nixon administration that would significantly alter 
control of the" canal and surrounding territory.
Thereafter, the regime moved to internationalize 
negotiations. Working through the United Nations and the 
Organization of American States, the regime was able to 
gain the support of various nations by portraying U.S. 
control of the canal as imperialism, similar to Britain's 
former control of the Suez Canal. In March 1973, the 
United States vetoed a resolution by the U.N. Security 
Council meeting in Panama City. The resolution referred to 
a new canal treaty guaranteeing Panama control of its 
entire territory. Apart from communist nations, the 
Torrijos regime was supported in this and later instances 
by non-aligned Third World nations, especially in Latin 
America.19
International support for the Panamanian government 
on the canal issue served primarily to reinforce earlier
18Ibid., 108-115; Department of State, Department of 
State Bulletin 53 (18 October 1965), 625.
19Farnsworth and McKenney, U.S.-Panama Relations, ch.
7; Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Chronology of Events Relating to Panama Canal. 95th Cong., 
1st sess, December 1977, 9.
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attempts by President Nixon to establish a realistic 
balance between U.S. interests and the costs of supporting 
them (explained more fully in the discussion of the Nixon 
Doctrine in chapter 4).20 Seeking to decrease the role of 
U.S. combat troops in a changing global order, the 
President had encouraged the efforts of Third World nations 
to secure their own political futures and to assume 
responsibility for their own defense.21
In February 1974, the need to open a "new dialogue"
with Latin America, and considering the limits of U.S.
power to direct political events in the Third World, the
Nixon administration agreed to a joint "Statement of
Principles" with the Torrijos regime. The statement called
for a new canal treaty
with a fixed expiration date . . . , with provision for phased termination of U.S. jurisdiction in the Canal Zone, increasing Panama's share of the economic 
benefits, and growing participation by Panama in the 
operation and defense of the Canal during the life of the new treaty, after which Panama would assume sole control .22
Continuing through the Ford administration, concern 
about the duration of U.S. control over the canal and
2°The Nixon administration had a major "need for economic cooperation with Latin America: and confronted "a growing anti-United States bloc among the southern 
nations," according to LaFeber, Panama Canal. 144.
21President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1972), Richard Nixon, 1970, 9.
22Congress, Chronology r 10.
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military base leases dominated public debate in the United 
States and stalled implementation of the joint statement's 
principles. The terms of the debate were reflected by 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in September 1975. Even 
as he worked to give Panama a greater economic and military 
stake in the canal, he remarked that "the United States 
must maintain the right, unilaterally, to defend the Panama 
Canal for an indefinite future."23
President Jimmy Carter came into office with ten 
general foreign policy goals. One of these goals was to 
improve relations with the nations of the Third World and, 
thereby, to achieve certain subsidiary objectives: to
promote economic growth and stability among Third World 
nations, to lessen the Soviet Union's ability to influence 
those nations, to decrease the anti-American attitudes and 
diplomacy of those nations, and to provide them with 
tangible incentives to cooperate with the Western 
democracies.
President Carter saw new canal treaties as a 
particular opportunity to demonstrate America's commitment 
to cooperation with Third World nations in resolving their 
economic and political problems. The Panama Canal was a 
focal point of the President's efforts to reorient the
23Ibid., 12-23. The Kissinger quote is from page 13 of this source.
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international order and U.S. interests from Cold War 
security concerns, towards human rights.24
With resolution of the canal issue as a top priority, 
Panama's internal situation remained a salient factor in 
the Carter administration's consideration of American 
interests. Seeking to prevent violence over the canal, 
while assuring continued U.S. access, the Carter 
administration sought one treaty which would provide an 
increasing role for Panama in the canal's operation and 
defense until the year 2000. The administration called for 
another treaty to assure the permanent neutrality of the 
canal beyond that date. Under both treaties, the 
administration sought to maintain the U.S. right to transit 
and defend the canal.25 As the President noted in March 
1977, negotiations with the Torrijos regime were intended 
"to phase out our [U.S.] military operations in the Panama 
Canal Zone, but to guarantee that even after the year 2000" 
the United States "would still be able to keep the Panama 
Canal open to" U.S. and other ships.26
The Carter administration made a number of 
assumptions about U.S. interests in pursuing treaty
24Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1983), 52-54; Jimmy Carter, Keening Faith (New York: Bantam, 1982), 139-186.
2SBrzezinski, Power and Principle. 51; Carter, Keeping Faith, 157-158.
26Congress, Chronology. 26.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 6 9
negotiations with the Torrijos regime. These assumptions 
were based on the Johnson and Nixon administrations' 
negotiating experiences. First, the United States had 
interests in assuring the continued neutrality, security, 
and operation of the canal, but those interests no longer 
required its continued operation and control by American 
personnel. Second, the political costs of controlling the 
canal (e.g., Panamanian and Latin American resentment, 
communist exploitation of the canal issue, and potential 
sabotage by Panamanian nationalists) had increased, while 
its strategic value had decreased. Third, U.S. interests 
were better served by granting Panama a growing economic 
and military role in the canal's security than by strict 
reliance on U.S. military force.27 Fourth, while U.S. 
treaty and base rights in Panama ought to reflect similar 
arrangements with other nations, the United States could 
not abandon the right to take actions considered necessary 
to protect its interests in Panama.28 Based on these 
assumptions, the 1977 canal treaties left open the
^In July 1976, a joint U.S. and Defense Department report was released containing a worst-case scenario in which 100,000 U.S. soldiers would be needed to defend the canal against a Cuban-backed Panamanian attack. Even against more probably, less severe threats, the "continuous operation of the canal could not be ensured," according to the report. Ibid., 20.
28Department of State, The Panama Canal Treaties— in the National Interest (Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofState, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, 18 October 1977), 1-5; LaFeber, Panama Canalf 158;Scranton, Noriega Years. 20-21.
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possibility of U.S. intervention, and they led General 
Torrijos to promise to reinstate democratic institutions in 
Panama.
The Reagan administration accepted similar promises 
in its dealings with Noriega until June 1987. Relations 
with his regime fit a general pattern in which the Reagan 
White House deemed such authoritarian regimes less 
threatening to U.S. interests than the expansive 
totalitarianism of communist regimes in the Soviet Union, 
Cuba, and Nicaragua. Demands on authoritarian regimes to 
protect human rights through the development of democratic 
institutions were thought mainly to create instability 
exploitable by communists.29 In this view, communists 
used "human rights less as a standard and a goal than as a 
political weapon; . . .  to expand the scope of their 
hegemony."30 The administration would continue only to 
declare its support for the efforts of those seeking 
democracy under regimes such as Noriega's.
These measures included economic, security, and 
diplomatic assistance rather than a direct combat role for
“Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary. November 1979, 35-44. It would be difficult to overstate the significance of this article on 
the Reagan administration's subsequent treatment of human rights.
3°Department of State, "Double Standards in Human Rights," Current Policy No. 353 (Washington, DC: U.S.Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, December 
1981), 2.
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U.S. forces in Latin America.31 This reflected in part 
the views of American military leaders who were "opposed to 
committing U.S. forces to the region unless" public opinion 
supported "it and [military] commanders" were "given a 
freer hand in waging war than they had in Vietnam."32 
Moreover, the Reagan administration faced an uneasy 
compromise between respect for Latin American sovereignty 
in resolving regional concerns and a need to be actively 
engaged in the region.33
The Reagan Doctrine was issued in part as an answer 
to the above concerns. Essentially a means of waging 
unconventional war against communism, the doctrine relied 
primarily on indigenous forces "to defy Soviet-supported 
aggression and secure [democratic] rights" enjoyed by the 
U.S. public. As long as communism remained the main threat 
to global democracy, support even for authoritarian regimes 
remained a matter of "self-defense" for the United
31Department of State, "U.S. Interests in Central America," Current Policy No. 576 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, May 1984), 1-5.
“George C. Wilson, "Top U.S. Brass Wary on Central America," Washington Post. 24 June 1983, sec. A, p. 20.
“Department of State, "An End to Tyranny in Latin America," Current Policy No. 777 (Washington, DC: U.S.Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, January
1986), 1-4.
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States.34 In this regard, Washington believed that 
cooperation with the Noriega regime provided certain 
benefits to the Reagan administration's efforts in Latin 
America: protection of the Panama Canal; maintaining
regional military bases and facilities from which to 
"covertly” train, fund, and supply anti-communist forces; 
and preserving significant intelligence sources.35
These benefits were beginning to be reevaluated in 
the spring of 1986. Public attention was drawn to 
questionable activities by Noriega and the Panama Defense 
Force (PDF) (i.e., drug trafficking, political repression, 
and cooperation with communist regimes) which threatened 
U.S. interests. A statement of these interests by 
Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams revealed the 
increasing difficulty of working with Noriega, while at the 
same time it reaffirmed reasons for doing so. As Abrams 
explained, the United States had to do the following: 
continue treaty obligations for the operation and defense 
of the Panama Canal and use of military bases, assure long­
term commercial and military transit across Panama; insure 
legal financial, commercial, and trade access to Panama by 
U.S. firms (as opposed to illicit financial and
34President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1987), Ronald Reagan, 1985, 1: 135.
35Scranton, Noriega Years. 8-14.
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transhipment activities by drug traffickers); cooperate 
with Panama to deny use of that nation by those hostile to 
the United States; and to protect U.S. citizens and assets 
in Panama. To insure these interests for the remainder of 
the century and beyond, it was necessary to encourage 
Panamanians to develop democratic institutions, while 
minimizing U.S. interference which would jeopardize that 
de ve 1 opmen t.36
The Reagan and Bush administrations maintained this 
position as part of an unconventional war begun against the 
Noriega regime in July 1987. In an adaptation of the 
Reagan Doctrine, both administrations relied predominantly 
on Panamanians (whether civilians or PDF members) to end 
Noriega's rule and set Panama on a path to stable 
democracy.37
Until negotiations broke down in late May 1988, the 
Reagan administration used various means (e.g., economic 
sanctions and offers to drop federal indictments for drug 
trafficking) to try to talk Noriega out of power. 
Thereafter, the best scenarios American officials could 
project for Noriega's removal involved a prolonged crisis
36Congress, Situation in Panama. 98-109.
37Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Recent Developments in Panama. 100th Cong., 1st sess., 18, 24, and 
25 June 1987, 17-18; Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Developments Concerning the National Emergency with Respect to Panama, message from the President, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 10 April 1989, 1-2.
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in which pressures would continue, effective civilian or 
PDF opposition would remain unlikely, and Washington's 
military options would remain open.3*
This proved to be an accurate scenario. In response 
to a victory by U.S.-assisted political opponents, Noriega 
annulled Panama's May 1989 elections, used paramilitary 
forces to repress opposition members violently, and 
installed a caretaker president.39 Previously, President 
Bush had ranked Noriega's regime along with the Sandinista 
regime in Nicaragua as leading threats to Latin America 
democracy and had refused to recognize any Panamanian 
government elected by fraud.40 In October 1989, Noriega 
purged the PDF after its members failed to depose him in a 
coup partially aided by U.S. forces. With little 
likelihood remaining that the PDF might be reformed, the 
Bush administration stepped up planning efforts to include 
conventional operations to destroy the PDF as an effective 
fighting force.41
3®Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Political Situation in Panama and Options for U.S. Policy. 100th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 20 April, 4 May, and 1 June 1988, 133- 142.
39Dinges, Our Man. 304.
40President, "Remarks to the Council of the Americas," 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (8 May 1989) vol. 25, no. 18, pp. 650-52.
41Scranton, Noriega Years. 185-96.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 7 5
President Bush publicly justified his decision to
initiate conventional operations against the PDF with the
point that he had "no higher obligation than to safeguard
the lives of American citizens."42 The President's
concern stemmed from the fact that on December 15, 1989,
the National Assembly of Representatives (a new body
created by Noriega after the October PDF coup) passed a
resolution stating that
Panama is declared to be in a state of war while the
aggression [by the United States] lasts ........ Toconfront this aggression, . . . Manuel Antonio Noriega is designated . . .  as Maximum Leader for national liberation.43
The next day, PDF troops short and killed a U.S. 
soldier, wounded a second, beat up a third, and threatened 
the third's wife "with sexual abuse." Although similar 
threats had faced U.S. military and canal personnel for the 
past two years, the "state of war" convinced President Bush 
of "an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in 
Panama."44 In effect, it did not matter whether that 
danger was intentional or reflected Noriega's lack of 
control over the PDF.
Other interests affected President Bush's decision to 
intervene against the PDF. First, Panamanians had been 
unable to establish stable democratic institutions with
42President, "Military Action in Panama," 1974.
43Dinges, Our Man. 306.
44President, "Military Action in Panama," 1974.
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earlier U.S. assistance. Second, Noriega was an indicted 
drug trafficker who could not be apprehended like other 
such persons and he has an individual with whom Bush had 
refused to negotiate since running for president. Third, 
since President Bush withheld recognition from the 
government installed by Noriega, treaty provisions calling 
for a Panamanian canal administrator by January 1, 1990, 
could only be implemented with a recognized government.45 
In any case, the Bush administration would not deal with a 
"political system other than a functioning democracy" in 
Panama. No other system was deemed able to "provide the 
political stability and the economic strength which" was 
"indispensable for the Canal's continuing safe and 
efficient operation" into the next century.46
U.S. Objectives in Panama
In his national address on December 20, 1989, 
President Bush indicated that there were four long-standing 
reasons for ordering American intervention. After a crisis 
of "nearly 2 years," Washington's goals remained "to 
safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in
45Ibid., 1974-75; Congress, Political Situation, 143- 
44; Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf, Strategic Importance of the Panama Canal. 101st Cong., 1st sess., 2 November 1989, 37.
46Ibid., 54.
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Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the 
integrity of the Panama Canal treaty [sic].1,47 In a 
written communication to Speaker of the House Thomas Foley, 
the President reiterated these goals and noted that the 
intervention was "an exercise of the right of self-defense 
recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations charter."48
As the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Colin Powell had to provide strategic content to 
the nation's political objectives. General Powell held 
that the intervention's strategic objectives were to 
provide
continuing freedom of transit through the Panama Canal, 
freedom from PDF abuse and harassment, freedom to exercise U.S. treaty rights and responsibilities, the removal of Noriega from power in Panama, the removal of 
Noriega's cronies and accomplices from office, the creation of a PDF responsive to and supportive of an emergent democratic government in Panama, and a freely elected GOP [government of Panama] which is allowed to govern.49
Powell associated certain principles with these 
objectives, including the use of maximum surprise, unity of 
command, minimization of collateral damage, use of minimum
“’President, "Military Action in Panama," 1974.
48Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Deployment of United States Forces to Panama. communication from the President, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 23 January 
1990, 1.
49William C. Bennett, "Just Cause and the Principles of War," Military Review 71 (March 1991): 3.
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necessary force, and plans for post-combat operations to 
support Panama's democratic authorities.50
Based on these objectives and principles, General
Powell assigned General Maxwell Thurman (the new commander
in chief of U.S. Southern Command) the mission to
conduct joint offensive operations to neutralize the 
PDF and other combatants, as required, so as to protect U.S. lives, property, and interests in Panama and to 
assure the full treaty rights accorded by international law and the U.S. Panama Canal treaties.51
This mission was to be accomplished in three phases. 
In the first phase, operations were to be conducted such 
that the PDF would be neutralized and held in place,
Noriega would be captured, government officials elected by 
Panamanians in May 1989 would be installed, and U.S. 
citizens and facilities would be protected as close to the 
onset of combat as possible. The second phase called for 
operations to establish law and order and provide 
transitional support for the newly-installed government.
The third phase was to consist of nation-building 
activities, which would eventually be turned over to 
civilian agencies of the U.S. government. "These phases 
were intended to and in fact did overlap, with no clear 
breaks between them."52
Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., Battle for Panama (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993), 40.
51Ibid.
S2Ibid., 41.
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A key objective of the above operations was removing
Noriega from power in Panama and bringing him "to justice
in the United States.,,S3 At the tactical level, Noriega's
apprehension could be accomplished by any U.S. forces but
was assigned specifically to special operations forces.S4
Even without specific attention, planners estimated
that the concentration of forces against the Panama 
City-Canal complex would essentially clamp down on the city. The effort was likened to casting a net over the 
city, prohibiting any movement. If any of the initial raids failed, planners thought the net would capture Noriega.55
In practice, conventional operations would deny Noriega 
freedom of movement and the means of waging war.
An explicit objective of tactical operations was to
move as rapidly as possible toward strategic and then
political conditions in which the "freely elected"
Panamanian government could govern effectively.56 Within
the primary area of operations, the commander ordered that
in all cases, PDF forces which display no hostile intent will be offered the opportunity to surrender. I 
do not want to force PDF units into a fight when they might otherwise either support U.S. actions or wish to avoid [sic] engaging U.S. forces.S7
“President, "Military Action in Panama," 1974. 
“Flanagan, Battle for Panama. 81.
5SBennett, 1 Just Cause, " 4.
S6Ibid., 3.
“Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Investigations Subcommittee, The Invasion of Panama: How
Many Innocent Bystanders Perished?. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 
7 July 1992, 220-21.
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Outside Panama City, airborne forces were told that
a measured application of force will be used, when possible, to minimize collateral damage to non- combatants, limit economic hardship to the Panamanian populace, and facilitate rebuilding the PDF.58
As at the political and strategic levels, command 
decisions at the tactical level had to weigh the costs of 
offensive action against those of limiting such action. At 
all three levels of authority, it was decided that the 
prolongation of hostilities represented the greatest threat 
to life and property.
U.S. Mobilization
An important step in American efforts to avoid 
prolonged conflict was the push to normalize U.S.- 
Panamanian relations from the outset. Generally believed 
to have won Panama's May 1989 election, presidential 
candidate Guillermo Endara and his two vice-presidential 
running mates were sworn into office at a U.S. military 
base north of Panama City less than an hour before U.S. 
forces began offensive operations. Still under American 
protection, President Endara called on PDF members to offer 
no resistance to U.S. forces. In his announcement of the 
intervention, President Bush acknowledged the resumption of 
diplomatic ties with Panama and steps undertaken with the
5SIbid., 220.
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Endara government to help restore Panama's economy 
following prolonged U.S. sanctions.59
The main effort to avoid a prolonged conflict 
involved conventional operations against the PDF and 
irregular Panamanian forces known as Dignity Battalions. 
President Bush "ordered the deployment of approximately
11.000 additional [stateside] U.S. forces to Panama" to 
carry out offensive operations simultaneously "with the
13.000 U.S. forces already present" in Panama.60 
According to the Director of Operations for the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the decision to send 11,000 reinforcements 
from the United States to participate in initial operations 
reflected the requirements of overwhelming and surprising 
opponents. (Of the 13,000 U.S. forces in Panama, 6,000 did 
not have combat as their main function).61
The PDF threat was estimated to include the 
following: 3,500 combat personnel at thirteen objective
areas in Panama City and around Panama, twenty paramilitary 
Dignity Battalions with between 25 and 250 members each, 
and 11,500 police, customs, and administrative personnel 
maintaining control of the Panamanian infrastructure.
S9Scranton, Noriega Years. 202-03; President,"Military Action in Panama," 1974-75.
6°Congress, Deployment of Forces. 1.
61Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Select Committee on Intelligence, 1989 Events in Panama. 
101st Cong., 1st sess., 6 and 17 October and 22 December 
1989, 121-122.
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Apart from the conventional threat posed by the PDF, their 
neutralization would deny Noriega the means to carry on an 
unconventional resistance from Panama's interior (likely 
involving U.S. hostages) or to escape from Panama.62
By the third day of U.S. operations (December 22,
1989), military officials admitted that they had 
underestimated PDF resistance and that it would take from 
five to ten days to stabilize Panama City. The extent of 
PDF resistance required the deployment of between 2,000 and
3,000 additional forces from the United States. The result 
of this planning failure was an extended period of looting 
(with uninsured losses over $400 million) and instability 
in Panama City and Colon. In fact, some Panamanians (those 
whose homes burned in the Chorillo neighborhood around PDF 
headquarters) were more concerned with economic aid than 
casualties. By January 3, 1990, Noriega was persuaded to 
surrender to U.S. authorities outside the Papal Nunciature 
in Panama City (where he had taken refuge on Christmas 
eve) ."
According to an investigative report by the House
Committee on Armed Services, it was not found
that there was necessarily a conscious effort to minimize civilian casualties during fighting; rather
62Ibid., 58, 123-125; Flanagan, Battle for Panama. 24, 
41; Bennett, "Just Cause," 3.
"Congress, 1989 Events. 118-131; Bennett, "Just Cause," 4-5; Scranton, Noriega Years, 204-05; Zimbalist and Weeks, Crossroads. 154; Congress, Invasion of Panama. 8.
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there was a conscious effort to minimize fighting that might cause any casualties— civilian, PDF, and American lives and property.64
Because of actions by both U.S. and PDF/Dignity Battalion
forces, between 230 and 330 Panamanian civilians were
killed and about 1,500 wounded over the duration of the
intervention (Dignity Battalion members, looters, and
innocent bystanders). About 70 PDF members were killed and
124 were wounded. Twenty-three U.S. troops died and 324
were wounded. All U.S. citizens taken hostage were
rescued.65
U.S. Public Support
Among its unique features, the U.S. intervention in 
Panama was preceded by a prolonged crisis or state of 
unconventional war and was concluded fairly rapidly. In 
this regard, members of Congress and the U.S. public had a 
lengthy period in which to consider the relative costs of 
large-scale military action. More particularly, the 
efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush to seek options for 
Noriega's removal short of conventional force at least 
allowed Bush to claim some legitimacy for his decision to 
use such force as a last resort.
64Ibid., 10.
65Ibid., 5; Flanagan, Battle for Panama. 229; 
Congress, 1989 Events. 119-120.
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President Bush did not carry on prior consultations 
with congressional leaders immediately before deciding on 
conventional operations in Panama. As Bush told.the 
American public on the morning of the operations, "I 
contacted the bipartisan leadership of Congress last night 
and informed them of this decision."66 Along with this 
announcement, the President reported to Congress 
"consistent with the War Powers Resolution."67
Congressional leaders made no significant effort to 
challenge the president's decision, nor did other members 
of the legislature. Among the reasons for congressional 
inactivity were the overwhelming popularity of the 
intervention, the intervention's rapid termination, the 
intervention's coincidence with a long congressional 
recess, and the President's "working relationship with 
Congress on foreign policy issues."68
To this list must be added a period of congressional 
activism which contributed to the Reagan administration's 
original efforts to remove Noriega from power.69 Upon 
assuming office, President Bush inherited a declared
“President, "Military Action in Panama," 1974.
67Congress, Deployment of Forces. 1-2.
“Eileen Burgin, "Congress, the War Powers Resolution and the Invasion of Panama," Polity 25 (Winter 1992): 238.
“Congress, Restricting Assistance. 3. Apart from investigations conducted by various congressional subcommittees, examples of congressional activism include measures enacted by both houses to pressure Noriega.
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national emergency, entailing statutory requirements for 
economic sanctions against the Noriega regime and periodic 
reports to Congress.70 President Bush's decision to 
intervene in Panama was shaped by the failure of prior 
means employed to remove Noriega.
The public was hesitant to support an escalation to 
overt military intervention against the Noriega regime, 
reinforcing the tendency for the Reagan and Bush 
administrations to explore alternatives to remove him. 
According to an NBC-Wall Street Journal poll in June 1988, 
38 percent of those interviewed favored using U.S. troops 
to remove Noriega if he continued to refuse the Reagan 
administration's calls to leave power, while 46 percent 
opposed using U.S. troops. Similarly, following Noriega's 
annulment of the Panamanian elections in May 1989, a 
Gallup-Newsweek poll showed 32 percent favoring a U.S. 
invasion to overthrow Noriega and 59 percent opposing such 
a move. After the failed coup attempt against Noriega in 
October 1989, a Time-CNN poll showed that only 28 percent 
thought that military force should be used to remove him, 
while 59 percent thought it should not be used.71
Once President Bush had intervened in Panama, the 
public rallied to support the action. Separate polls (USA
70Congress, Developments Concerning National Emergency. 1.
71Public Opinion Online.
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Today. 20 December 1989; ABC-Washincrton Post. 11 January
1990) showed that just over 80 percent of those interviewed 
continued to approve of the intervention, while those 
disapproving remained around 15 percent. In an ABC poll on 
December 21, 1989, about 65 percent of respondents rated 
the intervention more of a success than a failure and would 
support an extended troop commitment.72 Public support 
previously denied for military intervention in Panama was 
extended for decisive action to end a prolonged state of 
unconventional war.
Military and Nonmilitarv Means
The period of unconventional war against the Noriega 
regime was prompted by the Senate's passage of S. Res. 239 
on June 26, 1987, calling for Noriega to step down as head 
of the PDF. In response, Noriega organized protests that 
destroyed U.S. embassy property. U.S. economic and 
military assistance to Panama were frozen in July 1987. By- 
December, Congress moved to cut off all assistance to 
Panama.73
Until May 1988, when negotiations broke down, the 
Reagan administration tried to talk Noriega into 
relinquishing power. It was questionable whether pressures
72Ibid.
73Congress, Restricting Assistance.
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exerted against Noriega (e.g., drug indictments, economic 
sanctions) were sufficient to exact desired results. As 
the administration's negotiator, Michael Kozak, stated, 
"pressure alone is not a policy.""* When President Reagan 
froze Panamanian assets in April 1988, as part of a 
declared national emergency, he acted to deny funds to the 
Noriega regime, while minimizing economic damage that would 
hinder Panamanian development.75
With economic sanctions in place, the primary 
emphasis in the Reagan and Bush administrations remained on 
a Panamanian solution to the Noriega problem. The 
Panamanian elections of May 1989 would provide the next 
opportunity to achieve such a solution. Continuing an 
operation reportedly begun under President Reagan,
President Bush authorized "covert" actions to support 
Noriega's opponents. For example, "Bush personally lobbied 
congressional committees and gained their support for $10 
million for the opposition campaign."76
After Noriega annulled the election, President Bush 
made a public statement on May 11, 1989. The President 
pointed out that in order to secure certain objectives
74Congress, Political Situation and Options. 122.
75Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, National Emergency with Respect to Panama. communication 
from the President, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 11 April 1988, 1-4.
76Scranton, Noriega Years. 157.
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(such as protecting U.S. citizens and establishing
democracy in Panama) in consultation with congressional
leaders, he was taking a number of steps:
First, the United States . . . will cooperate with initiatives taken by governments in this hemisphere to 
address this crisis through regional diplomacy . . . .  Second, our Ambassador . . . has been recalled, and our Embassy staff will be reduced to essential personnel only. Third, U.S. Government employees and their 
dependents . . . will be relocated out of Panama or to secure U.S. housing areas within Panama . . . .  Fourth, the State Department, through its travel advisory, will 
encourage U.S. business representatives resident in 
Panama to arrange for the extended absences of their 
dependents wherever possible. Fifth, economic sanctions will continue in force. Sixth, the United 
States will carry out its obligations and will assert and enforce its treaty rights in Panama under the Panama Canal treaties. And finally, we are sending a 
brigade-size force [2,000] to Panama to augment our military forces already assigned there. If required, I do not rule out further steps in the future.77
While the augmentation forces had an active role to 
play in curbing increased harassment of U.S. personnel,78 
they also clearly signaled the intent to protect America's 
interests in Panama. A more subtle signal was given to PDF 
members when President Bush remarked that "a professional 
Panamanian defense force can have an important role to play 
in Panama's democratic future.1179
77President, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer 
Session with Reporters on the Crisis in Panama," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (15 May 1989) vol. 25, no. 19, pp. 689-90.
78Anthony M. Schilling, "Force Protection," Military Review 71 (March 1991): 26-27.
79President, "Crisis in Panama," 689.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 8 9
Whatever influence this signal had on the PDF 
officers who seized Noriega at PDF headquarters on October 
3, 1989, they asked for and received U.S. military support 
in blocking reinforcement routes into Panama City.80 That 
support came in spite of high-level uncertainty as to 
whether or not the coup was a ruse by Noriega to embarrass 
the United States.81 What became more certain after the 
coup failed was that the PDF was unlikely to remove Noriega 
and was capable of flexibility in reinforcing PDF 
headquarters.
Washington's decision to remove Noriega using 
overwhelming force came about largely due to his regime's 
public recognition of an existing state of unconventional 
war on December 15, 1989. What Noriega and the PDF failed 
to recognize were preparations begun earlier by U.S. forces 
in case conventional combat became necessary.82
8°Some evidence suggests that the coup plotters cared less for democratization than for a chance at self­advancement within a system that continued only formal 
democracy.
81Congress, 1989 Events, 9.
82Bennett, "Just Cause," 10.
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Conclusion
Like Operation Urgent Fury six years earlier, 
Operation Just Cause was a limited war in which rapid and 
overwhelming force was applied to control any unforeseen 
consequences arising from a prolonged conflict (i.e., loss 
of life among Panamanian civilians and American personnel). 
Just Cause met with mixed success in avoiding a 
prolongation of hostilities. The superiority of American 
capabilities helped to overcome the inadequacies of plans 
initially developed and approved by political and military 
decision makers to achieve their objectives. Nevertheless, 
the ability to apply such force with any measure of control 
would not have been possible without prior plans and 
preparations.
That the public and Congress supported the operation 
was due in large part to its relatively rapid 
implementation. Given the two-year period during which the 
operation's objectives were developed, the public and their 
representatives were given considerable exposure to the 
reasons for intervention. That exposure at least favored 
the possibility that popular consensus obtained after the 
intervention began was derived from some level of 
understanding of its purposes and costs.
Less tentatively, Operation Just Cause reflected the 
experience of political and military decisionmakers in the
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Bush administration with conditions favoring the decisive 
use of force (e.g., clear objectives, superior combat 
resources). In particular, the Bush administration's 
conduct in Panama was based on the strategic influence of 
the Weinberger criteria. Even with that influence, the 
intervention had consequences (i.e., a large number of 
civilian casualties and property damage) revealing that 
experiential knowledge cannot guarantee the success of 
strategic outcomes. This issue would prove no less 
difficult in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq.
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CHAPTER 7
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
Operation Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991, as 
a coalition of American and other national forces, acting 
under United Nations authority, launched a massive air 
campaign against strategic Iraqi targets. On February 24, 
coalition ground forces began the “final phase" of 
operations to liberate Kuwait from occupying Iraqi 
forces.1 With the rapid collapse of Iraqi resistance, the 
decision was made to end Desert Storm as “a hundred-hour 
war."2
Three years after one of the most decisive victories
in American military history, members of the Senate
conducted hearings to inquire into the implementation of
lessons learned from the overall conduct of the Persian
Gulf War. Among the lessons in question, the point was
made by an Assistant Secretary of Defense that
although we are intent on learning lessons from the past, we are not simply preparing to refight the last
’•"Chronology," Military Review 71 (September 1991): 
72,76.
2H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take A Hero (New York: Linda Grey, Bantam Books, 1992),
470.
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war. We know that there were certain advantages that 
we gained, there were certain circumstances associated 
with that war, and technology itself has progressed since that war was fought, now several years ago.3
The outcome of Operation Desert Storm was based on decades
of experience (lessons derived from previous limited wars)
as well as more immediate plans and preparation.
Given its unique context, what were the consequences 
of the Persian Gulf War for America's conduct of limited 
wars? First, although extensive, American objectives and 
means in Iraq did not include "unconditional surrender, 
military occupation of the entire country, and replacement 
of the existing regime with a military government.1,4 In 
this regard, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated that the 
concept of limited war continued to involve the use of 
rapid and overwhelming force to achieve objectives without 
becoming involved in prolonged conflict. Second, the 
Persian Gulf War (like intervention in Panama) demonstrated 
that efforts to achieve objectives through unconventional 
means provided additional time in which to mobilize for 
conventional war. Third, although providing a clear 
example of a major military success, the Persian Gulf War
3Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittees on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces 
and Military Readiness and Defense, Implementation of Lessons Learned from the Persian Gulf Conflict. 103d Cong., 2nd sess., 18 April 1994, 10.
4George, Bridging the Gap. 89.
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demonstrated the importance of not drawing too many lessons 
from a single case of limited war.
Historical Background
Saddam Hussein's decision to invade and occupy Kuwait 
on August 2, 1990, was the result of a number of historical 
factors. Among these, a long-term factor was the absence 
of "an effective system for the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts over the borders drawn" by the Britain and France 
after World War 1.5 Formed in 1945, the Arab League 
depended on the voluntary cooperation of member nations to 
reconcile the ideology of Arab unity and the sovereign 
rights claimed by those members whose boundaries remained 
essentially as the British and French had drawn them. The 
Arab League Charter provided no mechanism, and none was 
subsequently developed, to deal with the hegemonic 
aspirations of a regional aggressor such as Iraq's 
President, Saddam Hussein.6
A more proximate factor contributing to Saddam's 
decision to invade and occupy Kuwait was the end of his 
regime's eight-year war with Iran in 1988. The regime
sIbrahim Ibrahim, "Sovereign States and Borders in the Gulf Region: A Historical Perspective,11 in The Gulf
Crisis. ed. Ibrahim Ibrahim (Washington, DC: Center forContemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992), 3.
6Ibid.
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emerged from that war with a standing army of about one 
million and a foreign debt of $70-$100 million, half of 
which was owed to other Arab nations including Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. His decision not to demobilize his combat- 
tested army only added to Iraq's economic difficulties. 
Gradually, those difficulties increased preexisting 
tensions between Iraq and Kuwait over the issues of low oil 
prices, rights to oil produced from the Rumalia field 
straddling the Iraq-Kuwait border, Iraqi access to the 
Gulf, and the large Iraqi debt to Kuwait.7
By the summer of 1990, the tensions between Iraq and 
Kuwait were such that the Iraqi foreign minister openly 
accused the Kuwaitis of stealing oil and conspiring to 
decrease his regime's oil revenues by violating OPEC's 
production quotas. Saddam Hussein threatened military 
action if Kuwait did not abide by its quotas. On July 24, 
Iraq deployed the first troops to Kuwait's northern border, 
after having assured the leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
that his demands could be met through negotiations. By 
August 1, when Iraq's representative walked out on those
7Ibid., 10; Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, Europe and the Middle East, and on International Operations, The Persian Gulf Crisis. 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess., 8 August, 18 and 25 September, 17 October, 28 November, and 11 December 1990, 45.
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negotiations, about 100,000 troops had been sent to the 
Kuwaiti border-*
After invading and occupying Kuwait, Iraqi forces 
began deploying along the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border. 
President Bush warned Baghdad not to invade Saudi Arabia 
and offered forces to defend the Saudis. On August 8,
1990, the President told the American public that "a line 
[of some 50,000 troops] has been drawn in the sand.”9
Over the next five months, the President conducted an 
unconventional war in which economic, diplomatic, and 
military sanctions were used to try to obtain an 
unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. These 
sanctions were backed up by the threat of conventional war, 
as defensive mobilizations were used to prepare for any 
necessary offensive operations. Throughout this period, 
the President sought a national and an international 
consensus around certain objectives (as discussed below).
A key difficulty was to establish and maintain agreement on 
the forces needed to accomplish those objectives. As will 
be noted, it was necessary for President Bush to explore 
alternatives to conventional war, while simultaneously 
preparing for its occurrence in order to legitimize what 
was essentially a limited victory.
'"Chronology," 65; Caryle Murphy, "Mubarek Says Iraq, Kuwait Will Begin Talks This Weekend," Washington Post. 26 
July 1990, sec. A, p. 34.
9"Chronology," 66.
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President Bush's commitment of forces to the Persian
Gulf was only one expression of the region's importance to
the security of the United States. Generally, security
policies towards the Middle East (of which the Persian Gulf
region is a part) have stressed the requirements
for arranging stable conditions on behalf of all parties [groups or nations], for strengthening moderate states in the region, for protecting ties to the West, 
for preserving U.S. access to oil, and for assuring the survival of Israel as a democracy.10
Involving tradeoffs among various interests, these
requirements have evolved, as the United States has assumed
ever greater responsibilities in and around the Gulf,
particularly since World War II.
Reflecting the inability of the British to maintain 
their commitments after that war, the United States moved 
to contain Soviet aggression. With communists waging a 
civil war in Greece and the Soviet Union threatening 
Turkey, President Harry Truman included the Middle East, 
with Europe, as primary areas to be protected by the United 
States. According to the Truman Doctrine (1947), aid to
10Melvin A. Friedlander, Conviction and Credence 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 1.
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Greece and Turkey was necessary to prevent the spread of 
instability that could be exploited by the Soviet Union.11
President Truman did not view U.S.-Middle East 
interests solely in terms of Soviet hegemonic aspirations, 
as evidenced by his support for Israel. Truman made that 
support official through several steps: exerting pressure
to reduce British restrictions on Jewish immigration to 
Palestine, working through the United Nations to partition 
Palestine and help create Israel in May 1948, and extending 
recognition to the newly created nation.12
Besides concern for Israel, expressions of American 
interests in the Middle East have been dictated by the 
importance of the area's oil reserves. According to the 
State Department, the Middle East was na stupendous source 
of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes 
in world history, probably the richest economic prize . . . 
in the field of foreign investment.1,13 President Dwight
“President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the FederalRegister. National Archives and Records Service, 1972), 
Harry Truman, 1947, 176-180.
12Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. vol. 2, 132-169. Truman's motives reflected a mixture of realistic and idealistic concerns. In particular, he shared his immediate 
predecessor's disdain for British colonialism but was also 
concerned to prevent the Soviets from filling vacuums created by the decreasing British presence in the Middle East.
“Noam Chomsky, "After the Cold War: U.S. Middle EastPolicy," in Beyond the Storm. ed. Phyllis Bennis and Michel 
Moushabeck (New York: Olive Branch, 1991), 77.
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Eisenhower called the Middle East the most "strategically 
important area in the world."14
President Eisenhower took several steps to protect 
the area and curb Soviet influence. One move was covert 
action to undercut Soviet intervention and install pro- 
Western leaders (most notably, the Shah of Iran in 
1953).15 Such measures were part of larger diplomatic 
efforts, as represented by the organization of the Baghdad 
Pact in 1955 and the prevention of wider hostilities over 
Gamal Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 
1956.16 Eisenhower demonstrated his willingness to back 
diplomacy with force in 1958, when he sent forces to 
Lebanon to help the Chamoun regime remain in power.17 By 
the summer of that year, a military coup deposed the Iraqi 
monarchy and led to the loss of Iraq as the Baghdad Pact's 
most powerful member.1® After the coup, the Eisenhower
“Ibid.
lsThe administration stressed covert action as one 
means of reducing Soviet influence on a worldwide basis. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952-54. vol. 2, National Security Affairs. part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 595.
16A British perspective on the Suez Crisis is given by Anthony Eden, The Suez Crisis of 1956 (Boston: BeaconPress, 1968). Also see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
17Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 264-81.
“Campaign Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq, Saddam's Iraq, rev. ed. (London: ZedBooks, 1989), 24-25.
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administration concluded that Israel was "the only strong 
pro-Western power left in the Middle East" (italics 
mine) .“
This merely restated a commitment, albeit an informal 
one, shared by all presidents since Truman. An indicator 
of that commitment was the portion of military aid devoted 
by the Nixon administration to the Middle East, where 
Israel was the primary recipient. Prior to 1970, about 75 
percent of all such aid was going to Asia. Thereafter, 
reflecting efforts to disengage in Vietnam and to counter 
Soviet military aid (especially to Egypt and Syria), the 
Middle East's share of U.S. military aid was boosted to 
about 60 percent between 1971 and 1975.20
This aid was consistent with the Nixon Doctrine 
(detailed in chapter 4), according to which the United 
States would maintain its diplomatic commitments by 
supplying other nations so they could defend themselves. A 
crucial test of the doctrine came during the Yom Kippur war 
in 1973. American forces conducted what was at the time 
the largest airlift in military history to help the
“Chomsky, "After the Cold War," 81.
2°Sheila Ryan, "Countdown for a Decade," in Beyond theStorm, ed. Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck (New York: 
Olive Branch, 1991), 92.
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Israelis defeat the Soviet-equipped Egyptians and 
Syrians.21
Aid to the Israelis was viewed by the Nixon 
administration as an extension of diplomacy. In 
particular, Secretary of State Kissinger engaged in 
"shuttle diplomacy" to try to stabilize and bring peace to 
the Middle East. Kissinger's attempts continued through 
the Ford administration, laying the groundwork for the 
diplomacy of the Carter administration. Under President 
Carter, the Camp David accords were concluded by which a 
formal peace treaty would be signed between Egypt and 
Israel in the spring of 1979.22
The peace treaty marked Egypt's move towards becoming 
one of the United States' most important security partners 
(eventually ranking second only to Israel as a recipient of 
military aid).23 That partnership was itself a 
culmination of Egypt's increasingly hostile relationship 
with the Soviet Union following the Yom Kippur war. Even
21Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air 
Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993),186. The 1973 airlift was only surpassed by similar 
operations during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
“John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1985), 237-
39; William B. Quandt, Camp David (Washington, DC:Brookings, 1986), passim.
23As of fiscal year 1993, Israel and Egypt remained 
the top recipients of U.S. military assistance, accounting for 40.7 percent and 29.4 percent, respectively, of all requested funds. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Military Net Assessment. 8-11.
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though the Soviets had helped Egyptian president Anwar 
Sadat recover from that war, Sadat recognized the economic, 
political, and military advantages of cooperation with the 
United States.2*
Two events in 1979 would place a premium on such 
cooperation for President Carter. Coinciding with the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace talks, the Iranian revolution led to 
a vehemently anti-western regime under the Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Khomeini's regime took American hostages, 
supported terrorism, threatened access to oil, and 
consolidated all political power under the fundamentalist 
Shi'ite sect. Given the circumstances, it was difficult to 
justify Carter's emphasis on human rights as an important 
aspect of U.S. interests.25 The Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in December 1979 cast even further doubt on the 
president's stress on the importance of human rights.
Having moved to attain greater geographic proximity to the 
Persian Gulf, it was unclear how willing the Soviet Union 
was to carry out aggressions beyond Afghanistan.25
2*Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 288-91.
25Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions (Baltimore: 
Penguin Books, 1981), 180-332.
26Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.S. Interests in. and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf. 1980f 96th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 24 March, 2 April, 5 May, 1 and 28 July, and 3 September 1980, 3.
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In order to counter the Soviet threat, President
Carter stated that
an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force.27
To support what came to be known as the Carter 
Doctrine, the administration undertook several steps: 
developing a Rapid Deployment force, repositioning 
materiel, and undertaking regional base negotiations.28 
Although they met with mixed success, these steps were 
important to the subsequent organizational development of 
U.S. forces capable of defending the Gulf.
The Reagan administration built on President Carter's
experiences, most notably by increasing the U.S. defense
budget and aid to Middle Eastern nations. Among those
nations, Egypt assumed prominence as a moderate ally
against the Soviets.29 Given the Iranians support for
terrorism, President Reagan also found common cause with
Iraq against Iran, providing Saddam Hussein's regime
with substantial economic assistance and large amounts of indirect military aid to prevent Iran from achieving 
a hegemonic position in the Gulf and spreading its radical islamic fundamentalism.30
^Ibid., 4.
28Ibid., 64-65.
29Dankwart A. Rustow, "Realignments in the Middle 
East," Foreign Affairs 63 (1985): 598-601.
3°George, Bridging the Gap. 33.
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In effect, the "Great Satan" was helping a lesser devil to 
fight Iran.
Besides Iraq's role as a counterweight to Iran, 
assistance to Saddam Hussein reflected the attempts of the 
administration and its allies to reform his regime as a 
cooperative, non-aggressive member of the Gulf region.31 
An additional motive for aiding Baghdad was the Reagan 
administration's growing estimation during the late 1980s 
of the Soviet Union's declining strategic threat to the 
Persian Gulf in relation to the overt threat still posed by 
Iran.32
Whatever its capacity or intentions to carry out 
overt aggression against the Gulf, the Soviet Union was 
still viewed as having diplomatic means for establishing a 
physical presence in the Gulf.33 A clear indication of 
Soviet intentions was Mikhail Gorbachev's positive response 
to a Kuwaiti request for help in protecting oil tankers 
from Iraqi attacks. The Reagan administration reacted to 
that response, moving rapidly to extend protection to 
Kuwaiti tankers under the U.S. flag. By committing forces
31Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993), 23-25.
32Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau ofPublic Affairs, Office of Public Communication, July 1987), 
1-5.
33Ibid., 1-6. In particular, the Soviets might have 
obtained base rights.
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to protect the tankers, in effect the Reagan administration
involved them in open warfare against the Iranians, denied
the Soviet's diplomatic access to the Gulf, and
demonstrated that the United States would maintain open
passage through the Gulf. A significant result was the
demonstration of the U.S. commitment to protect its
regional allies.3*
With the end of the Iran-Iraq War and Iranian threats
to Gulf shipping, the Reagan administration retained ties
with Saddam's regime as a regional balancer and in order to
try to moderate his behavior. The incoming Bush
administration followed this pattern. In October 1989,
President Bush signed a National Security Directive (NSD-
26) stating that
normal relations between the U.S. and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests in both the Gulf and the 
Middle East. The U.S. government should propose 
economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq.As a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment, the U.S. should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, eg training courses and medical exchanges, on a case-by-case basis.35
The directive assumed that Iraq would be reformed by
positive inducements and that there would be sufficient
3*William J. Crowe, Jr., with David Chanoff, The Line 
of Fire (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 174-181, 202.
The most serious combat with the Iranians came in April 1988 when U.S. forces attacked and destroyed about fifty percent of Iran's naval vessels.
3SFreedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict. 26.
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time to gain influence with his war-weary army.36 These 
assumptions were based on tentative evidence that Saddam 
was moderating his behavior (e.g., discussing a new 
constitution to protect human rights, and participating in 
disarmament conferences).
Yet, by April 1990, the administration was openly 
acknowledging a deterioration of relations with Iraq.
Saddam had criticized the U.S. naval presence in the Gulf 
and called for its removal as well as threatened Israel 
with missiles from western Iraq. Iraqi efforts to smuggle 
nuclear components into the country had been detected; and, 
human rights abuses remained common in Iraq. While the 
administration opposed efforts by the Congress to impose 
sanctions on Iraq at this time, there was continuous review 
of "the entire range of options available" to protect U.S. 
interests.37
In mid-July 1990, the first Iraqi troops began to 
deploy towards Kuwait, and Saddam threatened military 
action. On August 1, Iraq broke off talks supposedly meant 
to settle economic and territorial controversies with 
Kuwait. During this period, the Bush administration, along 
with Arab leaders, continued to hold out the possibility of 
negotiations, but they promised military action to protect
36Ibid., 26-27.
37Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, United States- Iraai Relations. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 26 April 1990, 16.
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U.S. interests.38 After the Iraqi invasion on August 2, 
the question would remain of the degree to which military 
force could have prevented aggression against Kuwait 
without further provoking Saddam.
President Bush soon responded to and moved to control 
events in the Gulf region. On the morning of the invasion, 
Bush told reporters that "there is no place for this sort 
of naked aggression in today's world."39 Beyond the 
immediate context of liberating Kuwait, Bush came to link 
Iraqi aggression to a number of threats.
Among these, it was recognized that Baghdad's actions
were a threat to security and stability, both regional and
global. As Bush told congressional members during a
briefing on August 28, 1990,
Iraq threatened Kuwait, lied about its intentions, and finally invaded. In 3 days, Iraq had 120,000 troops 
and 850 tanks in Kuwait, moving south toward the Saudi 
border. And it was this clear and rapidly escalating threat that led King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to ask for 
our [previously offered] assistance. We knew that an Iraq that had the most powerful military machine in the Gulf and controlled 20 percent of the world's proven
38For more detailed information on the inability to prevent the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, see Ambassador April Glaspie's testimony in Congress, House, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, United States-Iraai Relations. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 21 March 1991. Also see Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellance in the Gulf, 1990-1991: AFailed or Impossible Task?," International Security 17 
(Fall 1992).
39President, "Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (6 August 1990) vol. 26, no. 31, p. 
1184.
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reserves of oil would pose a threat to the Persian 
Gulf, to the Middle East, and to the entire world.40
In further elaborating the Iraqi threat, Bush told 
the nation on January 5, 1991, that
Saddam already poses a strategic threat to the capital cities of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, 
and Syria, as well as our own men and women in the Gulf region. In fact Saddam has used chemical weapons of mass destruction against innocent villagers, his own 
people. Each day that passes brings Saddam Hussein further on the path to developing biological and nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. If Saddam corners the world energy market, he can then 
finance further aggression, terror, and blackmail.
Each day that passes increases Saddam's worldwide threat to democracy.The struggling newborn democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America already face a staggering challenge in making the transition to a free market.But the added weight of higher oil prices is a crushing 
burden they cannot afford. And our own economy is 
suffering, suffering the effects of higher oil prices and lower growth stemming from Saddam's aggression.41
This assessment of the Iraqi threat contained obvious 
references meant to mobilize opinion for the possible onset 
of conventional war. That fact did not detract from the 
validity of the threats identified by President Bush nor 
from public consideration of evidence of Saddam's 
aggressive potential. For example, having seized American 
citizens and other nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, Saddam's 
regime announced on August 20, 1990, that they were being
4°President, "Remarks at a White House Briefing for 
Members of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (3 September 1990) vol. 26, no. 35, p. 1300.
41President, "Radio Address to the Nation on the Persian Gulf Crisis," Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents (14 January 1991) vol. 27, no. 2, p. 15.
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moved to key installations to serve as human shields 
against any outside attack-42 President Bush stated his 
deep concern
about the American and other foreign nationals held hostage by Iraq. As I've said before, when it comes to the safety and well-being of American citizens held 
against their will, I will hold Baghdad responsible.43
(It was not until December 14, 1990, that the last group of
American hostages were allowed to leave Iraq.)44
More generally, Bush portrayed Iraqi aggression as a
threat to the "new world order" emerging in the wake of a
declining Soviet threat.45 Consistently, the President
stressed that Iraq's conflict was not just with the United
States. On August 22, 1990, nearly a month before he
mentioned a new world order, Bush said
as the deployment of the forces of the many nations shows and as the votes in the United Nations show, this 
is not a matter between Iraq and the United States of 
America; it is between Iraq and the entire world community, Arab and non-Arab alike. All the nations of the world lined up to oppose aggression.46
On January 5, 1991, Bush stated
42,1 Chronology," 67.
43President, "Remarks at a Briefing," 1301.
““"Chronology," 70.
45President, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (17 
September 1990) vol. 26, no. 37, p. 1359.
46President, "The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis," Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents (27 August 1990) vol. 26, no. 34, p. 1281.
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Eleven days from today, Saddam Hussein will either 
have met the United Nations deadline [January 15] for a 
full and unconditional withdrawal, or he will have once again defied the civilized world. This is a deadline for Saddam Hussein to comply with the United Nations resolution, not a deadline for our own Armed Forces.47
The credibility of the United States was approaching a
deadline to test its leadership in influencing
international events.
As Bush told Congress on September 11, 1990, Iraqi 
aggression
is the first assault on the new world that we seek, the 
first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world.48
In the United Nations coalition assembled against Iraq, the
President held
that there is no substitute for American leadership.In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our 
staying power. We will stand by our friends.49
U.S. Objectives in the Persian Gulf
Like the nation's interests, its political and 
military objectives were linked to the United Nations and 
the establishment of a new world order. As they were
47President, "Radio Address," 15.
48President, "Address Before Congress," 1359-60.
49Ibid., 1360.
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originally stated, those objectives were sufficiently open- 
ended to require an expanding commitment of forces and a 
gradual shift from defensive to offensive operations. In 
this regard, the conduct of the Persian Gulf War involved 
the expansion and elaboration of objectives in relation to 
"the specific diplomatic and military actions necessary to 
achieve them" at any given point in time.50 Ultimately, 
however, objectives were not expanded so as to prolong the 
war.
A fundamental objective of the war was spelled out in 
Resolution 660, adopted by the U.N. Security Council on 
August 2, 1990. The resolution demanded "that Iraq 
withdraw immediately and unconditionally ail its forces to 
the positions in which they were located" on August 1. The 
possibility of future Security Council meetings was left 
open "as necessary to consider further steps to ensure 
compliance with the present resolution."51
President Bush announced the first deployments of 
U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia on August 8, 1990. He said
Four simple principles guide our policy. First, 
we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete
Thomas R. Dubois, "The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait," Parameters 21 (Winter 1991-92): 30. 
The author's assertion that political and military 
objectives were expanded "beyond the liberation of Kuwait to the destruction of Iraqi warfighting capability and the political castration of Saddam" is an overstatement.
51Sherrill Brown Wells, ed., American Foreign Policy. Current Documents. 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Departmentof State, 1991), 455.
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withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to 
replace the puppet regime [installed on August 4]. And 
third, my administration, as has been the case with every President from President Roosevelt to President 
Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad.“
The President went on to point out that nthe mission of our
troops is wholly defensive."“
Addressing Congress a month later, Bush reiterated
the four reasons for initial deployments and added a fifth,
creation of a "new world order." Apart from that order's
ideal content (e.g., international harmony and justice),
its immediate purpose had to do with the maintenance of a
U.S. led coalition against Iraq.
At the same time, elaboration of this fifth objective
was accompanied by a more subtle expansion of the U.S.
military role. According to the President,
long after all our troops come home— and we all hope its's [sic] soon, very soon— there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of 
the Persian Gulf. Our role then: to deter futureaggression . . .  to help our friends in their own self defense . . .  to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile and, above all, nuclear 
technologies .s*
“President, "Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (13 August
1990) vol. 26, no. 32, pp. 1216-17.
“Ibid., 1218.
“President, "Address Before Congress," 1359, 1361.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 1 3
Although mentioned in the context of a post-war 
environment, this American role would figure prominently in 
the development and execution of massive offensive 
operations against Iraq.
Until early November 1990, the United States'
strategic objectives remained primarily defensive. As
Secretary of Defense Cheney had told the Senate Armed
Services Committee on September 11, 1990, the President
ordered the deployment of forces
to deter further aggression by Iraq against other 
nations in the region; second, to defend Saudi Arabia and others should deterrence fail; and third, to use military forces we have deployed to enforce the 
sanctions voted by the United Nations and basically, to enforce the interception or embargo or quarantine, if you will, on economic activities with Iraq [detailed 
more fully below in section on military and nonmilitary means ].ss
Deployments were continuing “specifically to make certain 
that" there would be “sufficient forces in the region to be 
able to deal with any contingency."56
On November 8, President Bush announced that "our 
forces, in conjunction with other coalition forces now have 
the capability to defend successfully against any further
55Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options andImplications. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 11 and 13 September, 27, 28, 29, and 30 November, and 3 December 1990, 13.
S6Ibid.
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Iraqi aggression.1,57 He went on to say that he had 
directed an increase in the "size of U.S. forces committed 
to Desert Shield to ensure that the coalition has an 
adequate offensive military option should that be necessary 
to achieve our common goals."58
By November 29, American influence on the U.N. 
Security Council had resulted in the passage of Resolution 
678. The resolution demanded Iraq's unconditional 
withdrawal from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, and authorized 
coalition members to "use all necessary means" to achieve 
that withdrawal and "to restore international peace and 
security in the area" after that date.S9
Although planning for offensive operations had been
going on since August 25, 1990, the deployment of
additional forces and establishment of a "deadline" for
Iraqi withdrawal intensified planning and preparation
efforts. By the latter half of December 1990, the
President had been briefed on and approved plans for a
combined air and ground campaign against Iraq forces. When
the plans were approved,
it was decided that if Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw from Kuwait and it became necessary to use 
force, the offensive would begin with the air campaign.
S7President, "The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis," Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents (12 November 1990) vol. 26, no. 45, 1790.
S8Ibid.
S9Brown Wells, American Foreign Policy. 544.
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While the ground campaign was approved, its start would 
be a separate and subsequent decision also requiring Presidential approval.60
While the air and ground campaigns could only be 
initiated with presidential approval, their conduct was 
under the direct command of General Norman Schwarzkopf, 
commander of U.S. Central Command. Within the Persian Gulf 
theater, Schwarzkopf promulgated a number of key military 
objectives: attacking Iraq's political-military leadership
and command and control; gaining and maintaining air 
superiority; severing Iraqi supply lines; destroying known 
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) production, 
storage, and delivery capabilities; destroying Republican 
Guard forces in and around Kuwait; and, liberating Kuwait 
City.61
In fulfillment of these objectives, Schwarzkopf 
assigned several missions to his air and ground forces. 
Operating throughout the entire offensive campaign, air 
forces were to destroy the Iraqi command and control 
structure,62 NBC capabilities, and forces opposing any 
subsequent ground campaign. Given sufficient attrition of
6°Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: GPO,1992), 70.
61Ibid., 74.
“Although Hussein and his top commanders were primary targets, "it was sufficient to silence" them if they could not be killed. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero. 318- 19.
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Iraqi forces, coalition ground forces were to conduct two 
attacks: a primary one to envelop forces around Kuwait
from the west and a supporting one to occupy forces in 
Kuwait and to capture its capital.63 Having approved 
execution of the ground campaign, President Bush told the 
nation on February 23, 1991, that he had "complete 
confidence in the ability of the coalition forces swiftly 
and decisively to accomplish their mission."64
U.S. Mobilization
The president's professed confidence stemmed in large 
part from evidence of the comparative advantages enjoyed by 
coalition ground forces after the month-long air campaign. 
Having lost over half of their armor and artillery, most of 
the 450,000 Iraqi troops thought to remain in and around 
Kuwait "were in poor condition with heavy desertions, low 
morale, and a severely degraded capability to coordinate an 
effective defense."65 Against this force, President Bush
“Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War. 75-76.
“President, "Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Ground Action in the Persian Gulf Conflict," 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (4 March 1991) vol. 27, no. 9, p. 207.
“Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War. 142. On the accuracy of these figures, see Keaney and Cohen, Air 
Power Survey. 9-10, 105-107.
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authorized the attack by a better equipped, highly mobile 
force of about 620,000 members (one-third non-American).66
The massing of this force (especially after November
1990) was an important indication of the administration's 
determination to avoid a prolonged war. As General Colin 
Powell told Senators on December 3, 1990,
General Schwarzkopf, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
I believe strongly that if the Armed Forces of the 
United States are asked to go into combat to achieve a decisive, political objective [victory], we must 
implement a decisive military strategy that seizes the 
initiative, one that is designed to win . . . . We do not over-estimate or under-estimate the capability of the Iraqi armed forces. We have studied them very closely. We understand their strength; we understand their vulnerabilities . . . .
Based on our analysis of the mission, the enemy, 
other factors, we recommended and the President approved a force buildup capable of accomplishing the mission which seizes the initiative and which forces 
the Iraqis to consider the consequences of a combined, overwhelming campaign against them.67
Asked about the possibility of a prolonged war two 
weeks later, President Bush told reporters that he thought 
"some believe this will be another Vietnam. And the agony 
of Vietnam is still with us. People remember a protracted 
war." He added, "one of the reasons that I moved this 
additional force, or had it moved, was because . . .  if 
there had to be some" military confrontation, "I would want
66Department of Defense, Persian Gulf Warr 387.
67Congress, Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region. 663.
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to be able to assure . . . there is enough force there to 
minimize the risk" to coalition troops.68
The success of the allied ground campaign was 
sufficient to force Iraq to accept the terms of a cease­
fire, which went into effect February 28, 1991, one hundred 
hours after the beginning of the campaign. Estimates of 
Iraqi military casualties ranged from 10,000 to 115,000 
killed during the war.69 Over 85,000 enemy troops 
captured or surrendered. Iraq lost between 50 and 65 
percent of its armor and 65 to 90 percent of its artillery. 
Of the coalition's casualties (about 1,000), 613 were 
American. Of these, 146 were killed in action (35 by 
friendly fire).70
The war against Iraq achieved its military 
objectives. Kuwait was liberated and its government 
restored. Although the Republican Guard was not destroyed, 
the Iraqi army was severely damaged. In a related vein, 
Saddam's capacity to rebuild and maintain an offensive
68President, "The President's News Conference with Regional ReportersWeekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents (24 December 1990) vol. 26, no. 51, p. 2050. An important incentive to avoid a prolonged war was the strain of maintaining the troop commitment, which by February 11, 
1991 included the second largest call up of reserves since the Korean War. "Chronology," 78.
69Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict. 408; Douglas Waller and John Barry, "The Day We Stopped the War," Newsweek. 20 January 1992, 18.
7°Ibid., Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War. 313, 
577-78, 589; Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict. 408-09.
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force was significantly degraded.71 Given the intensity 
and duration of the air campaign as well as the magnitude 
of the ground campaign, these achievements came about 
rapidly and with comparatively low coalition losses.
In a communication to House Speaker Thomas Foley on 
March 19, 1991, President Bush summarized the post-war 
situation. He stated
On February 27, I ordered a suspension of offensive combat operations. On March 2, the Security Council adopted Resolution 686, which demanded compliance by Iraq with the 12 resolutions previously adopted by the Security Council. Diplomatic efforts 
continue to achieve such compliance . . . .U.S. forces have already begun to withdraw from the region, . . . However, we will continue efforts to ensure peace and 
stability in the region as contemplated by Security 
Council Resolution 678.72
Working through the UN Security Council, the Bush 
administration obtained passage of a series of resolutions 
to force conditions on Iraq, satisfying resolution 6787s 
requirement for the restoration of "peace and security" in 
the Gulf. Among these resolutions, the Council adopted 
687. Along with subsequent resolutions, 687 was unique for 
"the extent to which the Council imposed obligations and 
duties that directly infringed on Iraq's internal affairs." 
Saddam's regime was held accountable for settling 
outstanding issues with Kuwait (repatriation, boundaries,
71George, Bridging the Gap. 91.
72Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on Kuwait, communication from the President, 102nd 
Cong., 1st sess., 20 March 1991, 1.
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reparations). In addition, the regime was obliged to allow 
for the inspection and destruction of its unconventional 
weapons capabilities as well as for the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to the Shi'ites and Kurds. Economic 
sanctions imposed after the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait 
were left in place but were moderated to allow for a 
limited export of Iraqi oil. "These resolutions were 
considered significant . . .  as possible precedents for 
U.N. efforts in any future peace and security 
situations."73
The resolutions compromised between the costs of more
aggressive intervention (risking additional loss of life,
fragmentation of the allied coalition, and creation of a
regional power vacuum) and the need to curb new threats by
Saddam's regime to the peace and security of the Gulf. As
President Bush told Congress on March 6, 1991,
we've learned the hard lessons of history. The victory over Iraq was not waged as "a war to end all wars."Even the new world order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our mission.74
73Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq: Compliance and
Implementation. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., March 1992, vii.
74President, "Address Before a Joint Session of 
Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (11 March
1991) vol. 27, no. 10, 259-60.
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In pursuit of this "mission,n what guidelines did the 
Persian Gulf War provide for Americans to use in evaluating 
possible involvement in and conduct of other limited wars?
U.S. Public Support
Among these guidelines, the war provided an important 
demonstration of the need for presidents to build and 
maintain a domestic consensus in support of military 
actions. In particular, President Bush had to mobilize 
Congress and the public to support large-scale offensive 
operations against Iraq. Without having faced that task, 
the president could not have legitimately claimed that such 
operations were undertaken only after diplomatic and 
economic sanctions (discussed more fully below) had proven 
ineffective in gaining Iraqi compliance with UN Security 
Council resolutions. Neither could he have maintained 
legitimacy for the buildup of forces needed to carry out 
those operations decisively and swiftly.
Congressional responses to that buildup reflected a 
growing concern for the application of the War Powers 
Resolution. Having previously reported to Congress on his 
declaration of a national emergency with respect to Iraq, 
Bush sent a letter to Speaker Foley on August 9, 1990, 
regarding the initial deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia. 
The president stated, "I am providing this report on the
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deployment and mission of our Armed Forces in accordance 
with my desire that Congress be fully informed and 
consistent [not in compliance] with the War Powers 
Resolution." The further point was made that it was "not 
possible to predict the precise scope and duration of this 
deployment."75 All along, the president refused to 
recognize the constitutionality of the resolution.
It was not until the next month, when Congress 
reconvened, that members began to focus greater attention 
on the resolution. By that time, it was becoming clear 
that the deployment "would not fall within the" 
resolution's "sixty-day period, and that support for the 
initiative and the President's popularity, at least 
temporarily, had declined."76 On October 1, 1990, the 
House passed H.J. Res. 658 "to support actions the 
President has taken with respect to Iraqi aggression 
against Kuwait and to demonstrate United States resolve."
As to compliance with the War Powers Resolution, the 
resolution found that "the President has consulted with the 
Congress and has kept the Congress informed with regard to 
the deployment" of forces to the Gulf region.77
75Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, The Persian Gulf Crisis: Relevant Documents,
Correspondence. Reports. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., June 1991, 13.
7<sBurgin, "Congress," 242.
77Congress, Gulf Crisis: Documents. Ill, 14, 23.
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On November 16, 1990, President Bush sent another
letter to Speaker Foley noting that
on November 8, after consultations with our Allies and coalition partners, I announced the continued deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf region . . . .
I want to emphasize that this deployment is in line with the steady buildup of U.s. Armed Forces in the region over the last 3 months and is a continuation of the deployment described in my letter of August 9.78
Rather than an action undertaken solely on presidential 
authority, the deployment was undertaken as part of 
consultations with congressional leaders "throughout the 
past 3 months."79 Still, the president did not seek 
Congress' permission for the deployment.
After November 1990, congressional attention focused 
increasingly on the possibility of offensive operations and 
the effects of diplomatic and economic sanctions. The 
ensuing discussion and debate culminated with the passage 
of H.J. Res. 77 on January 12, 1991, three days before the 
deadline set by U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 for 
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Authorizing the use of force 
against Iraq, H.J. Res. 77 passed the House by a vote of 
250 to 183 and the Senate by a vote of 52 to 47. The joint 
resolution required the president to certify that
78President, "Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the Deployment of Additional United States Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (19 
November 1990) vol. 25, no. 46, p. 1834.
79Ibid., 1835.
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diplomatic and economic sanctions would not be effective 
before beginning offensive operations against Iraq. 
Thereafter, the president was required to report on the 
status of those operations every sixty days in compliance 
with the War Powers Resolution.80 The Gulf War would only 
last forty-two days.
Like Congress, the public had reservations about the 
necessity of war against Iraq but was still willing to 
support the president's actions. An ABC-Washinoton Post 
poll repeated between August 20 and January 9, 1990, showed 
an average of over 67 percent approval for Bush's handling 
of Mthe situation caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait."
The highest level of approval was 78 percent on September 
8. By November 15, one week after the president announced 
the deployment of additional forces to the Gulf, approval 
reached its lowest level of 59 percent.81
These results were consistent with those of a Wall 
Street Journal poll which found approval of the president's 
overall conduct falling from 82 percent on August 20 to 51 
percent on November 13. When asked specifically about the 
decision to send more troops to the Gulf region, only 51 
percent approved.82
8°Congress, Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 8, 
daily ed. (12 January 1991), H443, H485, S403.
81Jentleson, "Prudent Public," 65; Public Opinion Online.
82Dubois, "The Weinberger Doctrine," 32.
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Between the passage of Security Council Resolution 
678 on November 29, 1990, and the January 15, 1991, 
deadline it established for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, 
the public remained committed to war as a last resort.
After talks broke down between Secretary of State Baker and 
the Iraqi foreign minister on January 9, 1990, President's 
Bush's approval rating rose to 69 percent, "the highest it 
had been since back in September."83 At the same time, an 
ABC-Washinoton.Post poll showed that the public was nearly 
evenly split between those favoring offensive operations 
immediately after the deadline (49 percent) and those 
favoring a longer wait for diplomatic sanctions to prompt 
an Iraqi withdrawal (47 percent). In the same poll, 62 
percent favored going to war at an unspecified date after 
January 15, while only 32 percent favored not going to war 
at all.84 Though the public was still willing to pursue 
other options, it was unwilling to give up the option of 
war against Iraq.
When that option was finally carried out, the public 
rallied to support it. A Gallup poll conducted during the 
first two weeks of the air campaign (January 17 to January 
31, 1991) showed an average of 81 percent in favor of the 
operations.85 That support remained high throughout the
83Jentleson, "Prudent Public," 66.
84Ibid.
85Schwarz, Public Opinion. 18.
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remainder of the war, including the decisive defeat dealt 
to Iraqi troops uurin^ ciie uunuLeu~uOujir ground oxxensive.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, Kurds and 
Shi'ites rebelled against Saddam, only to be suppressed by 
Iraqi forces- Where a Gallup-Newsweek poll (April 4-5,
1991) showed a clear majority of 78 percent favoring the 
provision of humanitarian aid to the rebels, another 
majority (63 percent) opposed using U.S. ground troops to 
intervene on the rebels' behalf.86 Having been cautious 
about the buildup of forces and the onset of major war 
against Iraq, the public remained cautious of involvement 
in Iraq's internal conflicts.
Military and Nonmilitarv Means
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 
1991, the Bush administration undertook several immediate 
steps to deal with the aggression. Working through the UN 
Security Council, Ambassador Thomas Pickering obtained 
emergency passage of Resolution 660 condemning Iraqi 
actions and demanding an immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal from Kuwait. Acting under authority of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the president 
froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States and 
prohibited transactions with Iraq. The State Department
86Jentleson, "Prudent Public," 70.
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began diplomatic efforts to form an international coalition 
against Iraq.87
From that date until November 8, 1990, the 
administration achieved a number of diplomatic successes. 
Secretary of State James Baker was able to convince 
"thirty-three countries to contribute financially or 
militarily to the anti-Iraq coalition."88 In maintaining 
the coalition, the administration countered Saddam's 
efforts to link the occupation of Kuwait with Israel's 
occupation of Palestinian territories.89 By the end of 
October, U.S. influence on the Security Council had 
contributed to the passage of ten more resolutions 
expanding on Resolution 660. Among these, Resolution 661 
established an international trade embargo on Iraq, and 
Resolution 665 approved the use of naval force to support 
that embargo.90
With these sanctions proving ineffective and over 
200,000 troops committed to the defense of Saudi Arabia,
87President, "Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters,"1184.
88Jo-Anne Hart, "American Objectives in the Crisis," in Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community, ed. 
James Gow (London: Brassey's, 1993), 39.
89Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, ch. 11. The 
ability to counter Hussein on this issue stemmed in large part from the president's willingness to bring the Israeli- Palestinian issue before the United Nations after Iraq withdrew from Kuwait.
9°Brown Wells, American Foreign Policy. 466-67, 487.
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the president announced additional deployment to the Gulf
on November 8, 1990. Although the president wanted to
assure adequate means of carrying out any necessary
offensive operations, he also wanted to increase pressure
on Iraq to comply peacefully with all Security Council
resolutions. As he told reporters,
I think it [fielding an offensive force] sends a very 
strong signal— another strong signal— to Saddam Hussein that we are very, very serious about seeing the United 
Nations resolutions complied to in their entirety, without any kind of watering down.91
Given the substantial dangers of allowing Saddam Hussein to
profit by his aggression (e.g., encouraging further
aggression), President Bush's decision reflected a need to
avoid a prolonged crisis while still exploring alternatives
to conventional war.
The passage of Security Council Resolution 678
established a time frame for Iraqi compliance, one which
the president could not associate with specific
operations.92 As Secretary Baker told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee,
economic sanctions and military preparations are not alternatives, but we are really reinforcing and escalating steps of the same strategy. Notwithstanding our desire for peace, from the outset we have proceeded with the full realization that if these objectives
"President, "President's News Conference," 1792.
"Setting an exact time frame for the commencement of hostilities would have weakened domestic and international support for war as a last resort. Moreover, Hussein might have initiated offensive actions or reinforced his 
defensive position if he had such foreknowledge.
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cannot be achieved peacefully, then we really must be 
prepared to use force, given the vital interests that we have at stake.*3
War was possible, but not inevitable.
On January 5, 1991, the president informed the nation
that
This week, we've taken one more step [to force Iraqi 
compliance short of conventional war]. I have offered to have Secretary of State James Baker meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq, 'Aziz in Switzerland, 
yesterday, we received word that Iraq has accepted our offer to meet in Geneva. This will not be secret diplomacy at work. Secretary Baker will restate, in 
person, a message for Saddam Hussein: Withdraw fromKuwait unconditionally and immediately, or face the 
terrible consequences.94
Those consequences remained up to Saddam's choice.
When Baker met with 'Aziz on January 9, he gave him a
letter from Bush to Saddam. The letter stated
You may be tempted to find solace in the diversity of 
opinion that is American democracy. You should resist any such temptation. Diversity ought not to be 
confused with division. Nor should you underestimate, as others have before you, America's will.9S
Whether or not Saddam would have been impressed with this
part of the letter, 'Aziz refused to deliver it.
93Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 4 
and 5 December 1990, 106.
"President, "Radio Address," 15.
9SMichael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The 
General's War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), 494.
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Among the wars discussed in previous chapters, the 
Persian Gulf War was unique for the scale of its execution 
and the extensive policy objectives it imposed on Saddam's 
regime. The war provided a further demonstration that 
Americans have come to expect limited war to involve the 
application of rapid and overwhelming force to avoid 
prolonged conflict. An important part of that expectation 
is that such force will be preceded by the application of 
unconventional or nonmilitary means (e.g., naval blockades, 
economic sanctions), especially since such means provide an 
extended opportunity for conventional mobilization. The 
war also demonstrated the importance of caution in its 
outcome and to expect similar outcomes in future limited 
wars.
The Gulf War's outcome was affected by four decades 
of American exposure to the problem of limited war. Based 
on that exposure, experiences have accumulated and been 
rearticulated through political processes. Reflected in 
the public statements of political leaders and in security 
policies, general empirical knowledge has been gained of 
those factors (i.e., interests, objectives, mobilization, 
public support, nonmilitary means) influencing the outcomes 
of previous limited wars (even if most Americans have not 
necessarily acquired such knowledge for themselves).
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For example, shortly before leaving office in 1993, 
President Bush commented oil the uses of military force. He 
said,
Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, 
where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice . . . ,96
Without public debate, lessons derived from the use of
force in one war may be misapplied by policymakers in the
next. Even with such debate, knowledge will remain
partial. Debate can only facilitate the accumulation of
knowledge needed to pursue successful strategic outcomes.
96,,Bush/s Talk to Cadets: When 'Force Makes Sense,'"New York Times. 6 January 1993, sec. A, p. 6; quoted in 
Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 292.
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION
Over forty years since the Korean War, Americans 
continue to face limited war as a fundamental challenge to 
their security. In order to help to more effectively deal 
with the problem, this study has sought to develop a 
pragmatic understanding of limited war (i.e., one in which 
it is possible to judge in retrospect the cumulative 
results of previous limited wars). In fulfillment of that 
task, this study has pursued two simultaneous goals: 
first, to model and critically evaluate two types of 
knowledge of relevance to policymakers in waging limited 
wars; and, second, to detail the development of that 
knowledge from its antecedents in the Korean War.
Reassessing the Two Models
In chapter 1, two models of knowledge were identified 
as having relevance to policymakers' conduct of limited 
wars. The first model, the deductive theory of limited 
war, addressed four questions. First, what basic framework 
did the theory provide for designing an effective strategy?
232
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Second, what critical variables were identified to which 
policymakers had to give strategic content? Third, what 
general logic was associated with a successful limited war 
strategy? Fourth, what strategic use did policymakers make 
of theory?
These questions were answered in chapter 2 and 
elaborated in chapter 4. Based on those chapters, a number 
of tentative conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
deductive model's policymaking impact.
In terms of the basic framework provided for an 
effective limited war strategy, the Eisenhower 
administration's emphasis on massive retaliation led to two 
theoretical positions which would have major consequences 
for United States' involvement in Vietnam.1 First, 
conventional and unconventional military capabilities were 
needed to compensate for overemphasis on nuclear 
armaments.2 Second, the United States economy was robust 
enough to support a conventional war of attrition.3 
President Kennedy's decision to expand conventional and 
unconventional forces as well as President Johnson's 
acceptance of a strategy of attrition helped involve the
Galperin, Limited War. 2-3.
^rodie, "Unlimited Weapons," 16-21; Brodie, Missile Age Strategy.
3Kissinger, "Military Policy," 416-28.
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United States in a massive ground war without a clear 
withdrawal strategy.
This situation was compounded by strategic choices 
made in the Johnson administration in relation to a key 
variable identified by limited war theory. Based on the 
single case of the Korean War, it was argued that the U.S. 
public was prone to support only total wars.4 Civilian 
advisors to President Johnson seized onto that idea. 
Determined to keep the war in South Vietnam from escalating 
into a total war, Johnson misinformed the American public 
about troop deployments in order to decrease the potential 
for popular mobilization.
The generally accepted logic of the deductive model 
was that the primary use of force was to achieve bargains 
rather than to defeat the enemy.5 Among the advisors to 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, this logic suggested an 
additional means (e.g., graduated response) of preventing 
total war with the Soviet Union or China while resisting 
communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
As noted in chapter 2 and detailed in chapter 4 of 
this study, the effort to adapt limited war theory to the 
Vietnam War served to call into question the logical 
grounds upon which the theory was based. In particular, 
the deductive model of limited war was misapplied in trying
40sgood, Limited Warr Kissinger, Necessity for Choice.
Osgood, Limited War. 9-11.
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to achieve a negotiated settlement with the North
Vietnamese. It must be remembered that there are two main
limitations on
the usefulness of such models for policymaking . . . .  First, the abstract model is not itself a strategy but 
merely the starting point for constructing a strategy. The usefulness of an abstract model of policymaking is 
limited to providing the basic framework for 
understanding the general requirements for designing and implementing a strategy . . . .[T]he policymaker has to tailor the abstract model into a specific strategy for the particular situation at hand and for the behavioral characteristics of [a] particular adversary.6
The inability of policymakers to develop an adequate 
strategy with respect to North Vietnam was more an 
indication of their lack of understanding than of the 
deductive model's lack of validity.
The second model in chapter 1 was derived from a 
speech by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (see 
Appendix). The use of the criteria contained in that 
speech as comparative standards has demonstrated that they 
contain generic knowledge, knowledge based on the "study of 
past experience that identifies the uses and limitations” 
of strategies "and the conditions on which" their 
"effective employment depends."7 In addition, the 
criteria have presented an opportunity to make certain 
generalizations about limited war that apply under specific 
conditions.
6George, Bridging the Gao. 118.
7ibid., xvii.
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The first question derived from the Weinberger 
criteria was, what were the interests used to justify the 
commitment of troops to combat? In all the cases examined 
in this study, there were doctrines which played a role in 
the commitment of troops to combat (e.g., containment, the 
Carter doctrine).8 At the same time, there are strong 
reasons to avoid allowing doctrine to become the 
predominate guide in the decision to commit troops to 
limited wars.9
As will be recalled from chapter 1, short of total 
war, the primary standard for judging the success or 
failure of a policy decision is its consistency with the 
rules governing democratic discourse and participation.10 
In the cases of Korea and Vietnam, the doctrinal bases for 
commitment (i.e., containment, the domino principle) were 
insufficient to maintain public support over the course of 
American involvement. The problem should be resolved by 
building a consensus prior to the commitment of troops (as 
far as possible given emergencies). In any event, "there
8The Nixon Doctrine was enunciated within the context of withdrawing combat forces.
9The communication of interests to the public alows for their translation from abstract, nonoperational goals into concrete, operational objectives whose costs can be 
assessed (i.e., troop levels).
10Nincic, Democracy. 166-168.
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is a need to avoid overarching doctrines and to seek more 
particular, more adaptive, and more conditional ones.”11 
The second question derived from the Weinberger 
criteria was, what were the political and military 
objectives to be accomplished? The evidence was clear in 
the cases of Korea and Vietnam, that objectives were not 
sufficiently worked out prior to the commitment of forces. 
Admittedly, in Korea, President Truman was responding to an 
emergency when he ordered the deployment of troops to halt 
the communist advance. Nevertheless, the decision to 
reunify Korea by force stemmed from a lack of prior 
consideration that the war's original objectives had 
already been achieved.
The lack of clear objectives in Vietnam was most 
apparent in the failure to move ahead with the process of 
pacification (see chapter 4), a strategic objective, rather 
than devoting primary attention to attrition, a tactical 
objective. A principle cause for the confusion of 
objectives, apart from the civilian management of military 
strategy, was the effort to develop strategies from theory 
meant primarily to deal with nuclear war.
As indicated by the case of Grenada, although not 
primarily a conventional operation, the decision to commit 
enough forces to overwhelm the opposition can prove 
decisive enough to compensate for a lack of time to
^elb and Betts, Irony of Vietnam. 367.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 3 8
establish clear objectives. Yet, when there was a 
prolonged period in which to plan for operations in Panama, 
it remained necessary to reinforce from the United States 
in order to make up for planning inadequacies.
The Persian Gulf War served as a primary example of 
the difficulty of translating political objectives into 
military objectives. As evidenced by the decision to halt 
ground operations prior to the destruction of Iraqi armored 
units, there are limits beyond which even decisive military 
force cannot achieve larger political concerns (i.e., 
maintaining a regional balance in the Middle East).
The third question derived from the Weinberger 
criteria was, what were the main decisions regarding and 
consequences of mobilization for combat? A primary basis 
for comparison between the three larger cases (Korea, 
Vietnam, and Persian Gulf) in this study was the ability to 
refrain from committing troops to combat until an optimum 
number had been massed to affect combat. In Korea, 
President Truman committed ground forces to combat in an 
emergency and at a time when the U.S. reserves were 
insufficient to maintain other commitments (i.e., Europe, 
the Middle East). Moreover, he accepted a prolonged 
stalemate while building reserves and maintaining 
negotiations, which President Eisenhower concluded with a 
nuclear threat against China.
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President Johnson's decision to commit ground forces 
reflected a similar concern for the situation in South 
Vietnam. It was not until the commitment of American 
forces had begun to strain the ability to maintain other 
commitments that he mobilized a small reserve force.
Johnson also accepted a prolonged stalemate to maintain 
negotiations. It was not until President Nixon expanded 
the air and ground war against the North Vietnamese that 
negotiations were achieved which allowed for the final 
redeployment of ground forces from the South.
Although President Bush faced an emergency when he 
deployed forces to protect Saudi Arabia, he waited until 
sufficient force was massed to decisively defeat Iraqi 
ground forces before ordering the commencement of offensive 
operations. The president was still willing to place 
forces in a situation of imminent hostilities. The 
advantages of massing troops were to retain the initiative 
for withdrawal and to impose sanctions on Iraq, an 
advantage compounded by the ability to avoid attrition.
The fourth question derived from the Weinberger 
criteria was, what were the levels and timing of public 
support relative to combat? In terms of congressional 
support, the pattern established by President Truman of 
circumventing that body's war making authority was not 
greatly altered by the passage of the War Powers 
Resolution. Presidents have consistently refused to
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compromise on their position as commander-in-chief. What 
has changed is the former tendency for presidents to 
involve troops in situations subject to prolonged 
commitments. The practical limit in war has become time, a 
problem President Bush overcome in Iraq without 
compromising on the War Powers Resolution.
Time has a similarly problematic aspect in relation 
to popular support over the course of limited wars.
Between the five cases presented, a number of situations 
developed which have potential applications as scenarios in 
future limited wars. At the extreme, a president might 
find himself in a situation like President Nixon who, after 
a prolonged attempt to negotiate a cease fire, was unable 
to maintain U.S. commitments because of a climate of 
retrenchment among the public. Similarly, President Nixon 
had long faced the problem of public pressure to withdraw 
from South Vietnam, a situation which finally occurred 
after considerable damage to national policy objectives.
In Korea, President Eisenhower escalated the war to include 
nuclear threats against the Chinese in order to stem the 
possibility of a prolonged negotiation process. In the 
Persian Gulf War, President Bush faced the politically 
difficult decision of halting the ground war before it had 
achieved all its objectives. President Bush also delayed 
supported to rebel groups in Iraq at a time when the public 
was unwilling to intervene on their behalf.
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Such public concern is closely related to the fifth 
question derived from the Weinberger criteria; what 
combination of military and nonmilitary means were used to 
achieve political objectives? The most obvious contrast 
between the five cases in regards to this question is that 
the first two involved negotiations during combat, and the 
last three involved the imposition of political conditions. 
A fundamental issue raised by this distinction is the shift 
that occurred in U.S. defense policy.
In the use of combat force as an instrument of 
negotiations, those who waged the Korean War, particularly 
President Truman, were exploring new territory in seeking 
to negotiate an end to the war. Those who did so in 
Vietnam had come to share a view held primarily by 
theorists and civilian defense strategists that war could 
be waged rationally, without mobilizing public opinion.12
After Vietnam, the shift occurred in U.S. defense 
policy towards the use of decisive force.13 As part of 
that shift, greater emphasis was placed on domestic 
consensus. The experts who had proceeded to build up a 
body of work on the theory of limited war before the 
Vietnam War had forgotten to include the public in their 
inquiries.
“For a fuller discussion, see Gacek, Logic ofForce.
“ Ibid.
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Pragmatism seeks the meanings of concepts in their 
empirical consequences and truth in empirical consensus 
achieved under conditions of continuous inquiry. How do 
these definitional criteria relate concepts to the 
consequences of policy decisions?
Drawing on Dewey, several assumptions are made in 
answering this question. First, those who carry on 
scientific inquiries are experts to the extent that the 
knowledge they produce has technical applications with 
consequences affecting and accessible to various 
contextually defined publics. Second, those 
generalizations whose applications are incorporated into 
policy by decision makers serve as working hypotheses 
rather than absolute programs of action. Third, in 
assessing the interests served in testing hypotheses, it is 
necessary to give the widest possible publicity to results. 
Fourth, any consensus achieved in publicity will include 
expert inquirers as well as publics with common interests 
in controlling the consequences of particular inquiries.14
The concerns behind these assumptions are warranted 
by the number of experts who seek or are sought to provide 
knowledge to decision makers in all areas of government. 
Growth in the number of ministries and agencies performing
14Dewey, Public and its Problems, ch. 6.
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new tasks indicates the increased importance of regulation 
as a function of bureaucracy. Moreover, public issues and 
problems are becoming more technical. Governmental needs 
for expertise draw on an increasing range of 
disciplines.15
For pragmatism, the issue becomes one of the degree 
to which experts remain responsive to the interests of 
various publics making up society. In any divisible 
measure of authority between technical and political 
experts, lack of responsiveness is a basic political 
problem. Broadly speaking, this problem entails decision 
making that is deficient to cope with the other problems 
(i.e., social, economic, and legal) by which interests are 
subject to aggregation. Among the sources of deficiency, a 
partial list includes lack of information, poor problem 
comprehension, unequal power among participants, and too 
much or not enough centralization of decision-making 
authority.16 What is needful is "the improvement of the 
methods and conditions of debate, discussion and 
persuasion," an improvement that "depends essentially upon
15Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: EpistemicCommunities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46 (May 1992): 8.
16Paul Diesing, How Does Social Science Work?. (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 79-80.
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freeing and perfecting the processes of inquiry and of 
dissemination of their conclusions."17
This assertion of the primacy of political problems 
is not to be confused with an assertion of the primacy of 
politics. Rather, the assertion is only of the need for 
expertise to be informed by public interests through direct 
social contact. It would not be pragmatic to aim for 
political forms in which inquiry could not guide public 
interactions and moderate conflicts of interest between 
associations. It is accepted that knowledge "is created by 
experts in a social context, thus it is not necessarily 
true or complete; it often is political."18 Politics 
informs inquiry and vice versa. Pragmatism entertains the 
possibility that over time the meaning of intersubjectivity 
can be expanded beyond scientific inquirers to include 
those who commonly experience the consequences of 
inquiries. Even when communication between the two groups 
is optimized, however, there is only relative certainty as 
to the meaning of truth.
Another way of expressing this proposition is with 
reference to the concept of intelligence, "the observation 
of consequences as consequences, that is, in connection
17Dewey, Public and its Problems. 208.
“Peter R. Lavoy, "Learning and the Evolution of 
Cooperation in U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Activities," on Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. George W. Breslauer and Phillip E. Tetlock (Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1991), 743.
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with the acts from which they proceed."19 Over time, the 
goal of practical action is increasingly intelligent 
political decisions, a political order capable of framing, 
articulating, and answering increasingly complex problems. 
Science, particularly that designated as social, is 
involved in politics in that it provides information, 
diagnoses, and techniques to decision makers. Such 
involvement makes for intelligent politics to the extent 
that it helps improve society's ability to cope with its 
own problems, to regulate public consequences itself. 
Democracy obtains in this process to the extent that all 
persons and organizations affected by problems participate 
in their solution.20 Fixed solutions arrest the 
development of intelligence.
How does this methodological position differ from 
others, particularly those grounded in logical empiricism? 
It is helpful to remember that pragmatism argues for the 
use of intelligence in promoting consensus. Truth is 
regarded as consensus achieved in the practical application 
and improvement of theoretical knowledge. Concentration is 
on knowledge within historical contexts and on its 
fallibility. In seeking to reduce appeals to relativism 
and arbitrariness, objectivity is translated into a
19Dewey, Public and its Problems. 12.
diesing, Social Science. 80.
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retrospective judgment rendered of theoretical knowledge 
after accumulating some level of practical results.21
It is through this translation that pragmatism seeks 
also to judge the progress and continuity of science. 
Without accepting inevitability or precluding access to 
sources of knowledge, it is possible to speak of new 
knowledge in terms of theory's technological 
manifestations. The products of applied scientific 
knowledge can be sufficient for judging its effectiveness. 
In a sense,
despite any semantic or ideational incommensurability 
between a scientific theory and its latter-day replacements, there remains the crucial pragmatic 
commensurability of a constellation of problem-solving tasks that can (by and large) be formulated in the ordinary everyday language that antedates scientific sophistication. The fundamentally pragmatic aspect of 
its applications in problem solving and control at the level of everyday life manifests those continuities of the scientific enterprise with reference to which the idea of progress can be invoked.22
Science is not inevitably progressive, but the artifacts of
its physical activities are deemed in some measure to
indicate its progress.
More broadly, the possibility of progress presupposes 
a scientific process capable of successful operation and 
improvement without need of transcendent reason. Provided 
that the process is ongoing, inquiry develops criteria by 
which to judge future inquiry. Methodological assertions
21Prado, Limits of Pragmatism. 158-159.
22Rescher, Methodological Pragmatism. 188.
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with varying histories of success inform subsequent 
assertions. In other words, the logical principles that 
guide inquiry are presumed to emerge from methods already 
employed in science. Improvement of those methods is to 
proceed as a matter of history rather than a reflection of 
knowledge derived outside science.23
A fundamental aspect of this position is in its 
redirection of inquiry as a process. Truth or falsity 
would only block attempts at new directions reflecting 
discrepancies between data and expected results. 
Pragmatically, it stands irrelevant to debate the relative 
importance assigned to "confirmation, disconfirmation, 
corroboration, and verisimilitude" by philosophers. 
Essentially, pragmatism reverses the logical-empiricist 
"assertion that the logic of science deals solely with 
testing and that discovery is a creative act following no 
rules.1,24
The main pragmatic grounds for confronting logical 
empiricism is its mistaken search for universal laws of 
causality and a unitary scientific method. Pragmatism 
accepts a plurality of methods and treats generalizations 
as relative matters subject to context. Of identifiable 
methods, those involving case studies and formal (non-
23John E. Smith, Purpose and Thought (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), 99.
24Diesing, Social Science. 87.
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empirical) theorization are furthest from acceptance by 
logical empiricism. Quantitative methods, if disregarding 
universality, are closest to logical empiricism.
Pragmatism, as a methodology, can utilize all three 
methods.2S To the extent that the methods interfere with 
or constrain the methodology of pragmatism, they can be 
regarded as potentially improvable.
A Step
Just as methods are improvable, so is the knowledge 
of those who employ them. Having referred to American 
pragmatism as little more than improvisation, Henry 
Kissinger wrote that doctrine "is the mode of survival of a 
society," enabling it to reserve "creative thought for 
unusual or unexpected situations.1126
Thirty-seven years later, Kissinger wrote
First, before the United States commits itself to combat, it should have a clear understanding of the nature of the threat it will be confronting and of the objectives it can realistically reach. It must have a clear military strategy and an unambiguous definition of what constitutes a successful political outcome.
Second, when America commits itself to military action, there can be no alternative to victory, as General Douglas MacArthur advised. Qualms cannot be stilled by hesitant execution; prolonged stalemate will sap the endurance and hence the will of the American public. . This requires a careful elaboration of
2Sibid., 91.
26Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), 403-04.
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political goals and the military strategy to achieve them before the decision is made to go to war.
Third, a democracy cannot conduct a serious foreign policy if the contending factions within it do not exercise a minimum of restraint toward each 
other.27
This was hardly a rousing endorsement for participatory 
democracy, but it was a gradual step in that direction.
27Kissinger, Diplomacy. 700.
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TEXT OF REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER 
TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB 
- November 28, 1984 -
"The Uses of Military Power11
Thank you for inviting me to be here today with the 
members of the National Press Club, a group most important 
to our national security. I say that because a major point 
I intend to make in my remarks today is that the single- 
most critical element of a successful democracy is a strong 
consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes. 
Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we 
hope to achieve will never work. And you help to build 
that understanding among our citizens.
Of all the many policies our citizens deserve— and 
need— to understand, none is so important as those related 
to our topic today— the uses of military power. Deterrence 
will work only if the Soviets understand our firm 
commitment to keeping the peace . . . and only from a well-
271
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 7 2
informed public can we expect to have that national will 
and commitment.
So today, I want to discuss with you perhaps the most 
important question concerning keeping the peace. Under 
what circumstances, and by what means, does a great 
democracy such as ours reach the painful decision that the 
use of military force is necessary to protect our interests 
or to carry out our national policy?
National power has many components, some tangible—  
like economic wealth, technical preeminence. Other 
components are intangible— such as moral force, or strong 
national will. Military forces, when they are strong and 
ready and modern, are a credible— and tangible— addition to 
a nation's power. When both the intangible national will 
and those forces are forged into one instrument, national 
power becomes effective.
In today's world, the line between peace and war is 
less clearly drawn than at any time in our history. When 
George Washington, in his farewell address, warned us, as a 
new democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then 
lay 2-3 months by sea over the horizon. The United States 
was protected by the width of the oceans. Now in this 
nuclear age, we measure time in minutes rather than months.
Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet 
convinced of the precious worth of the freedom we enjoy, we 
seek to avoid conflict, while maintaining strong defenses.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 7 3
Our policy has always been to work hard for peace, but to 
be prepared if war comes. Yet, so blurred have the lines 
become between open conflict and half-hidden hostile acts 
that we cannot confidently predict where, or when, or how, 
or from what direction aggression may arrive. We must be 
prepared, at any moment, to meet threats ranging in 
intensity from isolated terrorist acts, to guerrilla 
action, to full-scale military confrontation.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers. 
said that "it is impossible to foresee or define the extent 
and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent 
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to 
satisfy them." If it was true then, how much more true it 
is today, when we must remain ready to consider the means 
to meet such serious indirect challenges to the peace as 
proxy wars and individual terrorist action. And how much 
more important is it now, considering the consequences of 
failing to deter conflict at the lowest level possible. 
While the use of military force to defend territory has 
never been questioned when a democracy has been attacked 
and its very survival threatened, most democracies have 
rejected the unilateral aggressive use of force to invade, 
conquer or subjugate other nations. The extent to which 
the use of force is acceptable remains unresolved for the
host of other situations which fall between these extremes 
of defensive and aggressive use of force.
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We find ourself, then, face to face with a modern 
paradox: The most likely challenge to the peace— the gray
area conflicts— are precisely the most difficult challenges 
to which a democracy must respond. Yet, while the source 
and nature of today's challenges are uncertain, our 
response must be clear and understandable. Unless we are 
certain that force is essential, we run the risk of 
inadequate national will to apply the resources needed.
Because we face a spectrum of threats— from covert 
aggression, terrorism, and subversion, to overt 
intimidation, to use of brute force— choosing the 
appropriate level of our response is difficult. Flexible 
response does not mean just any response is appropriate.
But once a decision to employ some degree of force has been 
made, and the purpose clarified, our government must have 
the clear mandate to carry out, and continue to carry out, 
that decision until the purpose has been achieved. That, 
too, has been difficult to accomplish.
The issue of which branch of government has authority 
to define that mandate and make decisions on using force is 
now being strongly contended. Beginning in the 1970s 
Congress demanded, and assumed, a far more active role in 
the making of foreign policy and in the decision-making 
process for the employment of military forces abroad than 
had been thought appropriate and practical before. As a 
result, the centrality of decision-making authority in the
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executive branch has been compromised by the legislative 
branch to an extent that actively interferes with that 
process. At the same time, there has not been a 
corresponding acceptance of responsibility by Congress for 
the outcome of decisions concerning the employment of 
military forces.
Yet the outcome of decisions on whether— and when—  
and to what degree— to use combat forces abroad has never 
been more important than it is today. While we do not seek 
to deter or settle all the world's conflicts, we must 
recognize that, as a major power, our responsibilities and 
interests are now of such scope that there are few troubled 
areas we can afford to ignore. So we must be prepared to 
deal with a range of possibilities, a spectrum of crises, 
from local insurgency to global conflict. We prefer, of 
course, to limit any conflict in its early stages, to 
contain and control it— but to do that our military forces 
must be deployed in a timely manner, and be fully supported 
and prepared before they are engaged, because many of those 
difficult decisions must be made extremely quickly.
Some on the national scene think they can always 
avoid making tough decisions. Some reject entirely the 
question of whether any force can ever be used abroad.
They want to avoid grappling with a complex issue because, 
despite clever rhetoric disguising their purpose, these 
people are in fact advocating a return to post-World War I
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isolationism. While they may maintain in principle that 
military force has a role in foreign policy, they are never 
willing to name the circumstance or the place where it 
would apply.
On the other side, some theorists argue that military 
force an be brought to bear in any crisis. Some of these 
proponents of force are eager to advocate its use even in 
limited amounts simply because they believe that if there 
are American forces of any size present they will somehow 
solve the problem.
Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting 
or satisfactory solutions. The first— undue reserve— would 
lead us ultimately to withdraw from international events 
that require free nations to defend their interests from 
the aggressive use of force. We would be abdicating our 
responsibilities as the leader of the free world—  
responsibilities more or less thrust upon us in the 
aftermath of World War II— a war incidentally that 
isolationism did nothing to deter. These are 
responsibilities we must fulfill unless we desire the 
Soviet Union to keep expanding its influence unchecked 
throughout the world. In an international system based on 
mutual interdependence among nations, and alliances between 
friends, stark isolationism quickly would lead to a far 
more dangerous situation for the United States: We would
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be without allies and faced by many hostile or indifferent 
nations.
The second alternative— employing our forces almost 
indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our 
diplomatic efforts— would surely plunge us headlong into 
the sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the 
Vietnam War, without accomplishing the goal for which we 
committed our forces. Such policies might very well tear 
at the fabric of our society, endangering the single-most 
critical element of a successful democracy: a strong
consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes.
Policies formed without a clear understanding of what 
we hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of our 
troops, who would have an understandable opposition to 
being used— in every sense of the word— casually and 
without intent to support them fully. Ultimately this 
course would reduce their morale and their effectiveness 
for engagements we must win. And if the military were to 
distrust its civilian leadership, recruitment would fall 
off and I fear an end to the all-volunteer system would be 
upon us, requiring a return to a draft, sowing the seeds of 
riot and discontent that so wracked the country in the 
'60s.
We have not restored high morale and pride in the 
uniform throughout the services. The all-volunteer system
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is working spectacularly well. Are we willing to forfeit 
what we have fought so hard to regain?
In maintaining our progress in strengthening 
America's military deterrent, we face difficult challenges. 
For we have entered an era where the dividing lines between 
peace and war are less clearly drawn, the identity of the 
foe is much less clear. In World Wars I and II, we not only 
knew who our enemies were, but we shared a clear sense of 
why the principles espoused by our enemies were unworthy.
Since these two wars threatened our very survival as 
a free nation and the survival of our allies, they were 
total wars, involving every aspect of our society. All our 
means of production, all our resources were devoted to 
winning. Our policies had the unqualified support of the 
great majority of our people. Indeed, World Wars I and II 
ended with the unconditional surrender of our enemies . . . 
the only acceptable ending when the alternative was the 
loss of our freedom.
But in the aftermath of the Second World War, we 
encountered a more subtle form of warfare— warfare in 
which, more often than not, the face of the enemy was 
masked. Territorial expansionism could be carried out 
indirectly by proxy powers, using surrogate forces aided 
and advised from afar. Some conflicts occurred under the 
name of "national liberation," but far more frequently 
ideology or religion provided the spark to the tinder.
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Our adversaries can also take advantage of our open 
society, and our freedom of speech and opinion to use 
alarming rhetoric and disinformation to divide and disrupt 
our unity of purpose. While they would never dare to allow 
such freedoms to their own people, they are quick to 
exploit ours by conducting simultaneous military and 
propaganda campaigns to achieve their ends.
They realize that if they can divide our national 
will at home, it will not be necessary to defeat our forces 
abroad. So by presenting issues in bellicose terms, they 
aim to intimidate Western leaders and citizens, encouraging 
us to adopt conciliatory positions to their advantage. 
Meanwhile they remain sheltered from the force of public 
opinion in their countries, because public opinion there is 
simply prohibited and does not exist.
Our freedom presents both a challenge and an 
opportunity. It is true that until democratic nations have 
the support of the people, they are inevitably at a 
disadvantage in a conflict. But when they do have that 
support they cannot be defeated. For democracies have the 
power to send a compelling message to friend and foe alike 
by the vote of their citizens. And the American people 
have sent such a signal by re-electing a strong chief 
executive. They know that President Reagan is willing to 
accept the responsibility for his actions and is able to
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lead us through these complex times by insisting that we 
regain both our military and our economic strength.
In today's world where minutes count, such decisive 
leadership is more important than ever before. Regardless 
of whether conflicts are limited, or threats are ill- 
defined, we must be capable of quickly determining that the 
threats and conflicts either do or do not affect the vital 
interests of the United States and our allies . . . and 
then responding appropriately.
Those threats may not entail an immediate, direct 
attack on our territory, and our response may not 
necessarily require the immediate or direct defense of our 
homeland. But when our vital national interests and those 
of our allies are at stake, we cannot ignore our safety, or 
forsake our allies.
At the same time, recent history has proven that we 
cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's 
defender. We have learned that there are limits to how 
much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to 
forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and 
freedom. So while we may and should offer substantial 
amounts of economic and military assistance to our allies 
in their time of need, and help them maintain forces to 
deter attacks against them— usually we cannot substitute 
our troops or our will for theirs.
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We should only engage our troops if we must do so as 
a matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot 
assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to 
defend their territory— without their strong invitation—  
when our own freedom is not threatened.
On the other hand, there have been recent cases where 
the United States has seen the need to join forces with 
other nations to try to preserve the peace by helping with 
negotiations, and by separating warring parties, and thus 
enabling those warring nations to withdraw from hostilities 
safely. In the Middle East, which has been torn by 
conflict for millennia, we have sent our troops in recent 
years both to the Sinai and to Lebanon, for just such a 
peacekeeping mission. But we did not configure or equip 
those forces for combat— they were armed only for their 
self-defense. Their mission required them to be— and to be 
recognized as— peacekeepers. We knew that if conditions 
deteriorated so they were in danger, or if because of the 
actions of the warring nations, their peace keeping mission 
could not be realized, then it would be necessary either to 
add sufficiently to the number and arms of our troops— in 
short to equip them for combat . . . or to withdraw them. 
And so in Lebanon, when we faced just such a choice, 
because the warring nations did not enter into withdrawal 
or peace agreements, the President properly withdrew forces 
equipped only for peacekeeping.
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In those cases where our national interests require 
us to commit combat forces, we must never let there be 
doubt of our resolution. When it is necessary for our 
troops to be committed to combat, we must support them, as 
effectively and resolutely as our strength- permits. When 
we commit our troops to combat we must do so with the sole 
object of winning.
Once it is clear our troops are required, because our 
vital interests are at stake, then we must have the firm 
national resolve to commit every ounce of strength 
necessary to win the fight to achieve our objectives. In 
Grenada we did just that.
Just as clearly, there are other situations where 
United States combat forces should not be used. I believe 
the postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from 
them I have developed six major tests to be applied when we 
are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. Let me 
now share them with you:
1. First, the United States should not commit forces 
to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or 
occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that 
of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we 
should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, 
that a particular area is outside our strategic perimeter.
2. Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat 
troops into a given situation, we should do so
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wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.
If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources 
necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit 
them at all. Of course if the particular situation 
requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we 
should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly.
When Hitler broker treaties and remilitarized the 
Rhineland, small combat forces then could perhaps have 
prevented the holocaust of World War II.
3. Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat 
overseas, we should have clearly defined political and 
military objectives. And we should know precisely how our 
forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives.
And we should have and send the forces needed to do just 
that. As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war— or 
rather, no one in his senses ought to do so— without first 
being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that 
war, and how he intended to conduct it."
War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time, 
but the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent 
strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat 
mission has become necessary for our vital national 
interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job—  
and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for 
peacekeeping.
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4. Fourth. the relationship between our objectives 
and the forces we have committed— their size, composition 
and disposition— must be continually reassessed and 
adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives 
invariably change during the course of a conflict. When 
they do change, then so must our combat requirements. We 
must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the 
basic questions: "Is this conflict in our national 
interest?” Does our national interest require us to fight, 
to use force of arms?" If the answers are "yes," then we 
must win. If the answers are "no," then we should not be 
in combat.
5. Fifth. before the U.S. commits combat forces 
abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will 
have the support of the American people and their elected 
representatives in Congress. This support cannot be 
achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats 
we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing 
and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the 
Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war 
overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking 
our troops not to win, but just to be there.
6. Finally. the commitment of U.S. forces to combat 
should be a last resort.
I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding 
whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the
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months and years ahead. The point we must all keep 
uppermost in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit 
forces to combat, we must support those forces to the 
fullest extent of our national will for as long as it takes 
to win. So we must have in mind objectives that are 
clearly defined and understood and supported by the widest 
possible number of our citizens. And those objectives must 
be vital to our survival as a free nation and to the 
fulfillment of our responsibilities as a world power. We 
must also be farsighted enough to see when immediate and 
strong reactions to apparently small events can prevent 
lion-like responses that may be required later. We must 
never forget those isolationists in Europe who shrugged 
that "Danzig is not worth a war," and "why should we fight 
to keep the Rhineland demilitarized?"
These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased 
negatively for a purpose— they are intended to sound a note 
of caution— caution that we must observe prior to 
committing forces to combat overseas. When we ask our 
military forces to risk their very lives in such 
situations, a note of caution is not only prudent, it is 
morally required.
In many situations we may apply these tests and 
conclude that a combatant role is not appropriate. Yet no 
one should interpret what I am saying here today as an 
abdication of America's responsibilities— either to its own
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citizens or to its allies. Nor should these remarks be 
misread as a signal that this country, or this 
Administration, is unwilling to commit forces to combat 
overseas.
We have demonstrated in the past that, when our vital 
interests or those of our allies are threatened, we are 
ready to use force, and use it decisively, to protect those 
interests. Let no one entertain any illusions— if our 
vital interests are involved, we are prepared to fight.
And we are resolved that if we must fight, we must win.
So, while these tests are drawn from lessons we have 
learned from the past, they also can— and should— be 
applied to the future. For example, the problems 
confronting us in Central America today are difficult. The 
possibility of more extensive Soviet and Soviet-proxy 
penetration into this hemisphere in months ahead is 
something we should recognize. If this happens we will 
clearly need more economic and military assistance and 
training to help those who want democracy.
The President will not allow our military forces to 
creep— or be drawn gradually— into a combat role in Central 
America or any other place in the world. And indeed our 
policy is designed to prevent the need for direct American 
involvement. This means we will need sustained 
congressional support to back and give confidence to our 
friends in the region.
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I believe that the tests I have enunciated here today 
can, if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this 
gradualist incremental approach which almost always means 
the use of insufficient force. These tests can help us to 
avoid being drawn inexorably into an endless morass, where 
it is not vital to our national interest to fight.
But politics and principles such as these require 
decisive leadership in both the executive and legislative 
branches of government— and they also require strong and 
sustained public support. Most of all, these policies 
require national unity of purpose. I believe the United 
States now possesses the policies and leadership to gain 
that public support and unity. And I believe that the 
future will show we have the strength of character to 
protect peace with freedom.
In summary, we should all remember these are the 
policies— indeed the only policies— that can preserve for 
ourselves, our friends, and our posterity, peace with 
freedom.
I believe we can continue to deter the Soviet Union 
and other potential adversaries from pursuing their designs 
around the world. We can enable our friends in Central 
America to defeat aggression and gain the breathing room to 
nurture democratic reforms. We can meet the challenge 
posed by the unfolding complexity of the 1980s.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 8 8
We will then be posed to begin the last decade of 
this century amid a peace tempered by realism, and secured 
by firmness and strength. And it will be a peace that will 
enable all of us— ourselves at home, and our friends 
abroad— to achieve a quality of life, both spiritually and 
materially, far higher than man has even dared to dream.
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